American Air to increase regional fleet
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Great news on the Embraer, as I personally like manyof the planes they build, one of the reasons I like B6, although obviously different Embraer then what Republic will be flying.
Add to the list ORD-PHL. Another route that used to be all SUper 80s / 737s that now has more Eagle flights then AA ones, and personally, on that type of flight, even the smaller RJs are fine, the bigger ones will be even better, so if it went to all Eagle I would not be upset or feel like customer service has been downgraded.
Cheers,
777 / 767 / 757
I do 95% of my flying to Asia and Europe, and really mostly Asia, and DA and UA service for the premium passenger is a complete joke. Never know which plane will or will not have a true 1st class or what business class will be present. So realx about the profits WT, huge improvements are being made, it ain't gonna happen over night, but I have full confidence that the product offerings are going to lead to small increases in fares and popularity when having to choose. Not to mention, flagship service on AA 777s SMOKES anything I have experienced from DA or UA----hats off to the FAs for that as much as anything (course flagship suites, even with all the wear and tear, are a big part too). Additionl of the upgraded business class seats should seal the deal.
But lets not go OT.
Cheers,
777 / 767 / 757
WorldTraveler
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no one has ever said that AA doesn't provide a high quality int'l product... but it doesn't translate into revenue premiums across the aircraft which is the way DOT data shows. Look again at the int'l average fare data for the Pacific for all 3 carriers (plus HA) cited in the post above. AA's Pacific yield is comparable to HA's which flies much shorter flights and has a business class much smaller and w/ a much lower quality product. So AA is clearly not getting comparable revenue for the quality of the product they offer. Doesn't matter how good it is ... AA is not a charity and they cannot continue to offer a product for which they cannot make a profit. The employees have given all they can.
And the reality is that other carriers do manage to get corporate business from AA. So apparently other carriers offer a product that is good enough for their customers - or they would be losing business and would not be gaining the revenue premiums they do.
And the reality is that other carriers do manage to get corporate business from AA. So apparently other carriers offer a product that is good enough for their customers - or they would be losing business and would not be gaining the revenue premiums they do.
That table is an unreliable as many of your postings of numbers and percentages. I looked at it, and in most rows, the asserted yield is smaller than the asserted RASM. Unless load factors exceed 100%, that's generally an impossibility. Accordingly, that airliners.net teenager-created table tells me nothing useful. Perhaps it's because Form 41 data was used to create it - many times, Form 41 data appears to have no basis in reality. Whatever the reason, without some fact-checking and corrections, that table is useless.
If accurate, then it's curtains for AA.
Again, AA might as well give up if AA attracts the lowest fares on all of its flights.
WorldTraveler
Corn Field
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well of course the data is unreliable if it doesn't provide the answer we want... any question, any data.
I have made light of AA's revenue issue for years - to the consternation of many people... but I have been right.
We are now seeing that competitors are now moving into some of AA's highest profile markets and having no problem doing so.
No, not all of AA's revenues are sub-par..... but the Pacific has been a difficult market for AA for years... and the only way other airlines have gained the critical mass necessary to compete is thru a merger w/ another carrier that had that presence. Problem is that there isn't any other US airline that has a Pacific network that AA can buy.
And AA's Atlantic presence is not as strong as it once was - and the revenue advantage that AA once had is not there. That is not bias or opinion - but something that can clearly be supported by a number of datapoints, not the least of which is the latest quarterly and annual results for all carriers.
As I have long noted, AA's strongest advantage is its Latin network and that is indeed where it continues to grow as much as it can. I see little reason to doubt AA's ability to succeed w/ new capacity in that region.
But talk of new routes to Asia and Europe has to be weighed against AA's performance in those regions over the past several years as well as the actions of larger competitors in those regions.
Domestically, AA still has very strong hubs at MIA and DFW but there is ample data to show that AA's performance in NYC and ORD continues to be pressured by competitors.
I have made light of AA's revenue issue for years - to the consternation of many people... but I have been right.
We are now seeing that competitors are now moving into some of AA's highest profile markets and having no problem doing so.
No, not all of AA's revenues are sub-par..... but the Pacific has been a difficult market for AA for years... and the only way other airlines have gained the critical mass necessary to compete is thru a merger w/ another carrier that had that presence. Problem is that there isn't any other US airline that has a Pacific network that AA can buy.
And AA's Atlantic presence is not as strong as it once was - and the revenue advantage that AA once had is not there. That is not bias or opinion - but something that can clearly be supported by a number of datapoints, not the least of which is the latest quarterly and annual results for all carriers.
As I have long noted, AA's strongest advantage is its Latin network and that is indeed where it continues to grow as much as it can. I see little reason to doubt AA's ability to succeed w/ new capacity in that region.
But talk of new routes to Asia and Europe has to be weighed against AA's performance in those regions over the past several years as well as the actions of larger competitors in those regions.
Domestically, AA still has very strong hubs at MIA and DFW but there is ample data to show that AA's performance in NYC and ORD continues to be pressured by competitors.
eolesen
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- Jul 23, 2003
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Gee, I guess the JV's with JL is just a giant waste of time, and the JV with BA/IB has been an absolute disaster, right?
The JV move was such a bad idea that DL is copying it using DJ/VA and VS, all aimed at making inroads into the UK and AU, which are their weak spots. Likewise with Gol and Aeromexico...
But I DLgress.
AA's weak spot is China. CX and DragonAir help out on the south end, but they don't have the coverage that DL gets via CZ & MU, and UA gets via CA.
Since CZ has ties to a couple of oneworld carriers, perhaps they could be convinced to leave Skyteam?...
