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An Airline Owning A Refinery?

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Really can't see how this would NOT be a good move on DAL's part.
I'll just wait for the experts to weigh in.
I'm not an expert, but I'm skeptical when someone invests $250 million (net purchase price of $150 million plus upgrade investment of $100 million) and then claims that it will magically produce annual fuel price savings of $300 million. If the Trainer refinery was such a guaranteed money-tree, then why did its oil company owner (clearly the experts in the field) shut down the refinery and refuse to make the $100 million investment? Oil companies are greedy, right? Oil companies know all about making profits, right? So why would an oil company hand this golden goose to Delta for such a small price?

Hint: the $300 million annual fuel price "savings" may not be real.

If Delta can really turn a $250 investment into $300, it should liquidate the airline, buy some more refineries and become the jet fuel provider to every other airline. Think of the potential profits - a 120% annual return on invested capital - that such a strategy could produce. If it can get other refineries at similar prices, then an investment of $10 billion would produce annual profits of about $12 billion. If DL has a very good year in 2012, the best it can hope for is a profit of about $1.5 billion. Becoming the jet fuel supplier to the industry (if the Trainer numbers are scalable) might produce an annual profit of $12 billion. If so, then DL should leave the flying to others and make serious money refining oil into jet fuel.
 
Very good point. Think of the ROI the airlines get already with their investments in banruptcy. Potentially at AA a $1.2 billion savings x 6+ years for what is evidently approaching a $1 billion "investment"
 
yet, in 2003 AA attempted to do the same type of thing that the BK airlines did - AA just did it outside of BK.

That "outside of BK" makes a lot of difference. While they got labor savings AA didn't get to turn debt into creditor's claims at an exchange rate of pennies on the dollar, didn't get to cancel leases/EETC's for unneeded facilities/equipment, didn't get to negotiate lower lease/EETC payments using the leverage of the threat of rejecting leases/EETC's, etc.

AA's desire to stay out of bankruptcy, voluntarily not giving a haircut to all the vendors it did business with and even the employees (that 1113 hammer), was noble but ended up costing it dearly in the longer run as it's competitors used bankruptcy to cut their costs more than AA.

Jim
 
I'm not an expert, but I'm skeptical when someone invests $250 million (net purchase price of $150 million plus upgrade investment of $100 million) and then claims that it will magically produce annual fuel price savings of $300 million. If the Trainer refinery was such a guaranteed money-tree, then why did its oil company owner (clearly the experts in the field) shut down the refinery and refuse to make the $100 million investment? Oil companies are greedy, right? Oil companies know all about making profits, right? So why would an oil company hand this golden goose to Delta for such a small price?

Hint: the $300 million annual fuel price "savings" may not be real.

If Delta can really turn a $250 investment into $300, it should liquidate the airline, buy some more refineries and become the jet fuel provider to every other airline. Think of the potential profits - a 120% annual return on invested capital - that such a strategy could produce. If it can get other refineries at similar prices, then an investment of $10 billion would produce annual profits of about $12 billion. If DL has a very good year in 2012, the best it can hope for is a profit of about $1.5 billion. Becoming the jet fuel supplier to the industry (if the Trainer numbers are scalable) might produce an annual profit of $12 billion. If so, then DL should leave the flying to others and make serious money refining oil into jet fuel.
perhaps the reason you are stumbling w/ the idea is because DL is participating in the petroleum industry as both a consumer and supplier - roles that modern business says don't work but which there are examples where cmopanies have done that type of vertical integration successfully.
DL is not buying more refining capacity that it can use and it isn't trying to build a network of refineries - it made that point clear. DL's interest is in making sure it has enough jet fuel at reasonable prices for its operations in the NE where it is concerned that the shutdown of refineries could have a negative impact on prices for fuel. DL is tuning the refinery to produce a much higher percentage of jet fuel than many people thought was possible - 32% - and is trading the refinery's production of other products from the refinery - largely gasoline - for jet fuel in other locations. Thus, DL is doing what it is doing to supply its own needs, not invade the oil company's space in the industry. That is probably why BP - one of the largest suppliers of aviation fuels - and P66 are working w/ DL.
The refinery is part of DL's efforts to do what it does do - provide airline passenger services - with some of the best financials among its network carrier peers.
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I think the biggest fear that alot of people in the airline industry have is that DL will end up being right and they will gain a significant advantage on the biggest cost advantage in the industry - and it will make it that much more difficult for other carriers.
That is the nature of business in a highly competitive industry - and other companies have used similar tactics to shift business to themselves in the past, including AA's first efforts to put Sabre on travel agent desks and then bias the display to show only - or first - AA flights.
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You can be assured that DL will be very closely scrutinized for how well this transaction works and they should be.
At the least, the refinery deal will have a negligible effect on DL's finances and DL will be competing on the same basis as every other airline - and on that basis they have been doing a pretty good job. The best scenario from DL's perspective will be that they gain an advantage that could be part of a fundamental change in the industry.
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We will probably begin to know the impact of the decision by the end of the year.

