WorldTraveler said:
commavia, the part that you continue to refuse to acknowledge is that NRT doesn't make sense as a hub. DL hasn't lost an ounce of competitiveness in Tokyo and your continued babbling doesn't make it any more so.
[...] Even Baby Einstein can understand that the Japanese government didn't devalue the Yen for Delta Air Lines; they devalued it for the entire Japanese economy which makes Japanese originating travel less profitable for ALL airlines, including Japanese carriers who pay for major parts of their operations including fuel and aircraft in dollars. DL hasn't lost competitiveness in the local market; the local market is worth a whole lot less which is why EVERY carrier is cutting capacity out of Japan - which affects the value of Japan as a hub.
[...] so, no, DL is restructuring its Pacific network from a position of strength and profitability which is unmatched in the US industry.
as for capacity restraint, let me remind you that DL cut capacity for years while AA in BK and in the years before and months after exiting added capacity to the market well above industry levels.
[...] finally, it should be obvious to Baby Einstein that DL is a far larger airline than AS and can do what it needs to in SEA; that is hardly the situation that exists as AA decides it wants to grow from LAX to key markets of other carriers that are very similar in size to AA.
First of all, commavia doesn't babble.
... On that note, before you and your babbling were banned from airliners, you spared no opportunity to tell us that Delta's Tokyo hub gave Delta a structural advantage. Back then, it was Commavia among others who tempered your delusions. (Personally, I still remember how he schooled you on certain accounting principles.)
As to Delta's unmatched position of strength, that's funny. Delta is building a transpacific hub at Seattle, not LAX or SFO. Of the three, Seattle is the smallest O&D market to Asia. If Delta were so strong, it would have taken on all the competition at LAX. Instead, it is picking a fight with AS and so far it is a draw.
As to the future, here is how I see it. In the context of the battle for JAL, William Swelbar of MIT opined in a blog post that AA (as a standalone carrier) did not get its proportionate share of connecting traffic from the US to Asia. He reasoned that this was a point of sale problem, not being able to offer a single fare and ticket to many city-pairs beyond Tokyo. In his mind, the solution to that was ATI with JAL. In his account, that is what made sense of Delta's play for JAL because Delta had the most to lose from United/ANA and AA/JAL being able to do what Delta (i.e., Northwest) had being doing almost exclusively for years. It was never just about the Yen as you are arguing now. (
http://www.swelblog.com/articles/a-battle-for-jal-or-the-threat-of-competition.html0
Of course, for AA, it wasn't just about ATI. (Swelbar knew that.) At the time it was battling Delta for JAL, AA had an uncompetitive cost structure and its domestic network was not as widespread as those of United and Delta after their mergers. Even with ATI, AA was in no position to expand or even recapture its proportionate share of traffic. But today, thanks to the US merger, AA has a larger domestic footprint with a greater position in the East and Midwest than Delta. And, due to reorganization, it now has a cost structure that supports expansion and the development of certain assets, such as DFW and LAX.
So, while the past in Asia belonged to Delta (i.e., Northwest), the future might belong to AA because as a connecting point the Dallas metroplex trumps the Detroit and Atlanta MSA's. On Delta, the latter can barely support one destination to Asia. But that's not the only threat to Delta's unmatched position of strength. While Delta does not have 30 gates at Seattle, AA already has current and future rights to 30+ gates at LAX. Up to now, AA hasn't done much with those assets. But if it follows through with its plans to build a transpacific hub at LAX, the competition for all the traffic flows that make Seattle viable will become even more intense. And, remember those traffic flows are more critical to Delta's viability in Seattle than they are to AA's viability in LAX.
On the subject of LAX, it was always been the biggest prize of the three. But Delta had very little leverage there after it tried to stiff LAWA. Consequently, Delta wasn't in a good position to get more gates. LAWA even took back the leaseholds (master leases) to its hangar complex. LOL. What is even funnier is that today Delta has as many gates at LAX as it does at Seattle.
Of course, when this point has been made in the past, you have countered that AA fanboys are delusional if they think that AA will end up with the majority of gates in any planned expansion of LAX. So, are you equally delusional now to think that Delta will acquire 19 more gates at Seattle while the other airlines, specifically Alaska, just stand by and watch it happen? By the way, AA already has the current and future rights at LAX to 30+ gates, the same number that Delta wants at Seattle. And, while I know I am repeating myself here, it is worth saying again because it puts in perspective just how much better positioned from a facility standpoint AA is at LAX than Delta is at Seattle.
... (As to your comment about AA's capacity increases before bankruptcy, you are wrong. But I'm not going to take the time to prove it to you.)