Good to see the conversation continuing….w/ a moment to sit down now, I’ll throw in a few more thoughts.
Jim,
There is no doubt that fuel prices are increasing – and even that they were higher at particular periods in the past. But fuel is remaining high priced, there is no expectation that it will reduce, and historic increases in fuel prices – whether on a temporary or sustained basis – has resulted in a thinning of the industry. Airlines have historically done a poor job of being prepared for the inevitable spikes in fuel prices – WN’s early 2000s hedging being one of the few positive examples – while capacity has been forced out of the industry during previous fuel price hikes. (remember that the mergers/acquisitions of the late 80s were followed by the fuel price spikes of the 90s which “undid” most of the west coast capacity that was acquired by AA and US – and partially by DL). OPEC will continue to push oil prices up as high as they can w/o crashing the global economy; unless the US can significantly increase domestic capacity to offset those cuts – and developing countries like India and China quit growing – then the price will continue to rise and w/ it airline demand will shrink – and consolidation will continue.
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Comm,b
Your enthusiasm and support for AA is commendable but your positions are based more on emotions (like hope) than facts (which are historical and defensible).
Airlines don’t come out of BK w/ a great cost structure. C11 provides the opportunity to reset costs but most of the benefits don’t happen until the airline starts regrowing post BK.
1. Pension costs are reduced only during BK since companies don’t fund retirement while replacing the DB plans w/ DC plans. Dumping pension plans is a balance sheet item and really doesn’t reduce costs to a great degree – other than long term cash outlays to catch up pension underfunding.
2. Productivity improvements are designed to properly resize the airline to its employee structure. Thus, AA can either cut much deeper now to get productivity in line with the current size or cut less and then grow into their size… that is the approach they took in 2003 but then never grew into their new size – thus AA was overstaffed for much of the past 10 years.
3. Benefit costs like medical will drop straight to the bottom line but in the scope of things are not going to make or break the company.
4. Outsourcing will save costs esp. in the longer term but the cost of transitioning to outsourcing is expensive and has been shown that it doesn’t necessarily deliver the size of cost cuts that many thought.
5. All of the talk about how the new aircraft will save so much belies the fact that those are expensive costs… they are replacing fuel and maintenance costs with the cost of borrowing money…. Further, other carriers ARE doing fleet replacement, just at a slower rate – and other carriers are getting deals just as good as AA, as much as some AA fans want to think otherwise.
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And then we get to revenue. BK doesn’t fix revenue problems which have plagued AA for years, including with competitive growth and pressure in key AA markets.
1. DO you realize that on EVERY Asia route on which UA OR DL competes with AA (and the majority of AA’s Transpac system is competitive with UA, not DL), DL or UA outperforms AA in revenue generation? UA outgenerates AA in revenue on every one of their ORD-Asia nonstops. AA and DL both have to deal with poor slots to/from PEK but DL still generates better revenues from DTW to PEK and SEA than AA does from ORD. LAX-PVG was supposed to be AA’s way of finding a new place for AA to grow its Pacific network – and you know that UA stepped right on top of AA’s flight – and UA outperforms in revenue. AA’s decision to end JFK-NRT is not surprising since I’ve said that since DL restarted JFK-NRT, it outperformed AA by a very healthy margin. Having your own hub on both ends of the route apparently is far more powerful than sharing revenue with a partner on one end.
2. To/from LHR, DL and UA now obtain revenues to/from LHR as good as or better than AA in AA’s largest TATL market. Despite predictions to the contrary, DL’s MIA and BOS-LHR flights are generating comparable revenues and aren’t going anywhere.
3. Domestically, carriers of all kinds are moving into AA’s key markets including B6, DL, and VX from ORD, MIA and DFW – and they are all generating very sustainable revenues. And already in 2012 we see DFW-BOS, DFW-LGA and MIA-LGA on the horizon for competitive growth – all key markets.
4. And then we have NYC, where the slot swap dramatically changes the game for AA, an airline that was once headquartered in NYC and has long had an advantage in obtaining corporate revenues. DL is already on par with CO in NYC revenue even before the slot swap is implemented. AA – and most other carriers – have no unique routes from LGA that DL has said they will fly, except for one. YYZ. You know the story. DL partner to be Westjet outbid WN, will feed DL’s new flights at LGA, and will force prices down in the NYC-Toronto market – to the peril of both AA, AC, and UA. AA, not surprisingly is the weakest player. DL just sits back, watches it all play out, and makes money off of the slot divestitures (or the DCA half of it anyway) and the revenue they pick out while watching their partner (also shared with AA) beat the competition up.
I’m sure since I’m biased, I’ve got some of these facts wrong and missed other successes.
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The exclusivity of AA’s network – its revenue advantages – is slowly being chipped away and will continue to occur.
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All the promises of what AA will become after BK are tempered by the fact that AA has a very long way to go before emerging from BK, let alone growing and competing anew. Throw in a merger with US and the process of competing against stronger, more nimble competitors is even further off.
In the meantime, DL and UA will continue to pursue their strategic objectives, of which AA meets two of DL’s – an increased presence at LHR and in Latin America.
UA probably will decide before too long they don’t really need US – or that the benefits aren’t really as great as the extra capacity US keeps in the industry along with its low fare pricing strategies (remember US has a revenue disadvantage to the industry and they don’t mind telling you that).
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I don’t know how this will all turn out but the notion that AA will waltz through BK and come up happy and cleaned up and ready to compete with other airlines which are already giving AA a great deal of heartburn and aren’t going to sit by for 3 years while and AA and US orchestrate AA’s restructuring and an AA/US merger are just way outside the scope of reality.
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Yes, DL wants to do all it can to limit AA’s success in BK – competitors take advantage of opportunities to grow.
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Whether DL or UA decide they want to further consolidate the industry and do what they have to do make it palatable to Washington remains to be seen….but I am certain they will not sit idly by and instead will seize their own opportunities which will come at AA and US’ expense.
And as a US based AIRLINE, DL and UA have advantages in this contest that neither BA or TPG can match.
If AA and US individually or collectively can overcome all of that, then, yeah, maybe they can pull off a merger.