sw plane goes off the rnway in mdw

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MDW 31C is ILS or LOC/DME approch. FREQ 109.9, 31C TDZE 613, 5826' Ldng, 250(300)DH, RNWY 31C is not CAT II cert., because of appr profile, obsticle. Aircrew and equipment have to be CAT II Cert. The Company has to have a CAT II/ or III program for flight ops, maintenance to have the equipment CAT II/ or III, and cert. by the faa. The FDR and the CVR will be time line by the NTSB, and the combination will tell if the autospoilers deployed,if the autobrakes were used and if, what settimg(MAX,MED,LOW,OFF,RTO), HYD press for MAX 2750(+,-100psi), MED 2500(+,-100psi),LOW 2200(+,-100psi)wheel transducer need only 10Kts to send the autobrake a signal. Sound like a little troubleee at TD, hold off on TR until under control, applied TR, TR unequal, fight for control, applied brakes and the antiskid took over the skid, end of real estate. the FDR timeline will tell were the TD was, short/long, Sorry to the people injury, peace be with them. For the little boy who died,famliy, my deepest heart condolense.
 
I figure the crew will take the heat for this one. Valiant as their efforts may have been to keep the bird under control, they simply ran out of runway as well as luck.

No doubt the crew had their hands full on this landing...the end result showed that for certain. It's a tragedy indeed that a young boy lost his life...heartfelt prayers to the families and the crew. However, it could have been so much worse considering the pax onboard. Let's not forget that.
 
According to the Boeing 737-700 systems manual:

wheel spin-up is not a consideration for thrust reverser deployment. TRs are independent of wheel speed and may be deployed when the air/ground safety sensor in in ground mode (any strut compressed) OR if either the #1 or #2 radio altimeter indicates <10 feet.

Flight spoilers will auto-deploy with wheel spin up of 60 knots. However, if any strut compression is detected - even without wheel spin up - the flight spoilers will deploy automatically. Ground spoiler extension requires compression of the right main landing gear strut.

You are correct about how the system works. Maybe I should have elaborated a bit more. In the PI CLT overrun accident, hydroplaning delayed wheel spin-up. That delayed auto-spoiler deployment (and auto brake activation). The delay in spoiler deployment, in turn, delayed the air/ground sensor switch to ground mode. And last, that delayed availability of T/R (remember, this was before the radio altimeter was added to the equation).

So the hydroplaning (and resulting delay in wheel spin-up) in and of itself didn't delay T/R deployment. It was just the start of the chain that did. There were additional factors - landing long and fast - that contributed to the accident but not to the delayed T/R deployment after touchdown.

Jim
 
Is reverse thrust even calculated in stopping distance? I did not think it was.
The T/R can be calculated in stoppimg distance, they can be used to powerback the a/c, but most co. do not put them in their flt ops manual, because the flt crew get their ground signals from ramp guide personnel, most ramp or maintenance personnel and so flt crew can not handle the tight area, with wing mount engines, the assymmetry is hard to control, speically in the terminal area. With autobrakes in MAX position, or position 3, autobrakes will stop a a/c shorter than the T/Rs on dry/wet pavement. In winter conditions T/Rs are better than autobrakes, but in combination T/Rs and autobrakes is perferred, because the autobrakes and antiskid can manage skids, hydroplaneing, and a lock wheel from a flat/blowen tire. The Cfm56-5 seires engine is a FADEC control engine, the TMC has to receive throttle position from the LVRTs to the TMC to send a signal to the FADEC computer. If the FADEC does not receive a signal from the TMC to deploy T/Rs because of improper thrust position, above idle, the TMC will not send a signal to the directional control valve S/O valve solnoid and the throttle T/Rs interlock to arm the T/Rs micoswitches in the thrust lever package before the T/Rs levers can be deploy, then the LVRTs send a signal to the TMC to the directional control valve S/O valve solnoid to open, and the directional control valve to deploy the T/Rs or stow the T/Rs depending on the desider position. The TMC sends a signal to the stow lock latches and the sync lock actuators to unlock and the directional control valve to port pressure to the drive actuators and the sync lock actuators and the stow lock latches so the T/Rs can be deploy/stow. the TMC get a signal from the air/gnd sys 1 or air/gnd sys 2 on the main ldg PSEU, if the main strut is compressed 2.6 to 2.9 inch the air/gnd sys will send a signal to the PSEU to the TMC for either autothrottle or manual operation of the thrust or T/Rs. if the autothrottle were used it would be automatic, if the flt crew manually control the throttle, the T/Rs would be slower to respond to the air/gnd sys safety interlocks. when you TD on snow/ice pack pavement, you do not have to be concern about hydroplaneing, the snow/ice made the water hard. The snow/ice pack pavement is difficult to TD on, and control the skid at normal approch speed, flight controls, autothrottles and T/Rs are perferred, because of the responds time and air buffer from the flt ctl and the T/Rs, but flt ctl and autobrakes are ok, a little more pavement, the least is flt ctl and manual brakes with anti-skid, alot more pavement.
 
