WorldTraveler
Corn Field
- Dec 5, 2003
- 21,709
- 10,721
The RJ era was fueled by the network carriers' perceived need to serve every city that its competitors served and serve them 5 or more times per day to multiple hubs. Before deregulation, small cities usually were served by one or two cities on mainline equipment to a hub in the region near each small cities with tickets interlined between carriers to create a true nationwide system, even if your trip from one side of the country to another might be on several "competing" airlines - all w/ fares and schedules governed by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Post deregulation with the virtual end of domestic interlining, six or more "nationwide" network carriers could not possibly serve every small city with their own aircraft, let alone with frequencies that could compete with the single network carrier that was the strongest in each city by virtue of hub strength in each region of the country.
With relatively cheap jet fuel, a plentiful supply of much lower cost new hire employees to the airline industry that were willing to work at regional carriers, and manufacturers such as Bombardier and Embraer that were anxious to break into the airliner market, the economics were right for the growth of regional carriers.
Changes in the network carrier segment helped bring an end to the need for the 50 seat industry. BKs of the decades of the 2000s reduced mainline employee labor costs. Consolidation has reduced the number of hubs - and thus the number of flights that need to be operated from each city in order for each network airline (now just 4) to be able to serve "all" of the country. And fuel is multiples higher than it was just a few decades ago.
Regional carrier employees have become more senior - and thus, their expectations for higher salaries have created an environment where new regional airlines win contracts largely by using less senior workforces.
Comair's pilot strike was a major attempt by regional carrier labor to gain network carrier salaries and DL was determined to ensure it never happened - or the regional carrier model would never work.
Of course, OH was under pressure to deliver the lowest prices to DL and that would have been the case whether OH was wholly owned (which it was in 2004 going into DL's BK) or if it had been independent and bidding on contracts.
Delta has always been a big proponent of the regional industry because DL's network - far more than AA and UA - was built around connecting small and medium cities to the world. Pre-NW merger, DL served more small cities including via RJs than any other airline in the US; NW's network model in the midwest was very similar and DL only increased its size in small and medium size cities. because of the ATL, DTW, and MSP hubs, DL is the largest airline in scores of small and medium sized cities. While AA and UA's domestic network is much more heavily concentrated in the largest markets, DL has built a network that connects more of the US to more of the world via its network than any other airline. WN has carried the AA/UA model further by serving even fewer cities and has decided they will not use aircraft smaller than the 737-700 which means they will never serve hundreds of cities throughout the US.
DL bought ASA and Comair to control quality and decisions, although history will probably show they could have met those objectives w/o owning them and w/o losing the billions of dollars they invested in them.
ASA was sold when it became apparent DL could never recover its investment and it was no longer necessary to own your regional carrier; regional carrier-mainline contracts have all been rewritten to eliminate the need for ownership. American Eagle and Comair have never found buyers.
There hasn't been any doubt that airline mgmt teams at DL, UA, and US have all played one regional carrier against the other for years in order to obtain the lowest price - at somewhat acceptable levels of service.
DL is in the best position to start the process of transferring capacity back to mainline because of its size and multiple hubs on the east coast, where the hundreds of small cities in the US are mostly located and where the majority of regional carrier capacity flies.
With 10-15 departures from most small and medium sized cities just to ATL, DTW, and MSP, DL can begin the process of reducing frequencies and serving markets with larger RJs and small mainline aircraft.
DL's current pilot ovestaffing allows them to staff many of the 717s without hiring many new pilots.
After 35 years of deregulation, DL appears to be leading the effort to return mainline aircraft to small and medium sized cities that have been served by RJs for decades.
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Kev,
on a related topic, do you have a list of cities from which DL carries US mail? Are some of the small cities that are regaining mainline service after years of RJ only service some of the same cities from which DL is now carrying US mail? Does DL put mail on any regional carriers? And finally, do the cities that have mainline below wing staffing carry the mail more than other cities with contract ramp?
Post deregulation with the virtual end of domestic interlining, six or more "nationwide" network carriers could not possibly serve every small city with their own aircraft, let alone with frequencies that could compete with the single network carrier that was the strongest in each city by virtue of hub strength in each region of the country.
With relatively cheap jet fuel, a plentiful supply of much lower cost new hire employees to the airline industry that were willing to work at regional carriers, and manufacturers such as Bombardier and Embraer that were anxious to break into the airliner market, the economics were right for the growth of regional carriers.
Changes in the network carrier segment helped bring an end to the need for the 50 seat industry. BKs of the decades of the 2000s reduced mainline employee labor costs. Consolidation has reduced the number of hubs - and thus the number of flights that need to be operated from each city in order for each network airline (now just 4) to be able to serve "all" of the country. And fuel is multiples higher than it was just a few decades ago.
Regional carrier employees have become more senior - and thus, their expectations for higher salaries have created an environment where new regional airlines win contracts largely by using less senior workforces.
Comair's pilot strike was a major attempt by regional carrier labor to gain network carrier salaries and DL was determined to ensure it never happened - or the regional carrier model would never work.
Of course, OH was under pressure to deliver the lowest prices to DL and that would have been the case whether OH was wholly owned (which it was in 2004 going into DL's BK) or if it had been independent and bidding on contracts.
Delta has always been a big proponent of the regional industry because DL's network - far more than AA and UA - was built around connecting small and medium cities to the world. Pre-NW merger, DL served more small cities including via RJs than any other airline in the US; NW's network model in the midwest was very similar and DL only increased its size in small and medium size cities. because of the ATL, DTW, and MSP hubs, DL is the largest airline in scores of small and medium sized cities. While AA and UA's domestic network is much more heavily concentrated in the largest markets, DL has built a network that connects more of the US to more of the world via its network than any other airline. WN has carried the AA/UA model further by serving even fewer cities and has decided they will not use aircraft smaller than the 737-700 which means they will never serve hundreds of cities throughout the US.
DL bought ASA and Comair to control quality and decisions, although history will probably show they could have met those objectives w/o owning them and w/o losing the billions of dollars they invested in them.
ASA was sold when it became apparent DL could never recover its investment and it was no longer necessary to own your regional carrier; regional carrier-mainline contracts have all been rewritten to eliminate the need for ownership. American Eagle and Comair have never found buyers.
There hasn't been any doubt that airline mgmt teams at DL, UA, and US have all played one regional carrier against the other for years in order to obtain the lowest price - at somewhat acceptable levels of service.
DL is in the best position to start the process of transferring capacity back to mainline because of its size and multiple hubs on the east coast, where the hundreds of small cities in the US are mostly located and where the majority of regional carrier capacity flies.
With 10-15 departures from most small and medium sized cities just to ATL, DTW, and MSP, DL can begin the process of reducing frequencies and serving markets with larger RJs and small mainline aircraft.
DL's current pilot ovestaffing allows them to staff many of the 717s without hiring many new pilots.
After 35 years of deregulation, DL appears to be leading the effort to return mainline aircraft to small and medium sized cities that have been served by RJs for decades.
----------------
Kev,
on a related topic, do you have a list of cities from which DL carries US mail? Are some of the small cities that are regaining mainline service after years of RJ only service some of the same cities from which DL is now carrying US mail? Does DL put mail on any regional carriers? And finally, do the cities that have mainline below wing staffing carry the mail more than other cities with contract ramp?
