How can Delta so quickly build a bridge between their terminals in LGA and US is still using buses. There you could put a walk way above the open air between B & C and have it behind security with glass. Why hasn't US jumped on making it easier to connect in DC?
DCA Hub
- Thread starter jcw
- Start date
-
- Tags
- building a bridge
That's easy.
One carrier is truly motivated to provide the best customer service they can, and is willing to spend the money to do so.
The other, not very interested at all and will not spend a nickel to improve customer service unless forced to do so by circumstances or regulation.
Guess which is which!
Dont call me Shirley
Veteran
Are you talking about LGA or DCA? In DCA, anything like that would have to be approved by MWAA and who knows who else. (Not to mention the cost). MWAA is very proud of the architecture of the place and would likely take a dim view of anything that would change it. US had to go through a great deal of trouble and h time just to get MWAA to permit use of the building's fire stairs, rather than the steps on the loading bridges. (Even tough the former is a safer option, much sturdier and step rungs that are not mesh type.)
Good point.
Delta at LGA only had to deal with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Everybody knows what pushovers they are.
I was told by chief pilot in DCA that airport authority would not allow it. But US is in talks about a new commuter terminal
With the Department of Justice (DOJ) concerns on DCA airport competitive effects on domestic competition, I was wondering if US Airways/American Airlines has adjusted their position on retaining the US Airways and American Airlines DCA slots.
I been hearing things that US Airways is evaluating a side deal on resolving the department's concerns on competitive obstacle's at DCA, Take-off and landing rights, gate space and other airport asset's.
I been hearing things that US Airways is evaluating a side deal on resolving the department's concerns on competitive obstacle's at DCA, Take-off and landing rights, gate space and other airport asset's.
In this case, I think Parker is brilliantly playing the question of slots in DCA. He told the committee that determines such things the very cities that the New American will have to cut if slots are taken away.
Every one of the destinations is a small city, and most are the home cities of the folks who sit on that committee.
He has pointed out that when those cities lose their service, other airlines who are clamoring for those slots (JetBlue, SWA, etc.) will simply use those slots to serve large cities that already have service.
"Bottom line, Mr. Chairman, are you willing to see service to your home town, Hole-in-the-Wall, Ohio, terminated so that SWA can add another flight to Ft. Lauderdale, where there is already 5 flights in place?"
WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,721
There is a very good chance that such a rumor is indeed accurate.
New AA should be fully capable of garnering 50% of the DCA market with the 55% of the slots that US has right now but the cost will be to the small cities US serves from DCA and those where US' presence is so small to not have a meaningful difference in the amount of traffic carried. Despite the political influence those small cities might have, there is a limit in the size of AA/US' operation at DCA that DOT/DOJ will enforce. Parker is trying to push the number of slots he can retain but ultimately AA/US will have to divest.
It is also noteworthy that the Brazil route case in which both AA and US are asking for access - along with DL - has also ground to a halt. It would appear that the DOJ and DOT are not going to move forward with the Brazil route case knowing that AA/US will be approved with conditions; giving even half of the new frequencies to AA/US who already combined control more than half of all US carrier slots at GRU is simply not going to happen anymore than AA/US will retain all of its current DCA slots.
It isn't a given that other legacy carriers will be excluded from the process, esp. if they can help connect cities that otherwise would lose service or which low fare carriers wouldn't serve. MIA might be a very good example.
AA/US has the choice to part with a smaller number of slots at DCA in a manner in which they have control and can pick the outcome or they can be forced to divest slots in a manner in which a much lower CASM carrier such as B6 or perhaps WN gains a high percentage of the divested slots and thus have a greater economic impact on new AA's ability to compete at DCA.
The more slots AA/US retains at DCA, the greater the likelihood that the DOT/DOJ will dictate the terms of divestiture and make it a blind transaction such that AA/US have no control over who gains the divested slots.
It is also possible that some of the slots will be placed into a pool that can only be reallocated for small town service, eliminating the argument that low fare carriers will just transfer the slots to serve large markets. And of course, the last thing Parker wants is low fare carriers in AA/US' primary markets at DCA. The DOT/DOJ is just as interested in making sure that big markets have meaningful competition to keep the prices down as they are in making sure that small towns are served. The recent WN route case shows that the size of the awarded market - Houston - was very significant in the route case.
Given that B6 and WN both have enormous potential to build out their route systems at DCA and connect them to other key points on their route systems, the chances are very high that AA/US will both lose some of the small town frequencies they have plus see increased competition on some of their biggest routes.
The DCA and Brazil route cases are probably indeed connected and might also include other merger-related transactions including terminals at US airports and slots at other airports around the world.
It is doubtful that new AA would be forced to reduce its slot holdings down a level that would allow them to operate on one concourse so the connection between the two concourses is still a genuine concern.
The issue with a regional terminal will be the same; unless it is physically connected to the existing concourses behind security, there will still be bussing which involves higher costs and a perception of a less convenient hub.
