IT WAS JUST A MATTER OF TIME !

your question is indeed valid and you did ask it ^correctly^ or at least in a way that can yield a "right" answer.
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WN's strategy has long been to stimulate traffic via new routes, discount fares, and the hype of new service and then increase the fares as the service matures. It really is a strategy that isn't much different from other airlines who start routes with introductory fares and then build the business base as the route develops.
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The difference between WN and other carriers is that WN has almost surgical accuracy in maintaining new routes and managing capacity.
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PHL is one of the best examples of a market in which WN started the market with fanfare, has now stabilized their presence, and fares have increased. The increase in average fares in PHL has been one of the highest on WN's network-= well above their system average.
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There is a concept in retailing that you compare the performance of stores that have been open for at least a year to provide some basis for the normalization that happens in the process of starting up any new business.
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In the airline industry, the concept doesn't work quite the same way but there are year over year comparisons - and each airline is expected to manage both its growth and established markets in order to produce acceptable overall results.
WN almost always performs at or above industry average - they do a very good job of managing their existing network and growing only as much as their "established" network will permit... responsible companies do not grow into new markets faster than what the established markets will allow.
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One of the reasons for using WN vs DL in SLC is because they have competed side by side in many of the same markets for years... they are both well-established. In markets like SLC-SEA and SLC-LAX, DL has managed to maintain an average fare premium AS WELL AS an overall market share premium for years... in other words, there are very few markets out of SLC where WN has EITHER a larger share of the market or a higher average fare.
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Specific to ATL, it also says that WN's greatest growth potential comes from increasing average fares and reducing the amount of local traffic comapred to FL (that would be AirTran, Eric) levels.
FL has lower costs than WN which means WN has to raise fares just to maintain the same profit level FL has AND FL's connecting ratio of 75% in ATL is way above what WN carries in any of their "hubs" or large cities - or what any other network airline carries through any of their hubs.
Further, there is NO major market from ATL where FL has a larger market share than DL or where FL has higher average fares.
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So, there are major structural factors that cannot be ignored when deciding whether WN can grow its operation in ATL.
When you couple those ATL market specific factors with DL's overall GROWTH of its domestic system (the only network carrier that has done so) and the fact that DL and WN already compete side by side in more markets than any other network carrier, it is very hard to come to a conclusion that WN will do any harm to DL.

It is also very apparent if you look at market data over years and years that DL and WN have succeeded in pulling alot of domestic market share away from other network carriers. And both continue to do so.

Eric,
have you got those airline codes straightened out?
WT, My take on this entire Thread is sort of in the middle. I don't see WN doing carnage damage to DL but I do believe they will be successful in ATL. Once the SOC is completed, I think you'll see WN grow ATL by connecting more 'Dot's' from cities FL doesn't currently serve, but WN does. Also, as CO moves over to the T Gates to pair up with UA and 5 gates now open up on D Concourse, I would not be surprised if WN/FL get at least 4 of them which, could allow WN entry into ATL pre SOC. We all know the 'Southwest Affect' and I think that willl apply in ATL as well. Eric is shooting a tad high with 300 Flights a day, I'd say closer to 270-280 range, depending on the extra possible 4-5 gates. WN also wants to do more coast to coast flying and ATL will help give that possibility. Understand also, this will evolve into WN's largest operation and they do things in a Texas Way. You will not recognize WN 10 years from now as their plans are very interesting. Just my opinion. Cheers, QA!
 
Yes, 300 is shooting high but not out of the question. At moderate usage, they hit 256 turns a day assuming 8 turns per gate, which is their system average utilization. At 9.5 turns per gate, which is the highest utilization attained at a major station/hub, 300 is possible with the current gate mix. Add in the possibility of more D gates, and 300 is an easy stretch.

We know from history that connecting the dots, quick turns, and high utilization is what makes WN tick. Their network guys are good at finding flows that the legacy planners can only dream of because they'd involve ugly back hauls thru a hub.
 
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Yes, 300 is shooting high but not out of the question. At moderate usage, they hit 256 turns a day assuming 8 turns per gate, which is their system average utilization. At 9.5 turns per gate, which is the highest utilization attained at a major station/hub, 300 is possible with the current gate mix. Add in the possibility of more D gates, and 300 is an easy stretch.