autofixer,

Depends on what "stopping distance" presentation you're talking about - or maybe more precisely, required runway for landing presentation since required runway length is what's normally given instead of actual stopping distance.

The "normal" requirements are obtained without T/R, that's why the T/R can be inop per the MEL (though this can restrict ops at certain airports with shorter runways).

However, Boeing can provide pretty much whatever data you want. For example, we (US) have a chart in our 300/400 manual giving required runway length with braking reported as poor. It assumes touchdown at the 1000 ft point, max braking, and max reverse. So the info there most definitely includes T/R use.

Jim
 
autofixer,

Depends on what "stopping distance" presentation you're talking about - or maybe more precisely, required runway for landing presentation since required runway length is what's normally given instead of actual stopping distance.

The "normal" requirements are obtained without T/R, that's why the T/R can be inop per the MEL (though this can restrict ops at certain airports with shorter runways).

However, Boeing can provide pretty much whatever data you want. For example, we (US) have a chart in our 300/400 manual giving required runway length with braking reported as poor. It assumes touchdown at the 1000 ft point, max braking, and max reverse. So the info there most definitely includes T/R use.

Jim
all the a/c mfg like boxcar boeing, schoolbus airbus, lawndart embraer, want-be lawndart bombadier, lockup lockheed, and mac-attack mcdonnell/douglas have tested or the mfg engineers have reserached and input the information in with the junk microsoft program for evaluation. then that same junk information is inputed in the sim, to evaluate braking/skidding/aircraft control, like normal microsoft programming, thing are not what they seem. I love those operating maunals with the pretty charts, but let get down to the brass tacs, the real thing is experience in a given condition, snow/ice pack is different at different areas of the pavement, then the snowplows or snowblowers or snowbrushers come through and it get all re-arranged, bare spots, pack snow scraped, ice spot, its all changing, its not fun.
 
Actually, land acquisition, relocation of property owners, and construction all associated with Extended Runway Safety Areas (includion relocation of existing roads) are eligible for significant funding under the FAAs Airport Improvement Program (AIP). I believe at medium/large hub airports the FAA pays 75% of the total cost of such projects. The airport's remaining share could be paid by the $4.50 Passenger Facility Charge impose upon each revenue departing passenger from MDW. Essentially, MDW could get these ERSA built free to them and not costing MDW a dime.
ONE YOUNG BOYS LIFE IS WORTH MORE THAN a Extenended Runway Safety Area, L like to see a 2 mile long by 1/2 mile wide approach zone with nothing but fields from the end of any runway, when you get windshears, problem weather conditions, mechanical/avionics failers, TFOA, I would perfer a clear area for everyones concern, And maybe these Aviation Department and Port Authories need to have some Big Metal (325,000 Lbs empty weight A/C and above, and L/H seater) Flight Crew Members as consultants on the Air side of the operation who knows what can happen when thing don't go as planned, since the Land Lovers do not know, are realize want it requires to keep things in the air, A/C and PAX, and the people on the ground safe in the approach area. Accident will have, but let try to reduce it from happennig, and costing another one life, because it could happen to anyone, GOD FOR BID. Check the NTSB, website, accident data. Be Safe.
 