New AA should be fully capable of garnering 50% of the DCA market with the 55% of the slots that US has right now but the cost will be to the small cities US serves from DCA and those where US' presence is so small to not have a meaningful difference in the amount of traffic carried. Despite the political influence those small cities might have, there is a limit in the size of AA/US' operation at DCA that DOT/DOJ will enforce. Parker is trying to push the number of slots he can retain but ultimately AA/US will have to divest.
It is also noteworthy that the Brazil route case in which both AA and US are asking for access - along with DL - has also ground to a halt. It would appear that the DOJ and DOT are not going to move forward with the Brazil route case knowing that AA/US will be approved with conditions; giving even half of the new frequencies to AA/US who already combined control more than half of all US carrier slots at GRU is simply not going to happen anymore than AA/US will retain all of its current DCA slots.
It isn't a given that other legacy carriers will be excluded from the process, esp. if they can help connect cities that otherwise would lose service or which low fare carriers wouldn't serve. MIA might be a very good example.
AA/US has the choice to part with a smaller number of slots at DCA in a manner in which they have control and can pick the outcome or they can be forced to divest slots in a manner in which a much lower CASM carrier such as B6 or perhaps WN gains a high percentage of the divested slots and thus have a greater economic impact on new AA's ability to compete at DCA.
The more slots AA/US retains at DCA, the greater the likelihood that the DOT/DOJ will dictate the terms of divestiture and make it a blind transaction such that AA/US have no control over who gains the divested slots.
It is also possible that some of the slots will be placed into a pool that can only be reallocated for small town service, eliminating the argument that low fare carriers will just transfer the slots to serve large markets. And of course, the last thing Parker wants is low fare carriers in AA/US' primary markets at DCA. The DOT/DOJ is just as interested in making sure that big markets have meaningful competition to keep the prices down as they are in making sure that small towns are served. The recent WN route case shows that the size of the awarded market - Houston - was very significant in the route case.
Given that B6 and WN both have enormous potential to build out their route systems at DCA and connect them to other key points on their route systems, the chances are very high that AA/US will both lose some of the small town frequencies they have plus see increased competition on some of their biggest routes.
The DCA and Brazil route cases are probably indeed connected and might also include other merger-related transactions including terminals at US airports and slots at other airports around the world.
It is doubtful that new AA would be forced to reduce its slot holdings down a level that would allow them to operate on one concourse so the connection between the two concourses is still a genuine concern.
The issue with a regional terminal will be the same; unless it is physically connected to the existing concourses behind security, there will still be bussing which involves higher costs and a perception of a less convenient hub.
I wonder if US Airways would be receptive of a takeoff and landing rights (slot) transfer and other assets through a lease that permanently conveys all of the slot right requirements and assets that are required to be in compliance with the FAA rules.To resolve the Department of Justice (DOJ) antitrust division principal concerns regarding the competitive effects that the propose merger of US Airways And American Airlines.
The government has made it clear that it wants to get more low cost air carriers into the highly congested airport in the US domestic market to foster competition there-by resolving principal competition concerns and competitive effect obstacles
We know American Airlines and US Airways earn the rights to the DCA takeoff and landing rights over their long history through mergers, acquisition, and market development, and the takeoff and landing right stipulated by the US government during the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) years and the Department of Transportation (DOT), but we can not turn the clock back, so to resolve the limited competitive effect that the DOJ has concerning the DCA slots, I see the only fair solution is a side agreement.
A possible solution could be US Airways will transfer 2 bundles of 16 takeoff and landing rights (slots) and other assets at DCA to a small low lost carrier that has limited service in the Washington D.C./Baltimore metropolitan area. The slot transfer would be through a lease that permanently conveys all of the slot rights,and some DCA airport facility assets to be in compliance with the FAA rules. The 2 bundles will be restricted to the with-in perimeter rule at DCA and no DCA-LGA, DCA-BOS shuttle service, and 1 of the bundles will be for service to small airport communities non-transferable to larger airports. and US Airways would be receptive to a slot exchange program with the air carrier/carriers of the 2 bundles of the takeoff and landing slots.
By having a auction like the Delta Airlines/US Airways "slot swap" at two different airports is not the same as US Airways/ American Airlines merger at DCA, so if we really want to go the way of the auction lets un-wind to the 1978 airline deregulation and re-regulate the airlines and un-wind the merger and acquisition since 1978, I sure don't want that to happen. US Airways/ American Airlines should be able to field the market for possible agreements on up to 50% of American Airlines slot holdings at DCA and perform some slot transfers through a lease vehicle.
The government has made it clear that it wants to get more low cost air carriers into the highly congested airport in the US domestic market to foster competition there-by resolving principal competition concerns and competitive effect obstacles
We know American Airlines and US Airways earn the rights to the DCA takeoff and landing rights over their long history through mergers, acquisition, and market development, and the takeoff and landing right stipulated by the US government during the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) years and the Department of Transportation (DOT), but we can not turn the clock back, so to resolve the limited competitive effect that the DOJ has concerning the DCA slots, I see the only fair solution is a side agreement.
