Bend over PDT.
- Thread starter DASH8AV8R
- Start date
BoeingBoy
Veteran
- Joined
- Nov 9, 2003
- Messages
- 16,512
- Reaction score
- 5,865
A most unfortunate side effect of the affiliated Express carriers having contracts that don't expire for a while. The only easy and relatively inexpensive place to cut Express capacity is at the wholly-owned carriers.
Sure is a shame, though. Hate to see anyone hit the street.
Also, the investor guidance that just came out last week forecast a reduction of 6 Dash-8's and 2 CRJ200's. Sounds like they may have decided to reduce capacity more than the guidance called for.
Jim
markkus757
Veteran
- Joined
- Jul 26, 2004
- Messages
- 598
- Reaction score
- 1
"up to 11"
"up to" is such a tricky phrase.
"up to" is such a tricky phrase.
Dash Trash
Member
- Joined
- Dec 11, 2005
- Messages
- 59
- Reaction score
- 0
Doesn't get much more stupid than to park the most fuel efficient airplane in the fleet.
Don't worry. Colgan's Dash-8-400s will soon be blanketing the Northeast and Mid-atlantic.
http://www.pncl.com/aircraft_stats/q400_9l...k_reference.pdf
http://www.pncl.com/aircraft_stats/q400_9l...k_reference.pdf
Dash Trash
Member
- Joined
- Dec 11, 2005
- Messages
- 59
- Reaction score
- 0
Better not be in US paint.
YVINTERN
Veteran
These birds would be cool to fly if Piedmont got those.
robbedagain
Veteran
- Joined
- Oct 13, 2003
- Messages
- 11,125
- Reaction score
- 2,676
Ive heard that the reason PI cant get them is due to the pilots' language scope which has a thing about what the express can fly. I only heard that recently but dont know much about it
The Q400 is an awesome plane, and very comfortable - better than coach on most...
You are correct, sir. ALPA scope clause limits wholly owned turboprop flying to a specific number of seats. I'm not sure what the magic number is, but it is less than 70 seats which is what the DH8-400 will accommodate. It's all political crap, because there is not a US mainline pilot on this planet that would fly a turboprop when they have the option of flying a twin jet.
Bottom line is that US could save a great deal of money on fuel and serve some smaller markets (feeding the mainline jets in the hubs) by utilizing the DH8-400, but until there is a scope change at ALPA, this will not happen.
Funny thing is that both Mesa and Repugnant (contract carriers) are able to fly twin JET aircraft up to 86 seats under the scope, yet a wholly owned division of the company cannot do the same. As a matter of fact, PSA (wholly owned division) looked into purchasing the CRJ-705, which is capable of accommodating 90 passengers, and they were going to fly it with 72 passengers, but ALPA said NO because the gross empty weight of the aircraft was just past their scope limit. Instead, Mesa Airlines gets to fly the CRJ-900 (86 seats) and the revenue goes to a crappy contract carrier with no ties to US.
Why not keep the revenue in house.... Never mind. That would be logical, and logic is obviously NOT a requirement to hold a mainline pilot job at US.
BoeingBoy
Veteran
- Joined
- Nov 9, 2003
- Messages
- 16,512
- Reaction score
- 5,865
The magic number for turboprops is 69 seats - anything seating more is in violation of the scope language.
You did omit one small detail - the company has never asked for turboprop scope relief (unless it's being discussed in the current negotiations) so why would the union voluntarily give it. Starting back in the 90's, the company sought and ALPA agreed to scope relief on the regional jets, which have gone from under 50 seats to 86 seats and the number allowed increased exponentially.
Even the 1998 contract limited Express (jets and turboprops) to 69 or less seats and no more than 25 rj's. Now we've got nearly 300 Express aircraft with a significant number of them being the same size as airplanes that mainline was flying 10 years ago.
Jim
You did omit one small detail - the company has never asked for turboprop scope relief (unless it's being discussed in the current negotiations) so why would the union voluntarily give it. Starting back in the 90's, the company sought and ALPA agreed to scope relief on the regional jets, which have gone from under 50 seats to 86 seats and the number allowed increased exponentially.
Even the 1998 contract limited Express (jets and turboprops) to 69 or less seats and no more than 25 rj's. Now we've got nearly 300 Express aircraft with a significant number of them being the same size as airplanes that mainline was flying 10 years ago.
Jim
BoeingBoy
Veteran
- Joined
- Nov 9, 2003
- Messages
- 16,512
- Reaction score
- 5,865
Piney - I don't know of a U.S. carrier that uses the Q400's as mainline equipment. As you undoubtedly know, HP had the Dash-8's on mainline at one time, but that was before the Q400 (so the HP pilots flew turboprops smaller than the Q400).
Scope is a means of preventing the company from farming out flying/jobs. If there was no scope, do you doubt for a minute that US would farm out the 737/A320 family flying to a Mesa or Republic (just as they've done with the CRJ900 & Emb170/175)?
