A350 Entry into Service Pushed Back 6-Months

PI,

The difference as has been discussed is that a Boeing will tell the pilot that they are going to exit the envelope and an Airbus will not allow it.

Here is a scary scenario that can happen to you that was thought out after the AF loss. A loss of pitot input to the ADRs that does not give a fault at the end of takeoff followed by a second pitot failure that again does not give a fault shortly after takeoff. In this low level scenario following the pitch/power for unreliable airspeed will have the crew lose control of the aircraft in about 2 and a half minutes because of the normal law override for Vmo.

I watched it unfold in the sim. The instructor told us we were going to get unreliable airspeed indications and to follow the QRH procedures. We recognized the unreliable airspeed right after thrust reduction. We received NO ecam warnings. We performed the QRH procedures for below FL 250 and above thrust reduction still in Config 1+F. AP AT OFF 10 degrees pitch. Climbing at a rate of approximately 1800 fpm. Reading the novel that is the QRH for unreliable airspeed interupted by CWC for flap overspeed. Got that silenced. Back to reading. Approaching 4500 feet or so airspeed indications are 340kts increasing rapidly. Normal law protections kick-in and a vicious feedback cycle begins. Full forward side stick and pitch is rapidly increasing causing a rapid increase in climb rate causing a rapid increase in indicated airspeed causing further increase in pitch. Onset is quite aggressive and loss of control very quick. I rolled the aircraft maximum as the pitch took off to lower the nose, yet we lost control as the trim was working fast and the increased loading and angle of attack stalled the aircraft without sufficient altitude to recover. A real eye opener to say the least. I mean to tell you that it happens FAST. The simulator is NOT the aircraft, but wow. I had the stick full forward, fully to the side and my foot to the floor when the sim froze and I kind of held that for few seconds as the disbelief was still being processed.

The scenario as I remember it is a rather remote possibility, run through a swarm of bees on takeoff roll to block pitot and then hit birds for additional blockage. The automation that keeps us "in the envelope" has a failure that is subtle with no ADR ecams, and therefore in NORMAL law, causes loss of control when close to the ground because performance exacerbates the problem. We might see some sort of procedural change when the powers to be fully digest this type of scenario.
 
PI,

The difference as has been discussed is that a Boeing will tell the pilot that they are going to exit the envelope and an Airbus will not allow it.

Here is a scary scenario that can happen to you that was thought out after the AF loss. A loss of pitot input to the ADRs that does not give a fault at the end of takeoff followed by a second pitot failure that again does not give a fault shortly after takeoff. In this low level scenario following the pitch/power for unreliable airspeed will have the crew lose control of the aircraft in about 2 and a half minutes because of the normal law override for Vmo.

I watched it unfold in the sim. The instructor told us we were going to get unreliable airspeed indications and to follow the QRH procedures. We recognized the unreliable airspeed right after thrust reduction. We received NO ecam warnings. We performed the QRH procedures for below FL 250 and above thrust reduction still in Config 1+F. AP AT OFF 10 degrees pitch. Climbing at a rate of approximately 1800 fpm. Reading the novel that is the QRH for unreliable airspeed interupted by CWC for flap overspeed. Got that silenced. Back to reading. Approaching 4500 feet or so airspeed indications are 340kts increasing rapidly. Normal law protections kick-in and a vicious feedback cycle begins. Full forward side stick and pitch is rapidly increasing causing a rapid increase in climb rate causing a rapid increase in indicated airspeed causing further increase in pitch. Onset is quite aggressive and loss of control very quick. I rolled the aircraft maximum as the pitch took off to lower the nose, yet we lost control as the trim was working fast and the increased loading and angle of attack stalled the aircraft without sufficient altitude to recover. A real eye opener to say the least. I mean to tell you that it happens FAST. The simulator is NOT the aircraft, but wow. I had the stick full forward, fully to the side and my foot to the floor when the sim froze and I kind of held that for few seconds as the disbelief was still being processed.

The scenario as I remember it is a rather remote possibility, run through a swarm of bees on takeoff roll to block pitot and then hit birds for additional blockage. The automation that keeps us "in the envelope" has a failure that is subtle with no ADR ecams, and therefore in NORMAL law, causes loss of control when close to the ground because performance exacerbates the problem. We might see some sort of procedural change when the powers to be fully digest this type of scenario.


That does sound rather eye opening. I'd like to see it. Was this something your check airman just figured out on his own, or did it come from somewhere else.

I did the unreliable airspeed at altitude, but it still happened relatively fast. Instructor said that he though there should be memory items, as you need to get on it.

The flying/airplane thing is always a work in progress........
 
The scenario as I remember it is a rather remote possibility, run through a swarm of bees on takeoff roll to block pitot and then hit birds for additional blockage.

Thank you. That's what I've been saying - that in those 1 in a 100 million situations the computers on the Airbus will keep the pilot from extracting the full performance of the airplane, and that extra margin of performance, whether it be bank, pitch, speed, g loading, whatever, may make the difference between living and dieing. Hopefully no one here will experience one of those situations outside the sim and will not die because computers over-ruled them.

