Sully takes issue with new book

[2BorNot2B]

Hmmm! A number of years ago, at an Airshow in France, did an Airbus not fly into the terrain despite the Pilot's efforts to recover from the descent?? That incident sticks in my memory ... I may be wrong. I recall that the explaination was that the aircraft's computers over-rode his "excessive" control inputs!

2B

 

[flyingcat]

Hmmm! A number of years ago, at an Airshow in France, did an Airbus not fly into the terrain despite the Pilot's efforts to recover from the descent?? That incident sticks in my memory ... I may be wrong. I recall that the explaination was that the aircraft's computers over-rode his "excessive" control inputs!

2B

The pilot was flying on idle power, low, and slow on the edge of stall over the show. By time he realized he was descending and facing a forest and needed to pull out it was too late. The engines could not spool up fast enough from idle to full power by the time they were brushing the tree tops. Think HHH!

In the end bad piloting is a recipe for disaster, in either an Airbus or Boeing despite the increase in safeguards added over the years.

 

[a320av8r]

Hmmm! A number of years ago, at an Airshow in France, did an Airbus not fly into the terrain despite the Pilot's efforts to recover from the descent?? That incident sticks in my memory ... I may be wrong. I recall that the explaination was that the aircraft's computers over-rode his "excessive" control inputs!

2B

These were test pilots who, against Airbus policy, disabled all of the safety features and got the aircraft a situation they were totally unfamiliar with. After allowing the aircraft to get too low and slow, getting behind the power curve, they applied TO/GA thrust. It takes a jet engine about 6 to 9 seconds to go from idle to full thrust. The aircraft actually did recover but it was too late to clear the trees at the end of the runway. Pilot error plain and simple.
Since I have flown the 727, 737-200/300/400, 757, 767, Fk100 and currently the A320 series, I feel qualified to post my opinion. The Boeing vs. Airbus argument is just plain silly. All are wonderful aircraft and balanced on a scale would be pretty much equal (ex Fk100). Our training here is truly second to none and once you are trained and understand how an Airbus operates it is an amazing aircraft.

 

[ableoneable]

These were test pilots who, against Airbus policy, disabled all of the safety features and got the aircraft a situation they were totally unfamiliar with. After allowing the aircraft to get too low and slow, getting behind the power curve, they applied TO/GA thrust. It takes a jet engine about 6 to 9 seconds to go from idle to full thrust. The aircraft actually did recover but it was too late to clear the trees at the end of the runway. Pilot error plain and simple.
Since I have flown the 727, 737-200/300/400, 757, 767, Fk100 and currently the A320 series, I feel qualified to post my opinion. The Boeing vs. Airbus argument is just plain silly. All are wonderful aircraft and balanced on a scale would be pretty much equal (ex Fk100). Our training here is truly second to none and once you are trained and understand how an Airbus operates it is an amazing aircraft.

You might want to read the actual accident report prior to pontificating.

These were test pilots who, against Airbus policy, disabled all of the safety features and got the aircraft a situation they were totally unfamiliar with

Just making stuff up? Nothing was disabled at all.

After allowing the aircraft to get too low and slow, getting behind the power curve, they applied TO/GA thrust. It takes a jet engine about 6 to 9 seconds to go from idle to full thrust

These pilots were the first victims of mode confusion. The airbus flight control laws are different below 50 feet than they are above 50. Modifications to the aircraft were made as a result of this accident.

The high speed idle that is triggered by slat extension is one of the modifications precipitated by this particular accident.

 

[2BorNot2B]

Very excellent and informative replies, and I Thank You. I retired off the 737-300/400, and never had a desire to transition to fly-by- wire! I always said "If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going"!

2B

 

[nycbusdriver]

The fact is that it was Air France's chief pilot at the controls of that ill fated A320 flight. He's still in jail. He is a prime example of "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing."