At what point should the union draw the line? 100 seats? 200 seats? 400 seats? Without scope more than one airline would probably turn into a paper airline - no planes, no crews, no maintenance, no anything but contract carriers. Headquarters would do little but collect the revenue and cut checks to the Mesa's, the Republics, the Comair's of the industry.
Jim
Scope is a means of preventing the company from farming out flying/jobs. If there was no scope, do you doubt for a minute that US would farm out the 737/A320 family flying to a Mesa or Republic (just as they've done with the CRJ900 & Emb170/175)?
At what point should the union draw the line? 100 seats? 200 seats? 400 seats? Without scope more than one airline would probably turn into a paper airline - no planes, no crews, no maintenance, no anything but contract carriers. Headquarters would do little but collect the revenue and cut checks to the Mesa's, the Republics, the Comair's of the industry.
Jim
Jim:
No disagreement on the rationale for limiting outsourcing, but empty gross weight would be a much better way to control "farming out" of mainline flying. The DH8-400 obviously weighs less than a 737/A320, and even less than a CRJ-900/EMB-175, so why not change the scope to reflect this? Allowing EN to fly 70 seat DH8-400's would benefit everyone at US because the revenue would be kept in-house. In these lean times, any small cost savings would benefit the larger organization as a whole. Do you not agree?
Oh, and I don't see Boeing, Airbus, or Bombardier looking into developing a 737/320 sized turboprop to beat the scope. It would be too costly and would not make sense to anyone.
BoeingBoy
Veteran
- Joined
- Nov 9, 2003
- Messages
- 16,512
- Reaction score
- 5,865
Let's see if I can touch on all that...
Seating capacity has been the traditional measure for scope. When an airline is deciding whether to buy airplane X or Y, it's capacity that they're looking at although weight may be a factor in which of two basically identical airplanes to buy. I don't know of any airline that says "we need an aircraft in the 80K - 100K empty weight range". Besides, weight per seat varies over time with technology. The early 707's seated about the same number of passengers as today's Emb170 (albeit in those days it was the equivalent to today's FC) yet weighed considerably more. Heck, it weighed more than a 737. As the composite designs spread over the product lines, a given capacity airplane will be lighter still.
Another problem with using weight is that two aircraft can be used for the same missions but have different weights. For example, the CRJ900 and Emb175 are both capable of holding 86 passengers, but the CRJ900 weighs more. An arbitrary weight could make one allowable under scope and the other a violation of scope. It doesn't make much sense to have a measure that basically demands that the company buy one of two competing products.
Getting into block hours over a certain weight and things like that tend to get complicated and there's the problem of not knowing if scope is being violated until after a given turboprop or rj is on the property and flying passengers. In short, it's like trying to shut the barn door after the horse has gotten out.
I don't see anyone building what we think of as a turboprop in the 100-150 seat range either. Engine manufacturers are researching non-shrouded fan engines for future 737/A320 replacement aircraft. The would be something of a hybrid of turboprops and today's turbofans - a turbine engine turning an exposed fan instead of prop.
While number of seats can be manipulated, the economics limit how much - nobody wants to fly an aircraft designed for 100 seats around with only 70 seats (except for the all-business type operations and there's limited demand for that). Just look at the Q400 - seats from 68 to 78 depending on configuration. If manipulating seats is worthwhile, why doesn't US just get them configured for 69 seats? No scope violation and everyone is happy.
I guess all of this is the long version of why seating capacity is used - it's simple, compliance is known in advance of any airplane being ordered, it's relatively easy to enforce (although there's a grievance about that now).
Jim
Seating capacity has been the traditional measure for scope. When an airline is deciding whether to buy airplane X or Y, it's capacity that they're looking at although weight may be a factor in which of two basically identical airplanes to buy. I don't know of any airline that says "we need an aircraft in the 80K - 100K empty weight range". Besides, weight per seat varies over time with technology. The early 707's seated about the same number of passengers as today's Emb170 (albeit in those days it was the equivalent to today's FC) yet weighed considerably more. Heck, it weighed more than a 737. As the composite designs spread over the product lines, a given capacity airplane will be lighter still.
Another problem with using weight is that two aircraft can be used for the same missions but have different weights. For example, the CRJ900 and Emb175 are both capable of holding 86 passengers, but the CRJ900 weighs more. An arbitrary weight could make one allowable under scope and the other a violation of scope. It doesn't make much sense to have a measure that basically demands that the company buy one of two competing products.
Getting into block hours over a certain weight and things like that tend to get complicated and there's the problem of not knowing if scope is being violated until after a given turboprop or rj is on the property and flying passengers. In short, it's like trying to shut the barn door after the horse has gotten out.
I don't see anyone building what we think of as a turboprop in the 100-150 seat range either. Engine manufacturers are researching non-shrouded fan engines for future 737/A320 replacement aircraft. The would be something of a hybrid of turboprops and today's turbofans - a turbine engine turning an exposed fan instead of prop.