We know from history that connecting the dots, quick turns, and high utilization is what makes WN tick. Their network guys are good at finding flows that the legacy planners can only dream of because they'd involve ugly back hauls thru a hub.
 
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FL is AirTran Airways.
According to DOT data, the first time the FL code was seen in DEN was May 2003; FL has never had more than 6 departures/day on a monthly basis since it began service to DEN.
Are you sure you haven't confused something?


FL was Frontier Airlines long before the code was recycled and the name was reused in the 90's.

I know that post WW-II to 1986 is probably long before you were trolling the Internet reading annual reports or press releases, but they most certainly had a hub operation at DEN. It was the core of their system.
 
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FL was Frontier Airlines long before the code was recycled and the name was reused in the 90's.

I know that post WW-II to 1986 is probably long before you were trolling the Internet reading annual reports or press releases, but they most certainly had a hub operation at DEN. It was the core of their system.
My, my, my, we are back in the saddle with guns ablazing. I mean after a blunder as big as you just made we have to move into hyperdrive to repair our tattered reputation.

Yes, I know that the FL code was not unique... but since you haven't posted any data relevant to the industry with regard to network or schedules regarding THIS CENTURY, let alone the past two decades, then it is highly relevant that you threw in a code that is actually used by another carrier and has been for nearly a decade, esp. when talking about a conversation involving DEN where that new carrier uses that code.
The FL code has not been used to refer to Frontier Airlines for more than 20 years, Eric. This discussion isn't a stroll down memory lane. It is about understanding the dynamics of the airline industry. Talking about airlines from more than 20 years ago without being able to provide any sense of context or data won't cut it - but then it is precisely because you shoot from the hip with anecdotes from history that you can't speak accurately about much that actually goes on in the airline industry TODAY.


There are codes like EA, WA, and PA that are not currently used but people who want to communicate clearly and accurately about the industry take the time to explain those codes since those carriers no longer fly, but all the moreso since FL is now used by other carriers.
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But since you have so much experience in the industry that dates back decades and decades, why don't you tell us how big FRONTIER's hub operation (the OLD Frontier) at its peak, the market share of DEN they had compared with UA and CO, and the number of routes on which their actually existed 3 carriers nonstop.
You see, Eric, because it was you who wanted to bring up the 3 way competition that has existed in DEN for decades so you should be capable of providing some basis of comparing FRONTIER's operation to the rest of the industry.
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A true knowledge of airline history would show that Frontier (of old) actually operated interchange operations with other carriers and thus did not directly compete with other DEN carriers; but all of that stuff went out the window with airline deregulation in 1978 (which would be like over 30 years ago). Which also explains why FRONTIER of old never was viable in DEN post deregulation... which would be the current era of aviation, the one in which WN would presumably compete with DL in ATL
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I'm betting (I actually know) that you will find that DEN was not a three airline town meaning competition on multiple routes by all three carriers, which is actually the situation that exists today.
There are no examples of three hubs existing at the same airport simultaneously and sustainably. The ORD/MDW AA/UA/WN 3 hub situation spread over 3 airports in the largest interior city in the US is the best example - and it still requires a lot of space between ORD and MDW for those three hub operations to work.
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You might also remember that the Frontier of yesterday went kaput, reorganized, and is back - and even the F9 (that would be the current Frontier) STILL can't make it in DEN... that's why WN is beating the crap out of them and isn't about to let up until they retreat to some little island off the coast of Mexico with their order book of new A319neos.
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What you proved to us in your little slip up is that you don't have any factual basis to support what you say..... which is why you make the errors you do on multiple subjects.
You could not possibly have pulled any data about F9 or FL when you are incorrectly using the codes and not providing the context in which you are using them -because every automated system other than front end GUIs require that you input actual codes in order to pull data - whether it be schedules, fares, CRS bookings, or historical DOT data.
Doesn't matter, though - you have yet to quote any relevant airline specific data in any discussion.
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There are things in life that are based on facts. Economics, pricing, and network management actually do have facts that support the conclusions that are drawn; they aren't creative guesses and they aren't random numbers pulled out of the hat. You have yet to demonstrate that you understand the concepts of revenue management or network planning or economics because if you did you couldn't possibly come up with the wild-a78 numbers you do.
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The fact that you all of a sudden agree with QA4 that 300 is perhaps a bit high shows that you have no scientific basis for your guess - nor do you understand the reasons behind the current FL flight level, the level of flights that DL has in ATL, or the level of ops that WN has at any station. You couldn't be throwing ANY numbers out randomly if you understood the science of revenue management and network planning.
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BTW, do you mind sharing your academic credentials? (education)... that might help us understand your knowledge base.
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Your comment about WN network guys finding flows that only legacy guys dream about shows how little you actually know about airline networks. The network carriers created hub and spoke operations and know how to carry connecting and transit traffic, not the low cost carriers who built their business models on point to point traffic.
Most people don't realize how much connecting traffic WN carries and WN tries to downplay how much flow and connecting traffic it carries- but the smallest network carrier in the USA, US, carries more connecting traffic than WN - and US is a fraction of the size of AA, DL, or UA.
WN has a great pricing model but saying that they are better than their network peers at finding flow traffic is just off the board, Eric. You really do shoot from the hip - and your accuracy is frighteningly inaccurate.
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For people like QA4 who demonstrate some interest in understanding the basis behind the size of the potential WN hub and don't try to tell everyone he/she has all the answers, I'll lay out the facts. Since I write what I do based on facts, I can't whip that post out (and two more in quick succession after it) without thinking or without without looking up the data that supports the conclusions I make.
This conversation about the size of WN's hub size has been going on for weeks... it's time to demonstrate once and for all what they are capable of doing - and leave the prognostication of hub size to people 1. like WN who actually will execute the plans and who have never quoted a flight number larger than 250 for ATL and 2. people who understand the science of network planning and revenue mgmt.
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I also won't move my answer just because some poster comes along a couple hours later and says that my number is a tad too high - which you apparently don't have any problem quickly agreeing to do.
 
