A fellow pilot posted on another thread:
There are only two ways to protect our vital economic, professional, safety and security interests:
Ownership
An aggressive collective bargaining strategy.
We don't believe in ownership and we are too afraid to engage in an aggressive collective bargaining strategy. The result: dismal performance and lackluster results. Leaving the ESOP debate alone, I would like to address the Section 6 issue.
The MEC consistently has adopted the strategy to remain in JNC negotiations together with the AAA pilots. We have also kept in reserve the option to enter our own Section 6 negotiations by filing the requisite paperwork. We are amendable and eligible for mediation under the terms of our CBA.
When the question of whether to discontinue JNC talks arises (as it has since the Nicalou Award), the MEC must weigh the risks/benefit of abandoning the JNC process for an independent run at a new contract.
The benefits of Section 6 negations are twofold.
1. Under the RLA Section 6 provides access to a federal mediator to facilitate progress at negotiations.
2. Under the same rules, the NMB can eventually declare an impasse and inaugurate a 30-Day Cooling Off period, which bears the full pressure of a strike threat on the process.
Under these rules labor can ultimately have applied maximum leverage to their collective bargaining. We can all agree on this.
However the risks must also be weighed.
The risks are multiple considering we are in the middle of our merger with US Airways and not independently bargaining our own new contract.
They are not limited to but include:
1. Consideration that the NMB would park the AWA ALPA negotiations once a mediator was assigned. The AWA AFA was in Section 6 with the company when the merger occurred. They were under the auspices of a federal mediator at the time. Their negotiations have effectively been parked by the NMB pending the integration of the two AFA councils. There is a belief that management would engage the same strategy with the pilots.
2. Weigh the risk that our CBA Section 1 permits the transfer of a/c. The Transition Agreement protects our fleet to a certain minimum number of a/c however; the question remains unanswered as to whether these protections remain if the JNC process is abandoned by any of the parties or do we revert to the protections in our contract under status quo which would permit the transfer of a/c to another wholly owned certificate? Take notice of the AAA MEC’s decision to remain in JNC talks when they have publicly stated that they want pay parity under their CBA. Why? They do not want to be in material breach of the Transition Agreement and therefore possibly trigger the loss of the protections the Transition Agreement provides. Including management’s commitment to provide financial relief by providing FPL to facilitate the JNC process.
This risk is a significant consideration for the MEC. Previously when entertaining the move to Section 6, we conversed openly with the AAA MEC Reps about the need for their support of our Section 6 should we employ a 30 Day Cooling Off strategy. We must assume that if management were to prepare for a strike of the AWA operations they would also use every tool under the RLA. I have no illusions that Mr. Parker will not do everything to protect the integrity of the operations if faced with a strike in the west. This could include the transfer of a/c to the east or the attempt to fly east metal on west routes during any work stoppage. The cooperation of the AAA MEC is imperative to any AWA Section 6 strategy. We had received verbal support for this strategy but, I’m not so sure we still can count on it.
Question to you; does anyone think that the AAA pilots are in any mood currently to provide us the support we would need to be successful in Section 6 negotiations?
3. If we enter Section 6 and successfully achieve a new contract with significant increases in pay/retirement and benefits, we have established a classic whipsaw. Management could agree to a new contract yet, effectively pass all growth opportunities to the AAA pilots to avoid the increase CASM of operating under an AWA contract. Listening to the rhetoric from the AAA pilots they would actually embrace the idea because it allows them to capture their attrition based vacancies.
Ultimately the two operations must be integrated under one contract and one seniority list to achieve the synergies of this merger. History is ripe with examples of airline mergers, which fail to achieve the pre-merger performance/financial expectation. You can hear Captain Prater echo this concern in his video. We must bargain and bargain hard with management to recoup what we have lost. Captain Prater’s mantra “When pilots fight each other management wins†is a reality we cannot ignore.
So when a pilot proclaims that we are afraid to engage in aggressive collect bargaining strategy, there are a lot more layers to that onion than what appears on the surface to his web board sound bite of; “get your kicks with Section 6.â€
Pearls of wisdom often appear here on this web board. Hence my continued participation in the food fights. I challenge anyone to provide effect counter measures to the risk/benefit of AWA entering Section 6 negotiations independent of the JNC talks.
For now the MEC has continued in the strategy that JNC negotiations are the way to best get to a new contract. The road has gotten quite bumpy since the Nicalou Award however; together against management we stand the best chance to improve our lots.
We reengage the JNC talks on July 10th. We fully expect all parties to be prepared to make progress. We will be keenly aware of stall tactics from any of the parties. The list will be affirmed on Tuesday and the pathway is clear that the contract is now the top priority.
I know this is a long post but, a new contract and the strategy that gets us there is the primary focus of your MEC.
