Actually the hearing in PIT the court ruled in the IAM's favor, called it a major dispute and issued a TRO against any further work being outsourced, upon appeal to the court in PHL, they ruled it a minor dispute and lifted the TRO and sent it to arbitration.
The IAM was not lucky to win the arbitration, the contract language was quite clear and it has been since 1949. It was a slam dunk win in arbitration. The CBA has never allowed outsourcing of heavy checks until the last round of concessions. The company when we came back from the strike in 1992 asked permission to outsource some checks and were told NO. Rakesh asked for the same when we parked all those planes out of time in 1999 and was told NO.
The claim was filed as a pre=petition claim, the IAM did not let it get thrown away, the Judge did that when the company filed for chapter 11 to get out of paying the claim.
Why don't you not let the facts get in your way?
You are too easy.
If the Airbus arbitration case was such a "slam dunk" (your words) then why did the IAM "want to waste the members dues money" (again your words) fighting to have the courts rule that it was a major dispute thereby bypassing the so called (by you) "slam dunk" arbitration case?
The facts are the IAM initiated the major dispute court case NOT the company and wasted money trying. They got an intial ruling for a major dispute (NOT a ruling on the Airbus issue per se ONLY on the type of dispute) and a TRO (T stands for temporary) but both were eventually reversed on appeal.
The facts are the IAM NEVER wanted wanted to go to arbitration. They were flabbergasted to get a ruling in their favor.
The facts are the IAM never collected any monetary award.
Don't left the FACTS get in your way.
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT – GOVERNING THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY©*
I. LABOR DISPUTES
The Railway Labor Act, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. ("RLA" or "Act"), was enacted in 1926 to encourage collective bargaining by railroads and their employees in order to prevent wasteful strikes and interruptions of interstate commerce. It is the basic body of law defining employee/employer labor rights and duties. The Act was extended to encompass disputes between air carriers and their employees in 1936. 45 U.S.C. § 181.
The Act is designed to maintain uninterrupted transportation operations and imposes a duty upon the employer and the union to bargain in the event of a labor dispute. The statute mandates that carriers and unions must "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions, and to settle all disputes." 45 U.S.C. § 152.
The RLA declares it to be unlawful for any carrier to interfere in any way with the organization of its employees or to use the funds of the carrier to form a competing labor organization. It also provides that disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or the interpretation or application of collective bargaining by either party may be referred to a system board of adjustment which each carrier has a duty to establish.
There are two types of labor disputes under the RLA: major disputes or minor disputes.
The United States' Supreme Court has set forth the standard for differentiating between major and minor disputes.
[A] major dispute relates to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise when there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change of terms of one . . . [A] minor dispute . . . contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case.[1]
If there is a major dispute, conduct by either party must be enjoined until the parties complete the mediation process prescribed by the statute. If the actions constitute a minor dispute, a federal district court has no authority to enter an injunction: exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes is vested in the system board of adjustment, which procedure is mandatory and exclusive.
As one court has said, the dispute is major if the change being imposed is not contemplated or arguably covered by the collective bargaining agreement. It is a minor dispute where the position of one or both of the parties is expressly and arguably predicated on the terms of the agreement.[2]
A party initiates a major dispute by filing a Section 6 notice proposing changes in the parties' collective bargaining agreement.[3] Once a Section 6 notice is filed and/or after the collective bargaining agreement ends, neither party may alter the conditions of employment in effect but must maintain the "status quo" during the course of settlement. The parties have an obligation under the Act to make every reasonable effort to negotiate a settlement and to refrain from altering the status quo while the major dispute procedures of the Act are being exhausted.
If the parties are unable to reach an agreement through negotiations, either party may ask for the services of the National Mediation Board, ("NMB"). A mediator is then assigned to aid the parties in reaching an agreement. The NMB has complete discretion in conducting mediation and in deciding when to release the parties from mediation. Until released by the NMB, the status quo must be maintained. The NMB may attempt to get the parties to submit their controversy to binding arbitration. If the NMB's written proffer of arbitration is rejected by either party, a 30-day cooling-off period begins to run from that date. If the NMB concludes that a dispute threatens to interrupt interstate commerce and deprive a section of the country of essential transportation service, the NMB must notify the President of the United States who then, in his discretion, may create an emergency board to investigate the dispute.[4] The emergency board has 30 days to investigate and report, but that period may be extended. During that time period, and for 30 days after the report is issued, the parties must maintain the status quo.