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BTW, do you mind sharing your academic credentials? (education)... that might help us understand your knowledge base.
<snip>
I also won't move my answer just because some poster comes along a couple hours later and says that my number is a tad too high - which you apparently don't have any problem quickly agreeing to do.


At least I'm willing to put my name on my opinions, and can admit an error in math.

You, OTOH, continue to hide behind the cloak of anonymity, and still have the audacity to ask for my educational credentials?

Sorry, but disclosure isn't a one way street.

I mean after a blunder as big as you just made we have to move into hyperdrive to repair our tattered reputation.

Blunder on airline codes?.... You're the one who decided that FL never hubbed there.

Read what I said:

DEN has been a two and three way slugfest for the past 30 years.

First you had UA, FL and CO... Then you had UA and CO, and CO gave up when they were heading into the second bankruptcy... That was followed by UA and WP, UA and BF (I doubt too many people even remember that one...), then you had UA and F9, bringing us to the current UA and WN show with F9 as an opening act....

What's even remotely ambiguous about the sequence there? Is it not in chronological order?....

1) UA, FL, CO were the hub carriers in DEN up until 1986, which is when FL imploded.

2) UA and CO continued to duke it out at Stapleton until CO finally bowed out, and F9 moved into the void.

3) About the same time F9 moved in, so did BF, who was hubbed at DEN from '93 to '96.

4) WP moved into DEN in 1997, collapsing in 1998, leaving just F9 and UA until 2006 when WN returned.



I know you like to call anything I catch you up on as a blunder. Nice attempt at deflecting.
 
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"Despite the huge following WN has and the great scores they get in customer service ratings, their business model has NEVER succeeded at overtaking a hub carrier.'

WT,

Isn't WN the largest Domestic carrier?

Did you mean that WN's model has NEVER succeeded at overtaking a hub carrier in their hub?

BWI was a USAir hub, it's now basically a WN hub. BNA was an AA hub as was SJC, both have WN as the largest carrier. STL was TW then AA's hub and now WN is the largest carrier. HP had their second largest hub in LAS which is now WN's largest city.
 
