I don’t suppose any of us who participate in this forum have any real internal information about what is going on between AS and DL which is why it is fun to speculate and debate. As such, no one’s perspective is any more or less possible.
My perspective is that:
1. There is nothing that DL has gained in information or benefits from AS that AS has not also gained from DL. There is no reason to doubt that the relationship is fully within the laws of the US that happen to be involving a small and a very large legacy carrier.
2. DL has made it clear by its actions that its original intent with the AS relationship was for them to provide much of the non-DL hub feed DL needed for its SEA international operation. DL’s apparent number one complaint with AS is that they have not provided that feed or has charged prices way in excess of what it would cost to provide that feed inhouse. DL has also expressed its displeasure with AS’ non-exclusive codeshare relationships, including with foreign carriers who directly compete with DL on many of the flights that DL operates from SEA.
3. DL is using large RJs for much of its new SEA domestic flying – but that is precisely what they do in most new markets. DL’s traffic reports show that DL is consistently shrinking the overall size of the DCI program while growing DL mainline so clearly DL’s deployment of large RJs at SEA is balanced out by upgrades from DCI to mainline elsewhere on the DL system. The scope restrictions on the number of large RJs (which I support) ensures that DL must upgrade other flights in order to free up large RJs for new routes. There are dozens of cities that have mainline service from ATL that haven’t seen it for decades because of DL’s upgrades.
4. DL doesn’t need to obtain enough gates to duplicate AS’ operation. They only need enough gates to fly to the largest feed markets because there is a contract which requires DL and AS to each provide a certain amount of feed to each other or face contractual penalties. DL has now put in place schedules to deliver the vast majority of its domestic feed traffic at SEA. The flows that are left to AS to deliver represent about five percent of the traffic.
5. It is very possible that DL could upgrade a number of its large RJs from SEA to mainline aircraft down the road. Perhaps someone can say, but I doubt if DL is using any gates at SEA that can only handle large RJs but not mainline aircraft. Given that the large RJs are about half the size of an A320/M80, there is a lot of ability to add even more feed without adding a whole lot more flights.
6. There will be gates that will come available at both LAX and SEA. Other airlines can’t squat on gates or they will be lost back to the airport. The increased competition at both LAX and SEA will result in other airlines pulling back.
7. AS is a very expensive airline for its size. And there really isn’t a whole lot that DL would gain that DL can’t build itself except for LAX-MEX, a restricted access route which is fully allocated and which neither AA nor DL can fly but UA and AS can on the US side. AM in which DL owns equity flies it but DL can’t realistically push connections onto AM because they are on the other side of the airport.
I do not see any strategic way that DL could pull back its own flying in order to avoid DOJ objections to overlap between AS and DL without putting its longhaul international nonstops from SEA at risk. AS might decide to give up and become an exclusive partner for DL but DL isn’t likely to pull back its flights until it can determine that AS will really give DL the feed DL needs. DL’s moves right now, in my opinion, which others might agree with, is that DL’s actions are aimed to ensure that DL will have the feed it needs at prices that support DL’s international flights. I don’t believe that there is a scenario in which AS will all of a sudden stop decide to agree to a merger.
I’m not many people at other AS or DL really want to get into a merger unless it is a cordial and agreed to be in the best interests of both airlines. Right now, that seems to be a very distant reality.
