BoeingBoy said:
Here's the paper I mentioned.
[post="250042"][/post]
Jim,
The paper brings up some interesting points. In particular, it suggests early on that WN took advantage of the cyclical nature of fuel prices. Perhaps that was their goal, but if it was it's a strategy that won't last for very long. In essence, they're suggesting that WN was recognizing an arbitrage opportunity (not exactly, but conceptually). Whenever such opportunities arise, once they're discovered they disappear. It's sort of like those lovely vacation spots (Waikiki, anyone?) that get discovered and then ruined in the process.
In this case, once the airline industry returns to a period of stability, hedging will become an integral part of fuel purchasing...which will effectively render the arbitrage component sterile.
Having said that, I still can see some significant benefits to the predictability of future fuel prices.
In addition, they performed a regression analysis with the goal of teasing out the value of the competitive advantage rendered by hedging. It's a useless calculation in this case, because it only covers the situation where an airline bought the hedges when the market was lower, and had the advantage when fuel prices rose. It's quite likely that this coefficient would be significantly reduced (though perhaps still greater than zero) over the long haul. Imagine, for instance, what hedges bought in 1984 would have done to an airline in 1986.
I really got a kick out of the hedge vs. valuation graph (Exhibit 3). The implication they're going for is a causal relationship. I don't think it really is, though; rather, it's a correlative relationship. You can't buy hedges when you need the money to make payroll. Reading more into it is ignoring the forest for the trees. Furthermore, the closest one could come to a causal relationship, even ignoring the forest, is to conclude that, when fuel prices rise sharply, those with the most fuel hedged do the best. It tells us nothing about what happens when fuel prices fall sharply.
Now, in answer to your questions about some of the other instruments:
A
collar can be thought of as a limited put or call. Traditional puts and calls have no limits to the upsides or downsides. This means greater risk to the parties involved, which affects the price of the instrument. By applying a collar (which is really nothing more than adding puts and/or calls into the mix), the risk to the parties is limited, which reduces the price to the buyer.
A
cap can be thought of as a one-sided collar, strictly limiting the upside.