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I said it before, Delta didn't fit Southwest's M-O. It was going full throddle after US more than anything. According to WT, WN takes advantage of airlines in BK. Yet it didn't take advantage of Delta's BK in any way as far as I know.

The bottom line is that we can gossip about any outcome. The end will justify the means. I'm sure WN's management has learned from their mistakes and especially from their victories. We can 'do the math' and I'm sure WN knows the math.

No, Delta will be around long after the world as we know it ends :rolleyes:

But saying that WN too close to home doesn't make you even a bit uneasy...well I don't buy it!

I'm guessing you better get ready to put out the fire, instead of tuning your fiddle :lol:
 
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Paris and Signals,
You two are brilliant and you prove exactly why you add value to the conversation.
You are absolutely correct, Signals, that WN didn’t go after DL in BK but instead focused on other targets. WN’s market share in DL hubs was unchanged before and after BK… the same is not true of any other US network carrier.
And, Paris, you are absolutely correct that all of the hubs you listed were former network carrier hubs but now have a substantial presence by WN.
You did leave PIT and RDU off of the list, both of which were former network carrier hubs.
But there is a big difference between the hubs that have been listed.
You will note that four of the hubs listed were former AA hubs. No other carrier has “lost” as many hubs to WN as AA. Eric will tell you that AA made the conscious decision to pull down BNA and RDU in order to build up MIA – but that doesn’t explain why AA not only dismantled the hub but also lost the local market in those cities to WN. Unlike US in PIT, AA pulled down each of the hubs – and is also no longer the largest carrier in the local market – measured either by revenue or passengers. It doesn’t really matter where an airline connects traffic but it does matter if they can retain the local market. AA has not only pulled down its hubs in those four cities but it has also given up the local market to WN. In several of the cases, AA also has lost the local market to WN AND ANOTHER NETWORK CARRIER.
In the case of US’ hubs, they recognized they were overhubbed… PIT and BWI are both within a couple hundred miles of PHL. LAS is a couple hundred miles from PHX. US didn’t need those cities as hubs. Hubs are expensive to operate. Unlike US, though, AA does not have hubs within several hundred miles of where they allowed those hubs to close, except for STL relative to ORD.
No other carrier has done as poor of a job at defending its local markets from competition as AA has done. Whether AA chose to pull down the hub is immaterial. US in PIT is proof that you can pull down the hub and still be the largest revenue carrier in a city. That is the uncomfortable truth but it is the truth nonetheless, even if some people do not want it to be known.
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There are very valid reasons why each of those hubs fell – and also why other hubs have not. Understanding why each has occurred will show why WN cannot possibly succeed in causing DL to fail in ATL and it also makes it highly unlikely that they will ever be able to achieve an operation of 300 flights or more as EOlesen proposed and then quickly revised to 270; as we’ll see even a flight level by WN of 270 is highly unlikely.
1. In dozens of cities, esp. in cities that are neither hubs for WN or other carriers, as well as in other airline hubs, there are very few examples where WN has more than 25% of the seats in the market or more than 20% of the revenue in that city, even if only comparing revenue within the US, since WN does not currently serve with its own metal any cities outside of the US. There are natural limits on the size of WN’s market size in a city that are determined by the number of cities it serves, which is itself based on the number of markets where it can provide the high frequency, lost price service which is the basis of WN’s business strategy.
LAX is an excellent example. There is no hub carrier that could stop WN’s growth yet WN has less than 25% of the seats in the market from LAX to the rest of the USA; the same pattern is repeated in dozens of cities in WN’s network. In RDU, WN has 24% of the seats but 22% of the revenue. There is no dominant carrier that would stop WN from operating more flights, but the WN model will not support the connecting/one-stop/through traffic necessary to increase WN’s passenger or revenue base.
2. Only in WN cities where it connects 25% or more of its passengers and where other carriers do not have hubs, does WN carry more than 25% of the passengers or revenue. In MCI, which is largely a “spoke” for other airlines, WN has 43% of the seats but only 36% of the revenue.
In these cities, WN does what other airlines figured out years before WN ever started flying and that is that funneling connecting/one-stop/through passengers through a city allows the airline to increase the number of seats in that market and thus obtain a higher percentage of local revenue.