Let the debate begin.
There are only two ways to protect our vital economic, professional, safety and security interests:
Ownership
An aggressive collective bargaining strategy.
We don't believe in ownership and we are too afraid to engage in an aggressive collective bargaining strategy. The result: dismal performance and lackluster results. Leaving the ESOP debate alone, I would like to address the Section 6 issue.
The MEC consistently has adopted the strategy to remain in JNC negotiations together with the AAA pilots. We have also kept in reserve the option to enter our own Section 6 negotiations by filing the requisite paperwork. We are amendable and eligible for mediation under the terms of our CBA.
When the question of whether to discontinue JNC talks arises (as it has since the Nicalou Award), the MEC must weigh the risks/benefit of abandoning the JNC process for an independent run at a new contract.
The benefits of Section 6 negations are twofold.
1. Under the RLA Section 6 provides access to a federal mediator to facilitate progress at negotiations.
2. Under the same rules, the NMB can eventually declare an impasse and inaugurate a 30-Day Cooling Off period, which bears the full pressure of a strike threat on the process.
Under these rules labor can ultimately have applied maximum leverage to their collective bargaining. We can all agree on this.
However the risks must also be weighed.
The risks are multiple considering we are in the middle of our merger with US Airways and not independently bargaining our own new contract.
They are not limited to but include:
1. Consideration that the NMB would park the AWA ALPA negotiations once a mediator was assigned. The AWA AFA was in Section 6 with the company when the merger occurred. They were under the auspices of a federal mediator at the time. Their negotiations have effectively been parked by the NMB pending the integration of the two AFA councils. There is a belief that management would engage the same strategy with the pilots.
2. Weigh the risk that our CBA Section 1 permits the transfer of a/c. The Transition Agreement protects our fleet to a certain minimum number of a/c however; the question remains unanswered as to whether these protections remain if the JNC process is abandoned by any of the parties or do we revert to the protections in our contract under status quo which would permit the transfer of a/c to another wholly owned certificate? Take notice of the AAA MEC’s decision to remain in JNC talks when they have publicly stated that they want pay parity under their CBA. Why? They do not want to be in material breach of the Transition Agreement and therefore possibly trigger the loss of the protections the Transition Agreement provides. Including management’s commitment to provide financial relief by providing FPL to facilitate the JNC process.
This risk is a significant consideration for the MEC. Previously when entertaining the move to Section 6, we conversed openly with the AAA MEC Reps about the need for their support of our Section 6 should we employ a 30 Day Cooling Off strategy. We must assume that if management were to prepare for a strike of the AWA operations they would also use every tool under the RLA. I have no illusions that Mr. Parker will not do everything to protect the integrity of the operations if faced with a strike in the west. This could include the transfer of a/c to the east or the attempt to fly east metal on west routes during any work stoppage. The cooperation of the AAA MEC is imperative to any AWA Section 6 strategy. We had received verbal support for this strategy but, I’m not so sure we still can count on it.
Question to you; does anyone think that the AAA pilots are in any mood currently to provide us the support we would need to be successful in Section 6 negotiations?
3. If we enter Section 6 and successfully achieve a new contract with significant increases in pay/retirement and benefits, we have established a classic whipsaw. Management could agree to a new contract yet, effectively pass all growth opportunities to the AAA pilots to avoid the increase CASM of operating under an AWA contract. Listening to the rhetoric from the AAA pilots they would actually embrace the idea because it allows them to capture their attrition based vacancies.
Ultimately the two operations must be integrated under one contract and one seniority list to achieve the synergies of this merger. History is ripe with examples of airline mergers, which fail to achieve the pre-merger performance/financial expectation. You can hear Captain Prater echo this concern in his video. We must bargain and bargain hard with management to recoup what we have lost. Captain Prater’s mantra “When pilots fight each other management wins†is a reality we cannot ignore.
So when a pilot proclaims that we are afraid to engage in aggressive collect bargaining strategy, there are a lot more layers to that onion than what appears on the surface to his web board sound bite of; “get your kicks with Section 6.â€
Pearls of wisdom often appear here on this web board. Hence my continued participation in the food fights. I challenge anyone to provide effect counter measures to the risk/benefit of AWA entering Section 6 negotiations independent of the JNC talks.
For now the MEC has continued in the strategy that JNC negotiations are the way to best get to a new contract. The road has gotten quite bumpy since the Nicalou Award however; together against management we stand the best chance to improve our lots.
We reengage the JNC talks on July 10th. We fully expect all parties to be prepared to make progress. We will be keenly aware of stall tactics from any of the parties. The list will be affirmed on Tuesday and the pathway is clear that the contract is now the top priority.
I know this is a long post but, a new contract and the strategy that gets us there is the primary focus of your MEC.
Let the debate begin.