The flyby was supposed to be at 400' above the ground. At that point, the pilot was going to bring the thrust levers (throttles) to idle and let the airplane decelerate, holding altitude by bringing the nose up and airspeed down to very slow levels. At a certain point, the automation would kick in and the engines would go to maximum thrust all by themselves and save the day. Had the captain done the maneuver as briefed, we would not be having this discussion.

But he decided to fly at 50' above the ground. Much more impressive, course. What he failed to realize is that the airplane will not automatically run the thrust up at low airspeed at that altitude. (He must not have been paying attention in ground school.) For obvious reasons, this particular fail-safe feature is disabled that close to the ground. Why? If the thrust went to max automatically near the ground, how could one land the airplane?

In short, the logic process of the airplane in the Air France accident thought the captain was trying to land since he was so close to the ground when he pulled that stunt. The system worked flawlessly as designed. The pilot, not so flawlessly. That's why the pilot is in jail, and not the designers of the airplane.

 

[Justme]

This difference is a mixed bag. There may be rare occasions when "bending" the airplane may give that extra edge of performance to escape disaster. It may leave the airplane unserviceable, but it may save lives. In the Boeing, you can do that, but taking it that far is a risk in and of itself, because a little too much "bend," and that in and of itself may result in disaster.

The fly-by-wire Airbus doesn't give the pilot that edge, and by doing so guarantees the integrity of the airframe itself and mitigates any disastrous result from breaking the airplane.

The above is all about pilot input. If the flight is critically upset by external forces, all bets are off for Boeing and Airbus.

The other side to your first paragraph is that the Boeing pilot, when faced with a sudden realization that he/she is going to have to escape disaster, will restrict their pitch rate and angle based on how close they think that they might be getting to structural failure or a stall. Wouldn't they? You, on the other hand, will have no need for restraint. You can c'mon back right to the stop. If I had to chose which airplane I was sitting in I'd definitely choose the bus.

As for upsets, it's amazing how many pilots out there have experienced upset in the roll axis when following something like a 757. I bet there are at least 1 or 2 contributors to this board who have exceeded 60 or 70 degrees as a result of wake turbulence. I agree that in that case there is no advantage to either fbw or conventionally linked flight control surfaces.

As for the Air France chief pilot.....when you say he failed to realize that floor was inhibited do you think that he didn't know about that reality or that he just failed to recall it at a critical time?

 

[nycbusdriver]

The other side to your first paragraph is that the Boeing pilot, when faced with a sudden realization that he/she is going to have to escape disaster, will restrict their pitch rate and angle based on how close they think that they might be getting to structural failure or a stall. Wouldn't they? You, on the other hand, will have no need for restraint. You can c'mon back right to the stop. If I had to chose which airplane I was sitting in I'd definitely choose the bus.

Exactly. The bus is my choice, too. I like it so much I even use it for my screen name!

As for upsets, it's amazing how many pilots out there have experienced upset in the roll axis when following something like a 757. I bet there are at least 1 or 2 contributors to this board who have exceeded 60 or 70 degrees as a result of wake turbulence. I agree that in that case there is no advantage to either fbw or conventionally linked flight control surfaces.

I agree with that, also, although I have not been upset behind a 757. Only one real eye-opener far behind a DC-10 above 10,000'. Didn't get to nearly 60 degrees though. If a FBW Airbus gets upset like that, it will probably revert to an "Alternate Law" mode which takes away some of the restrictions and protections in order to allow for quick, decisive upset recovery.

As for the Air France chief pilot.....when you say he failed to realize that floor was inhibited do you think that he didn't know about that reality or that he just failed to recall it at a critical time?

I think his failure was in not flying the way it was briefed. Had he briefed that he was going to do it at 50', someone may have caught the error at that point well before there was any danger. My guess is that more knowledgeable people planned the approach at 400', and he decided to be dramatic at the last minute. I would be surprised if he didn't know about the characteristic beforehand. Surely the factory or Air France school would have made it clear while he was in training. He probably forgot. Airline pilots live in a highly structured environment and we do things procedurally the same way every time. We don't (intentionally) do airshows, so that very fact of being outside his standard element should have been a red flag to plan it correctly and then follow through with the plan.