Both of these data points show that there are natural limits in the size of WN’s operation in any given city and it is directly related to the AIRLINE MARKET SIZE. WN continuously makes money because it DOES NOT put more capacity into markets than WN can profitably support. It is also why WN rarely withdraws capacity from a market; they do not oversaturate the market with capacity so that WN can maintain its presence even when the economy softens or when increased prices would otherwise result in a decrease in demand.
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Anyone who remotely understands WN’s strategy from a network standpoint would have no trouble realizing that making statements about how large WN will grow in a market without understanding the AIRLINE DYNAMICS of that specific market are bound to be wrong.
It also is why WN has never bothered to grow ANY city to 300 flights/day – or even 270 flights/day, again information that someone who understood WN’s network and strategies would understand.

Network airlines understand the dynamics of WN’s business strategy which is why they maintain a substantial size advantage over WN in every market in which the network carrier desires to retain.
At least network airlines other than AA understand these principles.

As Eric noted, Chicago is actually a good example of how WN interacts with hub carriers even if it is at a different airport. The same principles can be seen in WN’s operation at PHL and SLC– and FL’s operation at ATL…..
In Chicago, we see that WN has 23% of the seats to US destinations but 16% of the flights because AA and UA both have substantial RJ operations at ORD; still WN does not obtain more than 20% of the revenue. Airline hub carriers know very well that if WN is limited to less than 25% of the seats in a market WN will not grow large enough to take away pricing power away from the hub carrier.
Pricing power is demonstrated by the revenue premium that the network carrier gets for the same flights. In CHI, AA and UA obtain 25% more revenue from each passenger than WN does. The same pattern exists in other hubs including SLC and PHL. In ATL, DL gets 72% more revenue per domestic passenger than FL.
There is a clear link in multiple airline hubs between the revenue premium by the network carrier and the size of their hub relative to WN – or another low cost carrier.
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While Texans like to believe they do things bigger than everyone else, the simple fact is that the largest hub in the world is not in Texas, but in Georgia, and it is operated by Delta Air Lines at ATL.
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The size of the revenue premium in ATL at 72% is larger than exists between any other network carrier and the low cost carrier with a “hub” in any city…. The reason is simple. DL has more than FOUR TIMES as many domestic US seats as FL does. In PHL, US also has more than FOUR TIMES more domestic seats than WN – which is why WN’s growth in PHL has stopped; US has been very effective at limiting WN’s growth, although US does not get the level of fare premium that DL does in ATL.
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In complete contrast, by the end of 2010, AA had just a 13% fare premium over WN; with the cost difference between AA and WN being much higher, AA could no longer profitably compete with WN, AA pulled down its hub, and WN now controls the STL market.