L like to see a 2 mile long by 1/2 mile wide approach zone with nothing but fields from the end of any runway, when you get windshears, problem weather conditions, mechanical/avionics failers, TFOA, I would perfer a clear area for everyones concern
Would be nice wouldn't it? I remember when DFW had just that...take a look at the approach to that airport today. Really goes to prove "if you build it (an airport), they will come".
 
As for the rest of your post, a matter of opinion. Many experts think the HGS is actually safer than coupled approaches because the pilot is flying the airplane and 100% in the loop as to what is going on and already focused outside for the landing. A matter of philosophy and personal opinion.

No offense to you, but having flown a HUD 737-800, I can tell you those experts are full of shite. A coupled approach allows the pilot to focus full attention on the progression of the approach. A hand flown HUD approach lends itself to flight director fixation. You would not encounter very many line pilots hand flying any approaches below Cat I, if for nothing else, the liability is too great. Many airlines OP Specs require the use of automation below a predetermined runway visual range. Not to mention the FO would probably threaten to harm you. :)
Another point, an aircraft does not have to be HUD equipped to take CAT 1 approach mins down to 1800 RVR. Even airports without touchdown/touchdown zone lighting can be certificated for 1800 RVR.

Strictly 737-300/400 only. I don't know about the 737-700.

Thus, manual braking can result in greater deceleration since it is not automatically reduced to compensate for reverse thrust. This is demonstrated quite simply by disengaging the autobrakes by depressing the brake pedals manually (instead of turning the selector to off) - greater manual braking than the autobrakes are providing is required and certainly available.

Jim

Very accurate statement, but I would point out that most studies have shown that very few pilots every apply max brake pressure. Accidents studies have shown that when asked, many recall applying max only to find out later that was not the case. Very similar to the reduced reaction time necessary for max braking on RTO. It is not a natural instinct to apply max brake pressure on a slick runway surface. I can tell you this, the PF(pucker factor) on that approach would have been off the charts, autoland or manual.
Well see what the NTSB concludes. Thoughts and prayers for the family of the boy and the flight crew. They will need it too.
 
ONE YOUNG BOYS LIFE IS WORTH MORE THAN a Extenended Runway Safety Area,
I'm not trying to be an ass, I swear, but how much would an extended runway safety area cost?

The fact is the government puts a value on the lives of its citizens each and every day, by deciding how much to spend to make certain aspects of life safer. And over the years, from the studies I have seen, we are willing to spend between 8 and 12 million to save 1 life.
 
The fact is the government puts a value on the lives of its citizens each and every day, by deciding how much to spend to make certain aspects of life safer. And over the years, from the studies I have seen, we are willing to spend between 8 and 12 million to save 1 life.

It's not just the government, it is large and small companies also. Merck (Vioxx) and Du Pont (Teflon) are the two most recent examples that come immediately to mind, but it is many, many companies. Companies and their insurers have risk management departments. They weigh the cost vs. the risk and decide which risks are financially worth taking in the terms of financial loss for damages caused by a product, situation or service.

This post is not intended to be a comment on LUV, just merely a very broad response to the post by whlinder.
 
It's not just the government, it is large and small companies also.

We lose 42,000 plus live a year on the nations highways, you can't make life completly safe. This was an Accident.

BTW you can make these small airports safer by simply painting the runway 1,000 foot shorter and use the rest for overun! Calculate landing data for a 1,000 foot shorter runway to land, and voila, instant overun!Probably limit Midway to express jets though, so guess what, WON'T HAPPEN.