Why do you think there's this rift between OH and Line mechanics on this forum??? I see what other carriers have done with OH, and I'm also well aware of the pay structure of these third world countries doing OH for UA and others. I know my pay cannot compete against some unlicensed person in SA making $5 a day. In other words, I'm not stupid or ignorant to the fact that our gov't, the FAA, has sold out the licensed mechanics jobs to other emerging markets, just like every other job in this country.
I don't get the sense that most rank-and-file TWU members feel that way.
But, how do you convince the majority of aircraft mechanics in TUL that their jobs are in jeopardy without angering our so called "union brothers"? I get accused of being management one day and golden goose killer the next.
Good question.
I blame management for AA's problems because they too had an opprotunity to get as much relief from our CBA's as they could in 2003, and didn't, and now they go around and claim that they are at a labor disadvantage to other carriers. Really? Well, let me just say that management only gets one bite at the apple, and they failed to devour the apple....
While I certainly understand what you're saying, I think the critical piece missing from your statement is that the world changed - dramatically - after the company came to the unions asking for concessions in 2003.
Within five years of those concessions, fuel prices had hit historic highs that have now become the "new normal." And, most importantly, within three years, every one of AA's legacy competitors save one had entered bankruptcy. Perhaps AA management should have had the foresight to see that coming, but I know that at least I didn't expect - back in 2003 - that within a mere couple of years half or more of the capacity flying around U.S. skies would be on insolvent carriers. Had AA and/or the unions fully anticipated that in 2003, perhaps the level of concessions requested in the first round would have been larger.
The reality is that while the unions gave up heart-wrenching concessions in 2003, other airlines soon went into bankruptcy and were able to reduce their labor costs even further below AA's post-concessions levels through pay cuts, work rule changes, SCOPE relaxation, layoffs, outsourcing, flexibility, etc. What was absolutely monumental in 2003 - and seemed sufficient - was by 2006-2007 no longer enough to be competitive.
That's why for a period after 2003, AA was being roundly regarded as the best-managed and most successful legacy carrier: labor and non-labor costs came down dramatically from pre-9/11 levels, the company was paying down debt, and all of AA's competitors were in turmoil. But, alas, as any AA (or indeed any airline) employee well knows, things change really, really fast in this industry. And - again - what changed? Fuel and AA's competitors going bankrupt.
WE are NOT management's piggy bank, and it's time for senior management to figure out how to run this crazy business without harming the people that actually do take care of their customers....the employees, because without somewhat happy employees....AA's customers will always suffer, and management and the employees will always point fingers at each other and WE ALL LOSE!
I 100% agree with your sentiments: AA does have to find a way to both be profitable and have motivated, happy employees. Regardless of which side of the boat you're on, if it sinks, everyone's going down.
However, the challenge AA faces is that in many cases AA is now competing against airlines that either pay their employees less than AA, or get more productivity out of those employees than AA, or have dramatically fewer of those employees (relative to size) than AA, or some combination thereof. And, somehow, those airlines' employees - despite all that - seem motivated and happy in many cases. So how do AA and its employees compete with that?