Incident at CRW makes the news (must be a slow news day)

[BoeingBoy]

I don't know nearly enough about the CRJ to know whether the flap position they selected was the proper setting for T/O, but putting the transcript together with the FDR readout the flaps were set to what was briefed (although the actual L&R flaps were 1/2 & 2/3 degree less than the setting selected).

Jim

 

[phasersonstun2]

You wanna see a slow newsday, check this out. It made the front page in my city. Yes, really.

Sure, it was below the fold, but still...

Take me home... country road...to the place...I belong...West Virginia

 

[Crzipilot]

I don't know nearly enough about the CRJ to know whether the flap position they selected was the proper setting for T/O, but putting the transcript together with the FDR readout the flaps were set to what was briefed (although the actual L&R flaps were 1/2 & 2/3 degree less than the setting selected).

Jim

It was supposed to be a flap 20 take off. During the checklist they called and verified flaps 8. Capt noticed it somewhere around 80 knots or later....decided to change flap setting during take off roll.. I believe that's what happened, or close to it. When he moved the flap handle, he got some warning signals, which he then decided to abort.

 

[BoeingBoy]

It was supposed to be a flap 20 take off.

Thanks - I thought it might be a sensor problem that set off the warning based on the assumption that flap 8 was the correct setting. Is flap 8 a more "normal" setting that's used most of the time and flap 20 because it was CRW? Just wondering if habit resulted in the wrong flap setting.

Jim

 

[Crzipilot]

Thanks - I thought it might be a sensor problem that set off the warning based on the assumption that flap 8 was the correct setting. Is flap 8 a more "normal" setting that's used most of the time and flap 20 because it was CRW? Just wondering if habit resulted in the wrong flap setting.

Jim

Yup, flaps 8 is the "normal" setting......i.e. habit to click it down one notch and start rolling.....

they probably briefed 20, got numbers for 20, but there was a small blurb in there about being tired. So prob. the flow into clt, the f/o concerned on what gate in clt, then finally getting back into moving, habit caused f/o to set 8, then call out 8 on the checklist. They both said 8, and verified the flaps were in the 8 position, but it was supposed to be a flaps 20 takeoff.... At the end of the transcript, capt confirmed as such, with his conversations...

 

[DHG750R]

The NTSB's final report is out...
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20100121X82958&key=1

Interesting note in the report says

The captain should have called for an RTO as soon as he recognized the flaps were in the wrong position. As a result of the captain’s decision to attempt to reconfigure the flaps and delay the RTO, the airplane overran the runway end and entered the engineered materials arresting system (EMAS) at an airspeed of about 50 knots. The airplane stopped 128 feet into the EMAS arrestor bed with about 277 feet of arrestor bed remaining. Before the installation of the EMAS in September 2007, the runway end safety area for runway 23 was only 120 feet long. If this incident had occurred before the installation of the EMAS, the airplane most likely would have traveled beyond the length of the original safety area and off the steep slope immediately beyond its end.

That should eliminate any doubts as to just how serious this incident really was , not just a slow news day..

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:

(1) The flight crewmembers’ unprofessional behavior, including their nonadherence to sterile cockpit procedures by engaging in nonpertinent conversation, which distracted them from their primary flight-related duties and led to their failure to correctly set and verify the flaps; (2) the captain’s decision to reconfigure the flaps during the takeoff roll instead of rejecting the takeoff when he first identified the misconfiguration, which resulted in the rejected takeoff beginning when the airplane was about 13 knots above the takeoff decision speed and the subsequent runway overrun; and (3) the flight crewmembers’ lack of checklist discipline, which contributed to their failure to detect the incorrect flap setting before initiating the takeoff roll. Contributing to the survivability of this incident was the presence of an engineered materials arresting system beyond the runway end.