Chief Judge Jacobs suggests that we need not decide this question; rather, he contends that [t]he question is whether the [imposition of the March 1 Agreement] violated Northwest's duty to maintain the status quo. Post at 178, 183. However, we must look to bankruptcy law to determine the effect of contract rejection before assessing the rights and remedies of each party subsequent to that rejection. See, e.g., Carey, 816 F.2d at 93; Bohack, 541 F.2d at 317-18. Indeed, as we explained in In re Lavigne, [t]he Bankruptcy Code [generally] treats rejection as a breach so that the non-debtor party will have a viable claim against the debtor. 114 F.3d at 387 (emphasis added). For reasons explained herein, we conclude that § 1113 is an exception to this general principle; a debtor who rejects a contract pursuant to that statutory authority abrogates rather than breaches the CBA at issue.Chief Judge Jacobs also suggests that we miss[ ] the point, because a collective-bargaining agreement is not a private bilateral contract and therefore not susceptible to ․ analysis under bankruptcy law. See post at 183. It is he who misses the point. He cannot, simply by invoking multilateralism, exorcize bankruptcy law from this case; indeed, both Carey and Bohack involved purveyors of services in which the public had an interest, and we gave no hint that they were outside the normal bankruptcy rules because the contracts in those cases were multilateral. Compare post at 183-84 (noting that the CBA in this case is multilateral) with Carey, 816 F.2d at 85 (noting that the debtor has been engaged in the business of providing commuter bus service between New York City and Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports), and Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Bohack Corp., No. 75-C-905, 1975 WL 1213, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.1975), rev'd by Bohack, 541 F.2d 312 (noting that Bohack operates a chain of retail supermarkets throughout Brooklyn, Queens, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties).
