Let Failure Be An Option

Bear96 said:
I think if you look at AA + Eagle as one entity, and UA + UAX as another, however, and compare the relative ASMs, the sizes would be much more similar.
From Air Transport World Statistics June Edition.

Domestic Operations

Rank by RPM (Mainline only)

1. American 10,605,007
2. Delta 8,542,543
3. United 8,130,238
4. Southwest 5,574,905


Without adding their commuter carriers they are similar. Adding the commuters would probably not change the RPM's much.
 
Cosmo said:
Cost per employee is a meaningless statistic that doesn't take into account the scope of different airlines' operations and, further, doesn't reflect the revenues generated by each employee.
DING DING DING -- we have a bingo here folks!

Costs are meaningless??? This is the historical (and future) problem with UA and and its' defenders.

You ignored costs during the fat and dumb period.

Today UA is somewhat leaner but not a whole lot smarter.

Keep it up and you'll spin yourselves right into oblivion.
 
Here is Jan-May 2004 mainline and regional traffic information for the 6 legacy carriers along with the historical reported % of connecting pax over each carriers networks.

ML Pax ML RPMs Reg Pax Reg RPMs % Cnx Pax
AA 30M 35B 8M 3B 55
CO 12M 15B 5M 2.5B 45
DL 35M 33M 11M 6B 70
NW 19M 17M 4.5M 1B 55
UA 25M 30M 9M 3.5B 45
US 16 13M 5M 2B 55

When adding the mainline (ML) and reg(ional) traffic statistics and factoring in the percentage of connecting traffic, Delta already is the largest domestic carrier AND the largest carrier of connecting traffic , with American next. These statistics bear out my assertion that AA and DL are the two legacy carriers that are best positioned to carry domestic connecting traffic. All of DL’s hubs are in inexpensive, relatively unconstrained airports from ATC and capacity perspectives while only ATL has a large volume of local traffic and all DL hubs are geographically positioned for carrying connecting traffic, making DL’s network ideal for carrying connecting traffic. For AA, DFW is inexpensive, has few ATC or facilities constraints, and is geographically situated for carrying connecting traffic. For CO, IAH and CLE are good fits for carrying connecting traffic ; for NW, all 3 hubs work for carrying connecting traffic although NW is limited by its small regional carrier operation. For US, CLT is the only hub that is ideal for carrying connecting traffic. As previously mentioned, no UA hubs are ideal for carrying connecting traffic: ORD has consistent ATC constraints, DEN is expensive (it costs UA $12 each way per passenger more than other airlines to carry connecting passengers over DEN); IAD, SFO, and LAX are all on the coasts which are not ideal for carrying connecting passengers and most of the top O&Ds that could connect over those hubs are already served by nonstop service on other carriers.

Why does this matter? Because UA has the opportunity to redefine its business plan and right now it is simply sticking with the status quo – thinking it needs to serve every market in the country (or as many as it can). Every regional aircraft it puts in ORD displaces space a mainline aircraft could operate (as well as mainline United employees). Having a regional carrier operation across the country is costly for United and displaces potentially higher value local passengers which UA could carry since all of its hubs are in large metro areas. Some of the domestic widebody aircraft could be removed from service under bankruptcy to allow UA to better compete against LCCs. (notice that AA, CO, and NW which have lower costs than UA do not use many widebodies on the domestic system; widebodies are only valuable if airspace constraints make it necessary to offer lots of seats on a relatively small number of seats. Most of Delta’s widebodies are to Florida where Delta has been able to maintain a commanding share of the market even though every LCC flies to Florida or to California where Delta has a reasonable presence despite offering much fewer flights than AA or UA.

It really doesn’t matter financially if regional carriers are owned since the financial benefits can be obtained through contracts (similar to leasing a car rather than owning it). AA and DL own most of their regional carrier capacity which gives them wealth if they choose to sell off those assets but they each also have contract carriers. All of the other legacy carriers except UA have at least some regional ownership position, meaning it should be easier for UA to get out of the regional carrier business than anyone.

