You misunderstood my comment. My criticism was not that the data was aged or "too old," but instead, I took issue with the claimed "losses" without any recognition in your earlier post that AA has already made changes to the cost side of the equation. In the first quarter of 2013, labor costs were $300 million less than in the first quarter of 2012. On an annualized basis, that's a reduction of $1.2 billion. Your earlier posts were misleading when you pointed out the huge concessions and givebacks and then pointed out the pre-concession "losses" by AA on the TPAC network, when those losses didn't include the lower labor costs resulting from the concessions. Unlike every other legacy airline, AA releases its yield and PRASM on a regional entity basis each quarter in its quarterly results and in its 10-Q (and annual 10-K), so the weak yields and PRASM across the Pacific isn't news to anyone who has been paying attention. As I said earlier, AA needs to improve its yield and unit revenues on the TPAC and TATL. About UA's dominance in TPAC yields and PRASM: no real surprise given UA's incumbency, first due to the very fortuitous purchase of the Pan Am TPAC network and then due to the DOT's preference for UA over AA in later route cases. It took AA a while to break into both Japan and China as AA lost out to UA (and NW). Yes, DL's decision to merge with NW (and vv) was an easier way to become big across the Pacific than the slow, organic growth method chosen by AA. How many daily flights to Asia did DL offer the day before the merger? There was ATL-NRT and maybe one flight to ICN? Are you suggesting that AA should give up on TPAC flights? If its smaller network is a disadvantage, then shouldn't AA (and joint venture partner JAL) bulk up its TPAC network? UA has now reported large losses in three of the past five reported quarters, and in 2012, AA overtook UA in both mainline yield and mainline PRASM, as AA grew both while UA's numbers remained stagnant. In 2013, AA's labor costs will be well below those of UA (and probably DL), which should help AA compete despite lower yields to Asia. Your earlier posts didn't mention that the huge "losses" were pre-concession but the attempt to whip the employees into a frenzy ("look what AA is doing despite your concessions") was clear. Having worked for an airline for many years, I assume that you realize that no airline is profitable on each and every flight - sometimes particular flights are flown at break-even or at losses in an attempt to make the airline "enough things to enough people" so that the airline can win the important corporate contracts and become the airline of choice to the buyers of First and Business fares. I don't know if AA will ultimately win in its quest to become a "big enough" airline to Asia (I'll let you make the predictions of AA's demise) - but if AA doesn't expand its offerings to Japan, Korea and China, I'm pretty sure that new AA will lose to UA and DL.