http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/03/10/competition-in-the-skies-is-delta-part-of-the-problem-or-a-potential-solution/?mod=yahoo_hs
The decision to exclude Delta from the divestiture process in order to favor Southwest and other DLCs is not a decision in favor of competition. Instead, it is a policy decision favoring the DLC business model over the network carrier business model, even though the DLC business model cannot and does not serve all types of markets or all kinds of travelers.
Simply put, it is a decision that shields DLCs from competition with Delta. The Government’s plan to use the divestiture to “tilt” the market in favor of DLCs is contrary to the public interest, is based upon misconceptions about the nature of competition in the airline industry, and is an inappropriate Government manipulation of the market that will lead to anticompetitive outcomes in affected cities.
In response, the DOJ says — and we’ll paraphrase here — that Delta is part of the problem of dominant carriers limiting competition, and therefore can’t be part of the solution. “In cases involving allegations of coordinated effects arising from a proposed merger,” it says, “divestiture assets should not be acquired by firms that are part of the oligopoly.”
Or in slightly longer form:
The allegations of coordination among the legacy carriers fully justify the United States’ discretionary decision to direct that the divestiture assets be sold to firms that are unlikely to follow industry consensus, in this case the LCCs. The goal of the divestiture remedy is to enhance the ability of the LCCs to frustrate coordination among the legacy carriers. Allowing Delta to acquire divestiture assets would undermine the effectiveness of the remedy to accomplish this goal and, given Delta’s status as the second largest slot holder at Reagan National, would exacerbate the slot concentration issues at that airport.