Internationally, United has done a good job of building their transpacific network by nearly duplicating their SFO operation in ORD. Currently, no other US carrier serves Asia as well as United because of the multiple service options. The downside is that the constraints that allowed United to grow to such a strong position in Asia (need for 747s and a west coast hub) are no longer valid. AA, CO, and DL all will likely grow their Asian presences by overflying west coast and Asian hubs; NW risks watching its Asian presence shrink because it has no west coast hub of a 777/340 that can fly deep into Asia; connecting passengers at NRT is the most expensive way to serve the region.

Understanding the trends in the industry is important if successful business plans are to be developed. I love following the airline industry because it is constantly changing. UA employees need to be asking their management tough questions about its network as they are asked for huge concessions. The only way United can survive is if it is willing to do things differently than the rest of the industry and do them well.
 
Fly said:
Put down the pipe buddy. Delta is heading to bankruptcy.......like it or not.
is that a wish or prediction?
I still wish everybody at United (and U) the best.
(Actually, I'm a fan of AA though.)
 
Big Airlines: Not Much Runway Left
United and the other major carriers must remake themselves -- or go down trying

For the nation's biggest airlines, the day of reckoning is at hand. And if they didn't already know it, they should now. With the rejection on June 17 of United Airlines Inc.'s (UALAQ ) second attempt to get $1.6 billion in federal loan guarantees, the Air Transportation Stabilization Board has made it clear that major carriers have nowhere to taxi to escape the onslaught of the discounters. Even if United does persuade the board to give it guarantees in its third and final attempt, that won't solve what's ailing United.
Advertisement

United has already made deep cuts since entering bankruptcy in December, 2002, lowering costs by almost a third. Pilots, aircraft lessors, and retirees have all chipped in to create $5 billion a year in savings. Still, that's nowhere near enough to return the carrier to health. With fuel costs soaring, United, like most legacy carriers, is still losing money. And low-cost players, which have gone from 16% of domestic capacity in 1998 to about 29% today, are flourishing. No amount of government aid can -- or should -- fix that.

That's why United is going to need more cost-cutting and perhaps a smaller network to save itself. Industry analysts believe the company must attract a private equity investor with or without loan guarantees.

But such a player would likely demand new management and cuts in areas once deemed untouchable. The biggest target: employee pensions that, in their present form, will cost the company at least $4 billion over the next five years. And if United cuts pensions, that would put pressure on American (AMR ), Delta (DAL ), and Northwest (NWAC ) to do the same.

United and other so-called legacy airlines must continue to remake themselves -- or die trying. Delta and Northwest are currently in negotiations with pilots to cut wages. Northwest is seeking givebacks from other unions, too. And Continental has warned it will need labor concessions to survive. Since 2001, the legacy carriers have chopped operating costs by $13.4 billion and have reduced payrolls by 100,000. Yet so far not one network major "has gotten to where they need to be for long-term viability," says airline expert Daniel M. Kasper of consultancy LECG Corp. (XPRT ) Pensions aren't the only problem. Health benefits, inefficient work rules, and seniority-based pay scales remain crippling. And with sky-high fuel prices and leaner winter travel ahead, maneuvering room for some big players may run out.

How the shakeout will unfold remains far from clear. Even some of the carriers that seem most endangered, like US Airways Group Inc. (UAIR ), could pull off a last-ditch transformation. And if the government rejects United's loan guarantee for a third time, the carrier could gain the leverage needed to win far lower benefits and wages, turning it into one of the most formidable network players.

It's more likely that one or more carriers will follow in the footsteps of such dinosaurs as Pan Am, Eastern, and TWA. "Labor will clearly do something" at both United and US Airways, predicts one high-ranking airline executive. "Whether it will be enough is the question." Vaughn Cordle, a United pilot and financial analyst who runs AirlineForecasts LLC, questions whether airline employees truly understand the magnitude of the problems facing their carriers, especially the crushing debt and pension costs. If workers refuse to make the necessary changes, he believes, airlines such as United will be forced to start selling assets. In short, they'll slowly begin to liquidate, and that will only exacerbate cost and revenue problems.

