SWA MDW crash

Jim,

I tend to agree with your take on the "we don't want to hear it" statement. Without hearing the tone one could interpet the words many ways. However, no matter what my personal opinions are towards SWA I don't see this as the smoking gun. I understand the vernacular that the pilots were using this term to be more in line with, "Any poor braking action makes this risky approach even riskier and or not possible". Hindsight being 20/20 I bet the pilots wish it was poor for the entire runway as that most likely would have forced a divert and we would not be having this discussion.
 
ATTENTION ALL SWA-BASHERS ON THESE FORUMS:

We have ACARS fleet-wide and have started using ACARS times as of about two weeks ago. So for everyone who has been on the "SWA fudges their on-time numbers" bandwagon all these years, keep a sharp eye on the July on-time stats when they come out. We'll soon settle this argument once and for all. :up:

Great, one questions though. Are the time inputs automatic, or do YOU enter the times and hit send?
 
Great, one questions though. Are the time inputs automatic, or do YOU enter the times and hit send?
The times on the ACARS are automatic. SWA pilots have no more control over the ACARS times than do the pilots at UAL, AA, USAir, or any other airline that uses ACARS to record the times.
 
The times on the ACARS are automatic. SWA pilots have no more control over the ACARS times than do the pilots at UAL, AA, USAir, or any other airline that uses ACARS to record the times.
Just curious here. I thought all ACARS times were automatic. Is there a way to over-ride the system?
 
Just curious here. I thought all ACARS times were automatic. Is there a way to over-ride the system?

On older jets with paddle type door sensor/switches, you could (from what I understand, never did it) have one guy push on the door sensor to make it indicate closed while the other guy released the parking brake, indicating leaving the gate. Then the circuit breaker for the door sensor could be pulled and remain that way until the door was actually closed. This would give and early "out" time. That wouldn't help arrival times though. I really don't know how you could play with them other than setting the time on the clock wrong on a non-GPS updating ACARS system. Newer jets with magnetic prox sensors and GPS navigation are a lot more pilot proof.
 
Just curious here. I thought all ACARS times were automatic. Is there a way to over-ride the system?
Since Southwest has newer jets which are not like the one Bus described, should Southwest's ontime rating either remain static or improve, you can be sure that there will be those who will claim that the SWA pilots found a way to override the system.
 
On older jets with paddle type door sensor/switches, you could ...<snip>
I guess it depends on airline. At PI, and then US, any door - including cargo compartment - being open prevented an out time from being generated so it was almost impossible to trick the system (other than changing the ACARS clock, which couldn't be reset again till an in time had been generated). Then US switched to aircraft movement as the trigger for out times a while back - confirmed by the doors being closed, of course (about 1.5 kts, I understand).

Jim
 
That wasn't the final hearing. I suspect it'll be late this year or early next before the final hearing and report.

Jim
 
Flight delays seen in new rule
Travelers warned near anniversary of Midway crash

By Jon Hilkevitch
Tribune transportation reporter

December 7, 2006

A new flight rule in effect this winter will improve safety but also wreak havoc with airline schedules at Midway Airport during bad weather when aircraft-braking action is less than good, officials said Wednesday.

The warning to travelers at Midway and other airports with relatively short runways was issued two days before the first anniversary on Friday of the crash of Southwest Airlines Flight 1248.

On Dec. 8, 2005, a Southwest Boeing 737-700 overran Midway's longest runway while landing in a snowstorm, rolled through fences and struck two vehicles outside the airport on Central Avenue. A 6-year-old Indiana boy in a car was killed.

The Federal Aviation Administration issued a recommendation after the accident asking airlines to add a 15 percent safety margin into landing-distance calculations, to ensure that planes are able to fully stop on runways contaminated with ice or snow.

A plane that is either too heavy or cannot land on a short runway using the expanded stopping-distance standard would be forced to divert to another airport with longer runways, such as O'Hare International, or stay on the ground at its departure airport until the weather improves, officials said.

"The main impact to our operations will be felt on our shorter runways when `fair' and `poor' braking conditions exist," read a Southwest memo to its airport station employees.

Chicago Tribune article
 
Other than my preference for starting new topics for new information, especially since the resurrected topic was so far off it's start point, the article is a valid SWA post.

Can't agree with your post WNr. I'm glad to see we're paying attention, and so is the City of Chicago.

Go back to the US Scareways board. You don't belong here
 
I understand that swa has elected to ignore the FAA 15% safety pad because it is only a recommendation and not a requirement. any comments?
 
From the article:

"The main impact to our operations will be felt on our shorter runways when `fair' and `poor' braking conditions exist," read a Southwest memo to its airport station employees.

That doesn't sound like WN is ignoring anything.....

Jim
 
I understand that swa has elected to ignore the FAA 15% safety pad because it is only a recommendation and not a requirement. any comments?
You understand wrong! SWA has reprogrammed all of the Operating Performance Computers (OPCs) to account for the 15% safety pad. It also has been adjusted for the aircraft landing in the 1st 1500' instead of the 1st 1000'.
 
Back
Top