Why United Airlines will fail again (By Joe Brancatelli)

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Sep 30, 2002
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There is a plethora of financial and operational reasons why the United Airlines that exits bankruptcy early next month will soon enough be back in Chapter 11 or desperately seeking a merger to keep itself afloat.
But United Airlines will fail again primarily because it has no organizational heart, no identity and no definable brand. Most of all, it has none of the vision and discipline that separates the winners from the losers in the deregulated skies.

Consider the airlines that have had success of any meaningful duration in the last decade. There is, of course, Southwest Airlines. Whether you like what it sells is beside the point: You know and understand the product that it sells. And you know that Southwest delivers it at every seat on every flight on every route that it operates. Southwest's management and employees are fanatically devoted to its standards of simplicity and its unabashedly mass-transit approach to air travel.

Ditto JetBlue Airways. You know what you buy every time: a leather chair with decent legroom; free in-flight satellite TV and radio; a sense of casual style; and rational prices. AirTran Airways has found success because it offers a definable and recognizable product: no-frills, two-class service at simple prices. It even did the unthinkable—dump commuter flights—because they did not fit the image or the financial model. And before its corporate ego ran amok, Continental Airlines had a profitable run. Why? It crafted a demonstrably higher quality of "traditional" full-service flying and then reworked its management, crews, fleet and operations until the airline was a consistent and marketable whole.

United has done none of those things during its 38 months in Chapter 11. In a market that has proven it will only support consistency, United Airlines is a bizarre amalgam of in-flight products, fleet configurations and service concepts. It cynically tries to be all things to all fliers and careens from idea to idea, cabin to cabin and fare to fare, sometimes on a route-by-route basis.

In fact, United isn't. Not in concept or in execution. It is a disjointed collection of flights run by executives with no overarching vision, no unifying commitment and no marketing or brand discipline. In every conceivable way, United is the opposite of what works in the sky.

United will emerge from the most costly bankruptcy in American history with 26 separate in-flight seat configurations. It dabbles in everything from the upmarket p.s. service to the downmarket Ted. It slaps its name and logo on five types of narrow-body planes, four types of widebody jets and eight flavors of regional aircraft. It befuddles buyers with an ever-shifting combination of one, two, three and even four classes of in-flight service. And like all of the Big Six, its rococo fare structure is repulsive.

It is, simply put, an unholy mess competing in an unforgiving marketplace that only spares carriers with impeccable systemwide coherency.

United's intellectually slovenly approach to air travel guarantees its failure. But it's not just theory: United exits bankruptcy as a textbook example of worst-case practices. Consider:

• United's oil-price projections are fantasy. The five-year plan that United submitted to its bankruptcy court predicts annual operating profits through 2010. But its projections are based on oil selling for an average of $50 a barrel. The market price of oil is currently north of $65 a barrel. Given the growing demands of China and India and the upheavals in Iran and Nigeria, oil could be closer to $100 a barrel than $50 in the next five years. In fact, last week at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, experts contemplated the mechanics of a global economy with $120-a-barrel oil.

Rest of the article here:

http://www.usatoday.com/travel/columnist/b...ancatelli_x.htm
 
Goodness. Did Mr. Brancatelli get shorted an olive in his salad?

As far as the comment about the plethora of a/c types confusing the customer...I work for an airline and the only time I even think about what type of a/c I'm traveling on is if it is an RJ or smaller. I'm only concerned with, does the a/c go from point A where I am located to Point B where I want to be located. :lol:
 
I really think this is off-base. The distinctioins that he makes are a: not real differences to the customer; b: not a big deal with such a large, broad system. Furthermore, I think it is pretty understandable for United to be pretty much the carrier that legacies became in the 80's with some mitigation of the bad karma or crazy fares and other factors to trap markets.

Ted is fine for a carrier as large as UAL (especially if it becomes even a larger system). The UAL coach product is similar to Ted in that both have econ plus.

I'd agree that (like all other legacies) the express product differential is a problem, but United is less a problem than most.

Oh and I have a quick question. This seems an appropriate forum.

I need some cocktail party info:

What was the name of the consulting firm that came up with the UAL marketing plan a couple of years ago? I think they came up with the Air Canada plan too. Was it McKinsey?
 
I need some cocktail party info:

What was the name of the consulting firm that came up with the UAL marketing plan a couple of years ago? I think they came up with the Air Canada plan too. Was it McKinsey?

Your memory is sound - the ridiculous powerpoint presentation (widely distributed on the internet) was indeed created by McKinsey.
 
Well, I learned two things from this editorial today. First, never read an editorial by Joe Brancatelli and expect to be enlightened by any of his theses. I think all the guys that write these diatribes read each others' work then just change the paragraphs around to make it "original." Two, that the word "rococo" even exists in the English languarge. It means "immoderately elaborate or complicated." I'm going to try to use that word more often when I post here on usaviation.com.
 
Thanks FWAAA.

I discovered that McKinsey is quite large. A room full of 20-30 something employees of McKinsey had no idea that McKinsey did either United or Air Canada consulting... or any airline consulting. But, it might have been the New York or a Euro-office of McKinsey. And they were all drunk and/or making-out
 
On the contrary, I think UAL sees the value in her most FF's. God knows we have been throwing them to you for a long time now. It's a big risk, but not everyone wants the low cost crap model. Good luck, UAL.
 
Thanks FWAAA.

I discovered that McKinsey is quite large. A room full of 20-30 something employees of McKinsey had no idea that McKinsey did either United or Air Canada consulting... or any airline consulting. But, it might have been the New York or a Euro-office of McKinsey. And they were all drunk and/or making-out

McKinsey is one of Tilton's favorite groups. I'll bet they did some Conoco work as well. They are also the ones who secured pipeline rights at our airports, which is a good thing as we saw after Katrina and now in LHR after that refinery fire.
 
Wow...look at this back peddling by Tilton. He's not aiming for profits, he's just hoping to be at the top of the loser category.


AP: Do you still expect United to make an operating profit in 2006?

TILTON: It's going to depend on oil prices. We've put ourselves in a position to be able to compete with the effect of high oil prices in 2006, competitively with peers. The way we want to be measured is how we perform relative to peers. I'm confident that the work that we've done will put us in a position to have a competitive result whatever the market environment may be.
I don't think the issue, until the industry sorts itself out, is so much competing profitability stories as it is resilience stories.

Full story:
http://www.centredaily.com/mld/centredaily...ss/13757526.htm
 
Wow...look at this back peddling by Tilton. He's not aiming for profits, he's just hoping to be at the top of the loser category.

What an idiot. He's blaming oil prices for his failures to fix what's wrong?

News for you, Tilton: Brand new Boeings cost 50 to 100 times more money today than 707s did in 1958. How on earth can any airline hope to be profitable when airplanes are so darned expensive?

Although they have been slashed over the past four years, airline employee wages are much higher today than in 1958 as well.

Sure, fuel is up, but nowhere near as much as airplanes and wages.