Jim,
we have heard the "noble" efforts of AA to stay out of BK for years - but staying out of BK was all predicated on turning the company around.. .which AA did not do.
You can argue if you want about the valor AA had in not filing sooner and protecting stockholder value, but the real test will be whether AA does enough to turn the company around.
My personal assessment is that even though AA waited way too long to address its problems, it will ultimately succeed because other airlines are in worse shape in terms of their ability to compete - specifically UA which is facing labor pains and escalating costs necessary to finish its merger and US which doesn't have the size to compete on the east cost against AA, DL, UA, and WN - all of which have much deeper pockets and broader networks that will put enormous pressure on US.
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Thus, AA will probably come out ok relative to its peers but there is no doubt that AA has lost alot of competitive advantages and those will continue to be reduced as other competitors take advantage of the unwanted situation that AA now finds itself in during BK.
 
Jim,
we have heard the "noble" efforts of AA to stay out of BK for years - but staying out of BK was all predicated on turning the company around.. .which AA did not do.
Perhaps I'm just too old-fashioned. To me, trying to not screw others is noble, not "noble". Yes, in the end AA couldn't turn the airline around without screwing stockholders, creditors, etc but I applaud AA for trying to do the right thing. But I think companies should have an obligation to do more than what's best for the execs - who along with the hired experts are the only real winners in bankruptcy.

Jim
 
Gee, there are already two threads about this in the DL forum.

Take it over there, please...
 
WT: I don't fear anything that Delta does. I've been long on DAL since late last summer and stand to gain if this fantasy actually pays off. That self-interest does not prevent my skepticism - I'll believe the 120% return once it actually happens.
 
At E's request, I'll focus on just the part of this discussion that is pertinent to AA - specifically the statement that AA was noble or "noble" not to have filed for BK earlier.
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Problem w/ that notion is that AA has run the company on borrowed money for years, money which it knew it could not repay as its debt level soared higher and higher. AA had every intention of using BK to reduce its debt levels and in so doing to very "un-nobly" screw its creditors.
And then we have AA employees who are paying a far greater price because AA has taken much longer to turn the company around and airline employees always "CONTRIBUTE" to the turnaround of their BK employers. Where is the nobility in screwing the employees one more time - and when it is all said and done, AA employees might suffer the greatest reductions in compensation and benefits over a decade than any of its peers. Where is the nobility in that?
The only nobility was in saving the common stockholders who are true at-risk participants in any company, but incidentally upon which AA mgmt's performance bonuses were calculated.
Noble indeed.
 
Gee, there are already two threads about this in the DL forum.

Take it over there, please...

Give the industry a few more years and over ......there will be over..... here....

Yeh kiddies..sorry only Vanilla forum on this ice cream truck..

Alfred Kahn the father of airline deregulation must be spinning in his grave right now.
😀
 
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