The purpose of the statutorily imposed cooling off period is to give the parties enough time to conduct calm negotiations and resolve their differences before they resort to self-help and cause disruptions of interstate commerce. A critical aspect of the RLA was the power given to the parties and the National Mediation Board to make the exhaustion of the RLA's remedies an almost "interminable process," thus preventing or at least greatly delaying either party from resorting to self-help. However, once the RLA's mediation process has been exhausted, either party may resort to self-help by unilaterally changing working conditions or striking, as the case may be.
A great deal of litigation involves issues of whether there has been a change in the working conditions, which change can be enjoined, or whether the dispute constitutes a minor dispute and subject to the mandatory arbitration procedures.
All minor disputes are subject to binding arbitration before an adjustment board. Judicial review of an adjustment board's decision is limited. "
f an employer asserts a claim that the parties' agreement gives the employer the discretion to make a particular change in working conditions without prior negotiation, and if that claim is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' agreement (i.e., the claim is neither obviously insubstantial or frivolous, nor made in bad faith), the employer may make the change and the courts must defer to the arbitral jurisdiction of the Board." [5]
While the federal courts have no jurisdiction to resolve minor disputes, a system board decision may be judicially reviewed by a federal court in three limited categories: (1) failure of the board to comply with the requirements of the RLA; (2) failure of the board to conform, or confine, itself to matters within the scope of it's jurisdiction; (3) fraud or corruption.[6]
The distinction between major and minor disputes becomes more complicated when considering implied terms of a collective bargaining agreement. Because collective bargaining agreements are meant to be generalized codes to govern a myriad of cases, the parties' prior practice usage and custom is relevant in determining the rights of the parties under the agreement. Thus, in many situations, district courts must decide the actual objective working conditions out of which the dispute arose to determine the details of the statutory status quo. Courts must then review the agreements' terms and the intent of the parties when they agreed to those terms.[7]
II. THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD
The entire purpose of the National Mediation Board, which was not established until 1934, is to provide an integrated dispute resolution process to meet the statutory objective of the RLA of minimizing work stoppages in both the airline and railroad industries. Its procedures are designed to promote three goals outlined in the statute: (1) a prompt and orderly resolution of disputes arising out of the negotiations of new or revised collective bargaining agreements; (2) the effectuation of employee rights of self-organization where a representation dispute exists; and (3) the prompt and orderly resolution of disputes over the interpretation or application of existing agreements.
As previously noted, with respect to mediation, the parties to collective bargaining disputes are urged to resolve such disputes through direct negotiations. However, either party may request the NMB's intervention or it may involve itself on its own initiative. The NMB's success rate has been remarkable and statistics indicate that since approximately 1980, only slightly more than 1% of cases referred to it have involved the disruption of service. The Presidential Emergency Board, discussed in part I, supra, temporarily delays a work stoppage or lockout for up to sixty days and provides recommendations for resolving the dispute. The NMB's power to hold the disputed mediation for whatever duration is the key to the structure Congress established for bringing about settlements without industrial strikes. Federal courts have no power to terminate mediation and force the parties to go to arbitration. As one court has said, "the judicial review of NMB decisions is one of the narrowest known to the law."[8] .
Finally, the NMB is responsible for effectuating employee rights to self-organization where a representation dispute exists. Accordingly, the NMB's determination of collective bargaining representation enhances the stability of collective bargaining in the airline industry. Its role is to conduct the initial investigation of representation applications and determine and certify collective bargaining representatives of employees. It is also there to insure that the process of electing a representative occurs without interference, coercion, or influence.
92383_1.DOC
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[1] Elgin, J & E. Ry v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945), reaff'd, 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
[2] Switchmen's Union v. Southern Pac. Co., 398 F.2d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1968).
[3] 45 U.S.C. § 156.
[4] Section 10, 45 U.S.C. §160.
[5] Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives Asn'n., 491 U.S. 299 (1989).
[6] 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q).
[7] Another area of litigation involves issues concerning the extraterritorial effect of the RLA. The weight of authority is that it does not apply outside of the United States to foreign carriers. However because of the complexity of the issue, discussion will be reserved for future issues.
[8] I.A.M. v. TransWorld Airlines, 839 F. 2d 809, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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