 

[Phoenix]

The other side ..

Its a toss up. Good points and bad points to each.. love the creature comfort of the bus, low noise, space, the table.. but the most dorked up thing is throttles that don't follow the power curve (it took a desk-bound, pocket-protector, RPN-calculator jockey to come up with that design ).

 

[Reed Richards]

The fact is that it was Air France's chief pilot at the controls of that ill fated A320 flight. He's still in jail. He is a prime example of "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing."

The flyby was supposed to be at 400' above the ground. At that point, the pilot was going to bring the thrust levers (throttles) to idle and let the airplane decelerate, holding altitude by bringing the nose up and airspeed down to very slow levels. At a certain point, the automation would kick in and the engines would go to maximum thrust all by themselves and save the day. Had the captain done the maneuver as briefed, we would not be having this discussion.

But he decided to fly at 50' above the ground. Much more impressive, course. What he failed to realize is that the airplane will not automatically run the thrust up at low airspeed at that altitude. (He must not have been paying attention in ground school.) For obvious reasons, this particular fail-safe feature is disabled that close to the ground. Why? If the thrust went to max automatically near the ground, how could one land the airplane?

In short, the logic process of the airplane in the Air France accident thought the captain was trying to land since he was so close to the ground when he pulled that stunt. The system worked flawlessly as designed. The pilot, not so flawlessly. That's why the pilot is in jail, and not the designers of the airplane.

Great explanation without having to use some confusing aviation terms. Nice job NY! A Google earlier today on the event was eye opening! Someone should make a movie about all the intrigue and conspiracy theories associated with the accident...malfunctioning altimeters, stolen FDR's, courtroom declarations. This is a very good thread, and it really makes me want to dig a little deeper. By the way, my cursory reading says the test pilot got only 6 months in jail, and 4 or 5 others (some even in management) got suspended sentences. But I have a lot more to read.

RR

 

[nycbusdriver]

Great explanation without having to use some confusing aviation terms. Nice job NY! A Google earlier today on the event was eye opening! Someone should make a movie about all the intrigue and conspiracy theories associated with the accident...malfunctioning altimeters, stolen FDR's, courtroom declarations. This is a very good thread, and it really makes me want to dig a little deeper. By the way, my cursory reading says the test pilot got only 6 months in jail, and 4 or 5 others (some even in management) got suspended sentences. But I have a lot more to read.

RR

Regarding the pilots: You may be right about the jail time. The training center crowd says the captain is still in jail since there were fatalities. As far as I know, there were no "test pilots" involved at all. The pilot flying was the chief pilot for Air France. If it's anything like the USAirways program, chief pilots are the least proficient, least experienced pilots on the seniority list....except when it comes to flying a big, steel desk.

I'm not sure, the the video of the crash may be available on YouTube. I would be very surprised if it wasn't posted there. An interesting note on the video: as the airplane starts clipping the trees, you can still see the stability function of the fly-by-wire working thhe ailerons trying to maintain wings level.

 

[Metroyet]

The fact is that it was Air France's chief pilot at the controls of that ill fated A320 flight. He's still in jail.

He was sentenced to 18mo in jail, with 12mo suspended for manslaughter. He spent 6mo behind bars beginning in 1997.

He's been out for over a decade.

 

[metopower]

Regarding the pilots: You may be right about the jail time. The training center crowd says the captain is still in jail since there were fatalities. As far as I know, there were no "test pilots" involved at all. The pilot flying was the chief pilot for Air France. If it's anything like the USAirways program, chief pilots are the least proficient, least experienced pilots on the seniority list....except when it comes to flying a big, steel desk.