Of course, a move to shrink by some of the biggest players could certainly help the rest of their beleaguered brethren. But those carriers will hardly have room to breathe. Such low-cost juggernauts as Southwest (LUV ), JetBlue (JBLU ), and AirTran (AAI ), which could grab as much as 35% of domestic capacity by 2009, will continue to put pressure on costs and pricing. And those majors that do survive face a difficult future with debt-laden balance sheets. "I don't see any of them coming out strong," says credit analyst Philip Baggaley of Standard & Poor's (MHP ). More pain and turmoil clearly are on the horizon. And, as United is discovering, time is running out.
 
whatkindoffreshhell said:
Costs are meaningless??? This is the historical (and future) problem with UA and and its' defenders.

You ignored costs during the fat and dumb period.

Today UA is somewhat leaner but not a whole lot smarter.

Keep it up and you'll spin yourselves right into oblivion.
whatkindoffreshhell:

Next time, try reading and comprehending what I said.

Just to be clear for the laggards, I never said "costs were meaningless". What I did say was that costs per employee were meaningless in a comparison with other airlines because it doesn't reflect differences in the scope of operations or in revenues generated by each employee. For instance, it undoubtedly costs United more (on average) to employ a worker in SFO than it costs JetBlue to employ a worker in FLL, but if the SFO worker helps to generate more revenues than the difference in employee costs, then it is worth it. Yet that is not clear when only looking at costs per employee.

BTW, I don't work for United or any other airline.
 
Actually, Fly, the events of this past week have had a predictable effect on DL pilots. I think they have learned from United's problems and are determined not to make the same mistakes at their airline.

There have always been people throughout history who have been more interested in shooting the messenger thinking that will kill the message. The message was still valid even after the messenger died.
 
ual777fan said:
Delta owns all of their regionals except skywest, and ACA which they don't use anymore. ComAir, I know is Delta owned, and all of the others I believe are also owned by Delta. That is why their Passenger numbers are so much higher than United's.
Dont forget Chautauqua/Republic, who do Delta Connection and are not owned by Delta. In fact, they do American Connection, US Airways Express, Delta Connection, and United Express. No conflict of interest there! :rolleyes:
 
Light Years said:
Dont forget Chautauqua/Republic, who do Delta Connection and are not owned by Delta. In fact, they do American Connection, US Airways Express, Delta Connection, and United Express. No conflict of interest there! :rolleyes:
Speaking of Repubic (EMB 170s as UAX), I heard they are many/ many moons from getting FAA approval. As in, dlayed UFN.
 
Republic has been delayed forever. They were initially to be an alter-ego type deal with CHQ, operating ERJ145s as USX, a couple of years ago. When are they supposed to get thier first E170s?
 
Cosmo said:
whatkindoffreshhell:

Next time, try reading and comprehending what I said.

Just to be clear for the laggards, I never said "costs were meaningless". What I did say was that costs per employee were meaningless in a comparison with other airlines because it doesn't reflect differences in the scope of operations or in revenues generated by each employee. For instance, it undoubtedly costs United more (on average) to employ a worker in SFO than it costs JetBlue to employ a worker in FLL, but if the SFO worker helps to generate more revenues than the difference in employee costs, then it is worth it. Yet that is not clear when only looking at costs per employee.

BTW, I don't work for United or any other airline.
Nonsense. 'Costs per employee' in SFO certainly are greater than Jetblue in Florida.

That SFO employee just ain't generating the revenue. Don't make apologies.

Some of your unit costs attract more revenue than others (i.e. walk up fares vs. supersaver) but I suppose the other airlines also don't comprehend just how damned smart are those fellers at UA and appreciate the majesty of the size of their scope.

Keep spinning. And how many times have you announced that you don't work for United or any other airline? Whose asking?
 
whatkindoffreshhell said:
Nonsense. 'Costs per employee' in SFO certainly are greater than Jetblue in Florida.
You really have trouble reading, don't you?

How about taking it this way: cost per employee, taken by itself is meaningless. One must look at the difference between cost and revenue generation to determine the actual value of that employee. If the cost of that employee is greater than the additional revenue generated by the presence of that employee, then the employee is a liability. Otherwise, the employee is an asset.

So, let's look at it in simple terms. Let's say that the SFO employee costs $1,000 and the FLL employee costs $500. Similarly, let's say that the SFO employee generates $1,500 in revenue, while the FLL employee generates $400 in revenue. In that case, it doesn't matter that the SFO employee costs twice as much...the SFO employee is an asset, while the FLL employee is a liability.
 

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