SO , yes, PARIS, it is HIGHLY POSSIBLE for WN to take over control of a city from a hub carrier – but they do it because the hub carrier FAILS to maintain their SIZE ADVANTAGE over WN.
Network carriers have the ability to use domestic and international connecting traffic to help increase the size of their hub, which helps them compete with WN or other low cost carriers – but data strongly supports that if the network carrier fails to maintain a size advantage of THREE TO ONE OR MORE – the chances are very high that the network carrier will lose control of the hub. Whether they intentionally gave up on the hub and the desire to maintain the local market or whether they decided it was no longer worth fighting for the local market can only be known by each network carrier – but the results are very clear and the four AA hubs show that if you cannot maintain a size advantage, the chances are very high that you will lose the hub and there is a very good chance that you will lose the local market as well – if WN can push enough flow/connecting traffic through the market to gain its own size advantage, which tilts pricing in its favor. US lost the local market to WN in BWI but they did not in PIT.
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With these VERY CLEAR data points to help understand how WN works in other cities, let’s look at ATL and the notion that WN could mount a 300 – or even 270 flight operation.
1. The maximum size that the FL hub (that’s AirTran, Eric) has ever been in ATL was in June 08 when they operated 266 flts/day (within the US) offering 32,000 seats/day. At the same time, DL’s domestic hub in ATL offered 96,000 seats/day on 864 flights. The ratio of DL to FL seats was 3 to 1… but in order to maintain that ratio, FL was carrying 75% connecting traffic. Their management acknowledged that their business model could not support that high of a percentage of connecting traffic – and neither can any other hub based on DOT data.
Since 2008, FL has reduced the size of its ATL operation by 28% and as of this summer operates on average 208 flts/day with 25,000 seats/day.
Today DL offers on average 898 domestic flts/day from ATL with 107,000 seats. The size of DL to FL’s domestic operation is more than 4 to 1; making it obvious that DL has not allowed FL to obtain fares even comparable to the levels DL gets.
The FL hub in Atlanta was right-sized 3 years ago to reduce the number of unprofitable connecting passengers but it allowed DL to further increase its size dominance. FL cannot return to the same size of hub in ATL because FL continues to carry more connecting traffic than WN carries in any other hub.
WN’s first priority is to reduce the percent of connecting passengers through ATL to levels that support WN’s business model.
2. FL’s excess capacity in ATL forced it to price its product too low…. FL’s average fare in ATL is 30% lower than the average fare that WN gets at MDW. FL’s excess capacity is demonstrated by the fact that DL gets a 72% fare premium in ATL while AA/UA get a 25% fare premium over WN. FL’s average fare from ATL is lower than what WN gets in every other large “hub” city.
As a higher cost carrier, WN MUST raise its average fares to narrow the gap between it and DL and to raise the average fare to levels comparable to WN’s other hubs.
3. WN uses larger aircraft than FL. FL’s average aircraft size in ATL is 120 seats/departure, which incidentally is the same as DL – who uses a mixture of 50 seat RJs all the way up to 250 plus seat widebodies on domestic routes. In order for WN to grow capacity in ATL, it must use aircraft larger than FL’s average aircraft size of 120 seats. Further, the larger aircraft that WN has available to it (various versions of the 737) require more gate space than the 717s which form the basis of FL’s gate design in ATL.
In order to grow ATL, WN will have to use bigger aircraft… but those larger aircraft will require more space, meaning WN will not be able to fit in the same number of flights as FL could add if it had more 717s.
When one looks at the real numbers behind WN and FL’s operations against that of their competitors, you will see that
1. For every seat WN adds in ATL, DL is going to add at least 3 times more seats of its own, and possibly four times more seats.
2. WN needs to reduce the amount of connecting passengers and adding more seats to the market only increases the job WN has in filling MORE LOCAL passengers.
3. WN has to grow with larger aircraft which again require them to fill even more local passengers.
4. WN has to bring FL’s average fares up to levels compatible with WN’s costs and business model.

In order to operate even at the 270 flts/day level, WN would need to double the size of its local market share in ATL – which would take them to over 30%, SOMETHING THEY HAVE NEVER DONE IN ANY OTHER HUB CITY.
Considering that an additional 70 flts/day from WN would result in the addition of more than 250 flts/day by DL, the answer to whether WN could grow to a level of 270 flts/day at ATL, let alone the ridiculously absurb suggestion of 300 flts/day is an UNEQUIVOCAL NO.

….
As to the question of who is the largest US domestic carrier, based on the most recent revenue and RPMs, DL and UA have almost identical sizes of domestic operations right now. DL and UA do not report passengers solely on their domestic US route systems which is all that WN carries but it appears that the combined WN/FL will carry more passengers than DL or UA/CO.
So, how you define “largest” depends on what statistic you use and what time frame you look at.
It is worth noting that UA/CO are reducing domestic capacity by 10%, far larger than DL so it is very likely that DL will overtake UA/CO as the largest domestic network carrier based on passengers carried, and the largest US carrier of all types based on revenue and RPMs.

There are indeed mathematical and scientific principles that are used to determine hub size; notions that WN could operate a 300 flight hub in ATL are not supported by any network model or WN history, despite all the attempts that some people would like to try to convince us otherwise.
 
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Gary Kelly say's it’s the Atlanta fliers who will benefit. “One thing you can count on from Southwest Airlines is we'll have low fares and our desire is to bring more flights, with more low fares to Atlanta to make it more affordable to fly,” said Kelly.

Executive Vice President Bob Jordan said Thursday that Southwest will augment AirTran's Atlanta service with flights to 20 or more cities where AirTran doesn't fly.