Jim
 
Thank you. That's what I've been saying - that in those 1 in a 100 million situations the computers on the Airbus will keep the pilot from extracting the full performance of the airplane, and that extra margin of performance, whether it be bank, pitch, speed, g loading, whatever, may make the difference between living and dieing. Hopefully no one here will experience one of those situations outside the sim and will not die because computers over-ruled them.

Jim

What performance is not being extracted in his situation? The performance is there, it's managing it while trying to figure out what is going on that is hard. That is the same in a 172, 727, 757 or AB, as all of them have been lost to unreliable airspeed. It's a systems problem that the procedures and or systems may need to be changed for(that has never happened on a Boeing, huh-427?). If you can figure out what is going on soon enough you can manually fly pitch and power, and you have IRS GS for speed reference. Sorting it all quickly enough is a problem.

It sounds like the Boeing philosophy would give you the advantage here, as it wouldn't pitch up for the overspeed, but that is not the case in all abnormal situations.
 
It sounds like the Boeing philosophy would give you the advantage here, as it wouldn't pitch up for the overspeed, but that is not the case in all abnormal situations.
It took two paragraphs, but you finally got it. In the case cited, it was the performance of being able to drop the nose that the computers wouldn't allow. They wouldn't allow something that was well within the planes performance envelope. They saw the increasing airspeed and said "Nope, you can't do that". Of course, if you could disconnect the computers so you could drop the nose .... never mind, there's no off button is there...

Jim
 
It took two paragraphs, but you finally got it. In the case cited, it was the performance of being able to drop the nose that the computers wouldn't allow. They wouldn't allow something that was well within the planes performance envelope. They saw the increasing airspeed and said "Nope, you can't do that". Of course, if you could disconnect the computers so you could drop the nose .... never mind, there's no off button is there...

Jim

Actually you could with a few buttons.

Why did the superior 727 and 757s crash under a similar situation?
 
From what I recall, because the pilots failed to correctly diagnose the problem. Having said that, the only one I paid close attention to was the 727 since I was on it at the time.

If you turn off the flight control computers, what do you have left to fly the superior Airbus with?

Jim
 
From what I recall, because the pilots failed to correctly diagnose the problem. Having said that, the only one I paid close attention to was the 727 since I was on it at the time.

If you turn off the flight control computers, what do you have left to fly the superior Airbus with?

Jim


The force?
Pilot will power?

LMAO
 
From what I recall, because the pilots failed to correctly diagnose the problem. Having said that, the only one I paid close attention to was the 727 since I was on it at the time.

If you turn off the flight control computers, what do you have left to fly the superior Airbus with?

Jim

Well, that's kind of the point. You don't want to turn them off. Airbus determined that the greater threat to the aircraft at that point was the overspeed. You can probably count the times an altitude excursion exceeded 1000' because of overspeed on your hands...in the thousands and thousands of flight hours. And you don't have to turn them all off...just enough to revert to a flight control law other than Normal but why would you want to? The duration of such an event is probably measured in seconds. You can turn to avoid traffic...you can't turn to avoid an overspeed.

Boeing builds a fine aircraft...so does Airbus. I saw a documentary on the design of the 777. Boeing would have probably gone to hard limits on their flight control systems but United objected. Just different philosophies.

Driver B)
 
Also, look at Boeing pitots vs. Airbus pitots. The Airbus pitots aren't near MANLY enough...LOL!!!


Driver :p
 
It took two paragraphs, but you finally got it. In the case cited, it was the performance of being able to drop the nose that the computers wouldn't allow. They wouldn't allow something that was well within the planes performance envelope. They saw the increasing airspeed and said "Nope, you can't do that". Of course, if you could disconnect the computers so you could drop the nose .... never mind, there's no off button is there...

Jim


yeah sure, one un substantied un studied web post and your right... feel better now?
 
That does sound rather eye opening. I'd like to see it. Was this something your check airman just figured out on his own, or did it come from somewhere else.

I did the unreliable airspeed at altitude, but it still happened relatively fast. Instructor said that he though there should be memory items, as you need to get on it.

The flying/airplane thing is always a work in progress........

It was not part of the AQP, just something that some of the check airmen had been chewing on.
 
Actually you could with a few buttons.

Why did the superior 727 and 757s crash under a similar situation?


Just turn off the FACs. But I tell you that in the scenario that we got, you would have to be Johnny on the spot to "get'r done" before it is too late.
 
Good Lord fellows. All I posted was the A350 entrance into service was being pushed back 6-mongths.

I know, I keep looking at this thread wondering if there will actually be a discussion about the A350...

I see the A350-800 is listed in the fleet plan in the US Airways website, but there is a wide range of seats. I would expect the configuration would be the same on them all... I wonder if this 6 month delay will effect our order. They are scheduled to come in 2017, would a 6 month delay keep rolling that long?
 
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