I'm not sure, the the video of the crash may be available on YouTube. I would be very surprised if it wasn't posted there. An interesting note on the video: as the airplane starts clipping the trees, you can still see the stability function of the fly-by-wire working thhe ailerons trying to maintain wings level.

Enough about the Flt controls. Answer these questions please. Explain the engine control logic of the 320. Do the engines roll back to idle if they (computers) sense a failure? To recover that engine is a shut down and re start required ? Will apu auto start with dual engine failure? Is the situation of one failure and one at idle lock out this auto start if it there is this mode? Thanks for the info.

 

[ableoneable]

Enough about the Flt controls. Answer these questions please. Explain the engine control logic of the 320. Do the engines roll back to idle if they (computers) sense a failure?

It would take longer than a single post to fully explain FADEC logic used on the 320. There are many failure modes with many results.

For the IAE engines certain failures cause loss of autothrust and degrade the engine from EPR mode to either a rated or unrated N1 mode.

Other malfunctions can cause one of three conditions:

1. The affected engine can fail to full thrust where it will remain until shutdown.

2. The affected engine can fail to idle thrust where it will remain until shutdown.

3. The affected engine can fail to full thrust but control may be recovered through the use of the autothrust system. Manual control may not be possible and the engine will need to be shutdown in the flare. In this failure mode when the trust levers are retarded from the climb (normal) detent into idle and the autothrust system is disconnected, full thrust will result.

To recover that engine is a shut down and re start required ? Will apu auto start with dual engine failure?

Though there is a manual start capability it is only partially manual and still requires an operable FADEC channel. There is no malfunction mode that calls for a shutdown and re-start. In the event of an EEC or FADEC failure a re-start will not be possible.

The CFM has an auto-restart capability though this too requires the FADEC to be serviceable.

The APU has several auto-shutdown modes but no auto start capability.

(In the emergency electrical configuration an APU start may or may not be advised depending upon the electrical system installed on the airplane.

Early serial number 320-200s have a slightly different electrical system then the current standard and on those airplanes an attempted APU start while the aircraft is in the EE configuration is not recommended.)

Is the situation of one failure and one at idle lock out this auto start if it there is this mode? Thanks for the info.

I don't understand your final question. Please re-phrase.

 

[metopower]

It would take longer than a single post to fully explain FADEC logic used on the 320. There are many failure modes with many results.

For the IAE engines certain failures cause loss of autothrust and degrade the engine from EPR mode to either a rated or unrated N1 mode.

Other malfunctions can cause one of three conditions:

1. The affected engine can fail to full thrust where it will remain until shutdown.

2. The affected engine can fail to idle thrust where it will remain until shutdown.

3. The affected engine can fail to full thrust but control may be recovered through the use of the autothrust system. Manual control may not be possible and the engine will need to be shutdown in the flare. In this failure mode when the trust levers are retarded from the climb (normal) detent into idle and the autothrust system is disconnected, full thrust will result.



Though there is a manual start capability it is only partially manual and still requires an operable FADEC channel. There is no malfunction mode that calls for a shutdown and re-start. In the event of an EEC or FADEC failure a re-start will not be possible.

The CFM has an auto-restart capability though this too requires the FADEC to be serviceable.

The APU has several auto-shutdown modes but no auto start capability.

(In the emergency electrical configuration an APU start may or may not be advised depending upon the electrical system installed on the airplane.

Early serial number 320-200s have a slightly different electrical system then the current standard and on those airplanes an attempted APU start while the aircraft is in the EE configuration is not recommended.)

I don't understand your final question. Please re-phrase.

Question on APU refers to dual engine failure. on the 777 dual engine failure causes the APU to auto start to pick up for the Battery . Was wondering if the 320 had this feature.On a Boeing the engine would continue to run and not go to idle. I was wondering if this was airbus system thing .I have flown both the cfm and the iae engines and do not remember them rolling back to idle if foded. Also if you are knowlgable about the Hudson landing if one of the engines rolled back to idle or did both seize. thanks for your good info.