"It's easy to get to kind of 250-plus" daily flights in Atlanta, Jordan said.
 
Gary Kelly say's it’s the Atlanta fliers who will benefit. “One thing you can count on from Southwest Airlines is we'll have low fares and our desire is to bring more flights, with more low fares to Atlanta to make it more affordable to fly,” said Kelly.

Executive Vice President Bob Jordan said Thursday that Southwest will augment AirTran's Atlanta service with flights to 20 or more cities where AirTran doesn't fly.

"It's easy to get to kind of 250-plus" daily flights in Atlanta, Jordan said.
glad you dropped in, Mikey.
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Of course ATL will benefit from having low fares... just not as low as what FL has offered... because WN can't offer the same level of low fares as WN does - and the evidence is overwhelming that they will raise fares.
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Given WN's larger network esp. in the western US, WN will most certainly connect ATL with more locations... and they might even add nonstops to places like ONT or even SLC or BOI which FL doesn't serve. There are about 2 or 3 cities on WN's network that DL doesn't serve and by far the majority of WN's cities are served nonstop from ATL already with four times more capacity than what FL offers.
As the US airline with the most seats and flights to cities throughout the US - and the largest carrier of connecting passengers, DL has the ability to add all the flights it needs to ensure that it maintains its market share and revenue premiums.
And there is no evidence to show that WN has ever succeeded at cracking that ratio.
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Threads on this forum stay permanently active so we can come back and see whether the fleeting 300 flight prediction was right or the 270 or 250, which is still smaller than FL was at its peak.
And I might also note that the stats I quoted for flight departures above are solely for flights WITHIN THE United States since WN does not currently serve any cities outside of the USA. FL already does, including from ATL.
 
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"because WN can't offer the same level of low fares as WN does'

Huh?????

If you meant to say "because WN can't offer the same level of low fares as FL does." you're wrong because WN just announced a fare fare of 40, 80 and 120.00 based on distance.

If you meant to say "because FL can't offer the same level of low fares as WN does." you're wrong because FL is a subsiderary ofWN.

I quickly glanced at the 2000 page thesis and got the impression that you were downing AA for leaving minihubs. Not gonna get into that dog with you and AA.

Which airline carries the most Customers in the US?
 
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yes, the correct reading of the phrase should be "because WN can't offer the same level of low fares as FL does"\
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that would be 2000 WORD....not pages
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you apparently don't understand the difference between an OFFERED FARE and an AVERAGE FLOWN FARE. It has been noted many times that network carriers often offer fares lower than WN but they still manage to obtain higher average fares than WN.
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The simple fact is that WN is a higher cost airline, must reduce the percentage of connecting passengers they carry through ATL, WN is a higher cost airline so must RAISE average fares, the growth they offer will be with larger aircraft than FL's current 120 seat average, and they will have to meet with a competitive response from DL in capacity additions that will add 400 flights/day to ATL in order for FL to reach the estimate of a hub size of 300 flts/day, 350 additional flights/day in order for them to reach the 270 flight level makes it impossible for them to reach a flight level of 270 flights/day, let alone 300.
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Given that no one at either FL or WN has ever suggested levels that high and they had to reduce their hub size well below a level that is above the 250 that even their leadership says they can do - and which is larger than WN has at any other city - should be all the evidence that anyone would need.
 
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“I think the story here is about Atlanta and about us bringing more competition and more low fares to that market,” said Kelly. “We see a number of city-pair opportunities to go in with lower fares and stimulate traffic in classic Southwest fashion. The Campbell-Hill study numbers were a lot more ambitous than ours. But we see lower fares, healthy passenger growth in and out of Atlanta. That’s a big opportunity. Clearly there is additional opportunity for us to connect our networks together and grow traffic. So this is not just about Atlanta but Atlanta is where the big numbrs are. There is very little overlap between Southwest and AirTran and if you ranked our competitors on overlap, they are the smallest. We are four to five times their size and we see a lot of places we can add nonstops to their system. I liken it to the ‘90s with California presenting a great growth opportunity and in the last decade at Chicago and Denver. This is a strategic opportunity to fill that gap.” 
Interesting quote from a somewhat dated article...thanks 700
 
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