WorldTraveler
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no one said that the JVs were a waste of time.... I have previously noted that AA's performance on its NRT routes improved after the JV went in effect... but it still hasn't been enough to overcome the total Pacific strength of other carriers. Remember that DL's transpac size by itself to NRT is larger than AA plus JL. JV's certainly help but they don't overcome some of the basic fundamentals of the airline industry including that size matters - exactly the basis on which Parker has been pitching his merger proposal - and on principle, he is right.
IN Europe, Parker's US is larger on the continent than AA - and considering that AA's presence on the continent is tied up in a messy cost-cutting exercise led by BA, a little presence outside the JV could go a long ways. You could make a million arguments one way or the other for the merger... but you know that.
As for LHR, sure AA/BA has an advantage and whatever DL does won't change that.... but there is a critical point in size that competitors reach at which they are able to compete even against larger competitors. UA has had a larger int'l presence at ORD than AA for years but AA still manages to compete effectively for the domestic market.
The problem comes in regions like ORD-int'l or the US-Asia where AA is so outclassed that they can't effectively compete. That is the place US is in and they acknowledge it. Problem is that a lot of people don't want to acknowledge that AA might have already reached that place in a number of key markets, including NYC. UA continues to push against AA in ORD int'l.
Size really does matter and translates into an advantage when you have it. When you don't, it should be no surprise that you are at a disadvantage - and JVs can't fix that unless the JV makes you that much larger.
since there is no evidence of a legacy carrier regaining amounts of share that it has lost, history will show that AA's greatest strategic error was to drag its restructuring out over 10 years, allowing competitors ample time to invade key AA markets.
IN Europe, Parker's US is larger on the continent than AA - and considering that AA's presence on the continent is tied up in a messy cost-cutting exercise led by BA, a little presence outside the JV could go a long ways. You could make a million arguments one way or the other for the merger... but you know that.
As for LHR, sure AA/BA has an advantage and whatever DL does won't change that.... but there is a critical point in size that competitors reach at which they are able to compete even against larger competitors. UA has had a larger int'l presence at ORD than AA for years but AA still manages to compete effectively for the domestic market.
The problem comes in regions like ORD-int'l or the US-Asia where AA is so outclassed that they can't effectively compete. That is the place US is in and they acknowledge it. Problem is that a lot of people don't want to acknowledge that AA might have already reached that place in a number of key markets, including NYC. UA continues to push against AA in ORD int'l.
Size really does matter and translates into an advantage when you have it. When you don't, it should be no surprise that you are at a disadvantage - and JVs can't fix that unless the JV makes you that much larger.
since there is no evidence of a legacy carrier regaining amounts of share that it has lost, history will show that AA's greatest strategic error was to drag its restructuring out over 10 years, allowing competitors ample time to invade key AA markets.
robbedagain
Veteran
IF SAY US/AA MERGE AND COUPLE WITH THE MASSIVE PLANE ORDERS ON BOTH AIRLINES I WONDER IF THE COMBINED CARRIERS WOULD INCREASE INTL FLIGHTS
- Thread Starter
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http://aviationblog.dallasnews.com/2013/01/garton-american-eagle-will-compete-for-flying-of-larger-regional-jets.html/
So what your post boils down to is this: Since DL bought the only available NRT operation when it swallowed up NW, that forecloses any possibility that AA or anyone else will be able to expand organically in Asia to sufficient size to be able to compete against UA and DL. Yet in the paragraph I quoted, you talk about competitors invading "key AA markets" yet Tokyo and Asia was never a key AA market as it's always been a distant second or third or fourth to UA, NW and perhaps CO.
WorldTraveler
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if AA or any competitor serves a market, it matters whether they are 3rd or 33rd.
Int'l aircraft cannot be deployed on longhaul routes if you don't think you can make money.
AA is at a size in Asia - and DOT data clearly shows it - that it only competes in markets where it can generate sufficient revenues to cover costs in markets where it has no competition. DFW-NRT is about the only route where AA obtains comparable revenues to other carriers, even with the JV. DFW-ICN will be yet one more attempt by AA to compete in a market against another, stronger carrier - with almost predictable results.
The principle is not limited to ICN, however. It applies to any market where AA is no longer large enough or strong enough to stop competitors from encroaching on your key revenue. And the principle clearly does not apply just to AA. US dropped below that size which is precisely why they recognized they can only compete in NYC to/from their own hubs - and even their, competitors have a piece of those markets.
I've said it for years and I will say again that AA MUST regain the position to defend its markets from competitors and also stop trying to compete in markets where it has lost or never had the mass to compete against much larger carriers.
AA's competitors will bleed AA dry pushing AA to defend itself in markets that AA likely will never win.
A merger might fix some of those problems but AA's expectations about what it can be and where it deploys its assets are currently far apart.
Int'l aircraft cannot be deployed on longhaul routes if you don't think you can make money.
AA is at a size in Asia - and DOT data clearly shows it - that it only competes in markets where it can generate sufficient revenues to cover costs in markets where it has no competition. DFW-NRT is about the only route where AA obtains comparable revenues to other carriers, even with the JV. DFW-ICN will be yet one more attempt by AA to compete in a market against another, stronger carrier - with almost predictable results.
The principle is not limited to ICN, however. It applies to any market where AA is no longer large enough or strong enough to stop competitors from encroaching on your key revenue. And the principle clearly does not apply just to AA. US dropped below that size which is precisely why they recognized they can only compete in NYC to/from their own hubs - and even their, competitors have a piece of those markets.
I've said it for years and I will say again that AA MUST regain the position to defend its markets from competitors and also stop trying to compete in markets where it has lost or never had the mass to compete against much larger carriers.
AA's competitors will bleed AA dry pushing AA to defend itself in markets that AA likely will never win.
A merger might fix some of those problems but AA's expectations about what it can be and where it deploys its assets are currently far apart.
WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
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