A possible solution could be US Airways will transfer 2 bundles of 16 takeoff and landing rights (slots) and other assets at DCA to a small low lost carrier that has limited service in the Washington D.C./Baltimore metropolitan area. The slot transfer would be through a lease that permanently conveys all of the slot rights,and some DCA airport facility assets to be in compliance with the FAA rules. The 2 bundles will be restricted to the with-in perimeter rule at DCA and no DCA-LGA, DCA-BOS shuttle service, and 1 of the bundles will be for service to small airport communities non-transferable to larger airports. and US Airways would be receptive to a slot exchange program with the air carrier/carriers of the 2 bundles of the takeoff and landing slots.
By having a auction like the Delta Airlines/US Airways "slot swap" at two different airports is not the same as US Airways/ American Airlines merger at DCA, so if we really want to go the way of the auction lets un-wind to the 1978 airline deregulation and re-regulate the airlines and un-wind the merger and acquisition since 1978, I sure don't want that to happen. US Airways/ American Airlines should be able to field the market for possible agreements on up to 50% of American Airlines slot holdings at DCA and perform some slot transfers through a lease vehicle.
WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,721
your comments have a lot of value, Star.
The problem is that small city slots have very little economic value... their value comes from the political arena
Given that WN doesn't have the aircraft to serve small cities to DCA and B6 probably couldn't make an E190 work, then the real market for small city slots is the legacy carriers and their regional partners.
The reason why Parker wants to argue for the value of small town service on US is that the chances are high that if he is forced to give up slots, it will have to mean cutting those small town flights and losing some of the political influence.
Just for perspective, it appears that UA operated about 18 flights per day at EWR before it merged with CO. The divestiture requirement was for 18 slots. The DOT/DOJ apparently took the view that new UA could not grow its presence at EWR at all even though CO amassed its slots at EWR before EWR was slot controlled.
Given that current US already has 55% or so of DCA slots, the risk is very high that new AA will end up w/ closer to US' current number of slots than any combination that involves part of current AA's slot portfolio.
The problem is that small city slots have very little economic value... their value comes from the political arena
Given that WN doesn't have the aircraft to serve small cities to DCA and B6 probably couldn't make an E190 work, then the real market for small city slots is the legacy carriers and their regional partners.
The reason why Parker wants to argue for the value of small town service on US is that the chances are high that if he is forced to give up slots, it will have to mean cutting those small town flights and losing some of the political influence.
Just for perspective, it appears that UA operated about 18 flights per day at EWR before it merged with CO. The divestiture requirement was for 18 slots. The DOT/DOJ apparently took the view that new UA could not grow its presence at EWR at all even though CO amassed its slots at EWR before EWR was slot controlled.
Given that current US already has 55% or so of DCA slots, the risk is very high that new AA will end up w/ closer to US' current number of slots than any combination that involves part of current AA's slot portfolio.
So with CO side deal at EWR in the UA/CO merger and 18 UA slots CO propose the deal.
Then US should be allow to propose a agreement, with say RJET, RW unit for American's slot holdings, say 100 takeoff and landing slots and the two companies agree to a JV concerning all of the DCA slots that are operated by MQ and RW that has a CPA with US. And the new American develop a new CPA with MQ after their propose spinoff from AMR and new American develop a new CPA with RW under the agreement with US for the total DCA operation.
US/AA should also have the options to lease back 50% of the said slots for future development for main line operation.
Then US should be allow to propose a agreement, with say RJET, RW unit for American's slot holdings, say 100 takeoff and landing slots and the two companies agree to a JV concerning all of the DCA slots that are operated by MQ and RW that has a CPA with US. And the new American develop a new CPA with MQ after their propose spinoff from AMR and new American develop a new CPA with RW under the agreement with US for the total DCA operation.
US/AA should also have the options to lease back 50% of the said slots for future development for main line operation.
Historically, Newark was not slot-restricted - the big four were LGA, JFK, DCA and ORD. After Congress changed the laws to phase out the slot controls (recall the huge RJ influx at LGA and ORD when that happened), when the FAA re-instituted capacity limits at LGA and JFK a few years back, it also included EWR because it had become extremely congested and delay-prone. That, and obviously, it shares airspace with LGA and JFK.
IIRC, AA recently took back some EWR slots that AA was leasing to UA. Then, AA turned around and leased them to VX. AA also rejected the leases on a couple of surplus gates at EWR, and VX got one of them.
IIRC, AA recently took back some EWR slots that AA was leasing to UA. Then, AA turned around and leased them to VX. AA also rejected the leases on a couple of surplus gates at EWR, and VX got one of them.
Similar threads
