I'm going to disagree with jcw on this. I agree with the AA number, as the consolidated 3rdQ mainline and regional fuel expense was $1.67, and thus, so was the consolidated fuel expense. As the mainline airlines all pay for the regionals' fuel, seems appropriate to me to use the consolidated number for the other airlines when comparing to AA. Apologies to jcw if the numbers above are the consolidated numbers.
As for adjustments, I exclude the MTM adjustments for hedge losses that might occur in future periods (GAAP requires them, but they're speculative since no cash is paid until the contracts mature), but I include the hedge losses actually incurred during the quarter since cash is paid if the hedges are underwater, and in the case of the refinery-owning airline, I include the gains from the refinery.
For the third quarter, the numbers are as follows:
AA 1.67
DL 1.89
UA 1.97
wN 2.20
For the first nine months, the numbers are as follows:
AA 1.80
DL 1.95
UA 2.08
WN 2.08
In the third quarter, WN saw $0.50/gal in cash losses on bad hedges, and still has $1.2 billion of bad hedges for future periods if fuel stays at current prices. During the past year and into the next couple of years, WN may give back almost all of the fuel hedging gains it famously recognized during the 2003-2008 fuel price runup.
WN's hedging losses may end up being equivalent to 40 to 50 new 737s.
Given the huge fuel hedging losses inflicted on DL, WN and UA in this round of fuel price collapse, I wonder if those airlines will re-think fuel hedging. Parker's gamble to not hedge has paid off very well, easily saving AA $2 billion or more in the last 12 months.