While number of seats can be manipulated, the economics limit how much - nobody wants to fly an aircraft designed for 100 seats around with only 70 seats (except for the all-business type operations and there's limited demand for that). Just look at the Q400 - seats from 68 to 78 depending on configuration. If manipulating seats is worthwhile, why doesn't US just get them configured for 69 seats? No scope violation and everyone is happy.
I guess all of this is the long version of why seating capacity is used - it's simple, compliance is known in advance of any airplane being ordered, it's relatively easy to enforce (although there's a grievance about that now).
Jim
Here is some spin spin
Below is the US Airways Pilots (ALPA MEC) reply to the letter SR.VP Michelle Bryan distributed to all employees regarding the Regional Jet negotiations.
August 1, 2001
Michelle Bryan
Senior Vice President of Human Resources
US Airways Inc.
2345 Crystal Drive Arlington, VA 22227
Dear Ms. Bryan:
Once more, I find myself in the position of reacquainting you with the facts on small jets as they pertain to US Airways management and ALPA.
Your letter of July 30, 2001, that was addressed to the US Airways pilots and copied to all employees contained many misrepresentations and misleading characterizations of our involvement with small jet discussions, as much as a similar January 20, 2000, letter addressed to me did. In a clumsy manner, you are simply picking up where management left off over 17 months ago, forgetting that you had already lost this argument. While it was then unreasonable for you to misrepresent the facts concerning small jet negotiations, it is beyond comprehension now. The only people you are fooling are perhaps yourselves, but definitely not the US Airways pilots and employees.
We will not be driven by an arbitrary date imposed solely at management's discretion. Once we have determined that the pilots' concerns will be addressed, we are committed to working with you to discuss the issues associated with increasing the number of small jets on the US Airways property in a reasonable timeframe. After we have been briefed on the US Airways business plan and the impact of small jets on our jobs, we will work with you to establish a reasonable timeline to conclude the negotiations. Your arbitrary deadline of August 13 does not allow for the type of reasoned and thorough discussion appropriate for an issue of such potential significance to our pilots' job security and career expectations. I would hope that we can agree upon a work plan that will allow adequate time to explore and resolve our collective concerns.
Your July 30, 2001, letter states that little progress was made on the small jet issue in the past three years. However, your letter omits all of the essential facts that reveal management's responsibility for this lack of progress. In 1998, management did not raise the small jet issue as a significant priority. During this period, the pilots' Contract had just gone into effect and had not yet even been printed and distributed to the pilot group.
In February 1999, as per Letter of Agreement 51, a Regional Jet Task Force was established to investigate, study, and consider the issue. There was no timeline stipulated in the letter of agreement, nor was there an obligation to reach an agreement on this issue. The task force's primary role was to gather information and explore the issue.
In March 1999, management's focus was, again, not small jets. Management sought relief from the pilots' Contract by requesting a wet lease agreement to temporarily expand international flying using pilots and aircraft from another carrier. The MEC considered the issue and authorized a wet lease agreement to be developed, but management ultimately could not achieve either a wet or dry lease arrangement or keep the Philadelphia-Amsterdam route from being suspended. During this period, an interim agreement allowing the US Airways Shuttle to be expanded prior to the completion of the merger was also a management priority, and was acted on by the US Airways ALPA MEC.
In June 1999, the MEC held a special meeting to consider authorizing the Negotiating Committee to enter into discussions with management on small jets. During this meeting, the MEC was also considering other management requests for contractual relief to help fix the operational problems caused by management's lack of planning for growing the airline. These included training relief, additional flex cap months for 1999, and management's request for inclusion of ATR72 for code sharing with American Eagle. Due to the important nature of these issues, the special meeting was extended and reconvened in July 1999. Much of ALPA's time and efforts to address the operational issues were undermined by the maintenance backlog that occurred in July and August during management's negotiations with the IAM.
After receiving additional reports on the small jet issue, at the July 1999 special meeting the MEC directed that an RJ Options paper be developed by the Negotiating Committee so that an informed decision could be made by the MEC and pilot group on whether discussions should begin on this issue. The RJ Options paper was then distributed to the pilot group in August 1999.
On October 1, 1999, after receiving a report from the Negotiating Committee providing the MEC with additional information regarding management's plans for an expanded small jet network, the MEC passed a resolution authorizing the Negotiating Committee to engage in discussions with management on this issue.
On December 14, 1999, the MEC suspended these discussions because of the escalating scheduling, jumpseat, and Flight Operations problems, and management's unilateral implementation of the Reserve rest rules. Management failed to work with ALPA, after numerous requests commencing in June 1999, to ensure the rules were implemented with a minimum effect to the Pilots Working Agreement.
On January 19, 2000, the MEC passed a resolution directing the Negotiating Committee to resume negotiations with management on the small jet issue. The MEC determined that management was now satisfactorily addressing the issues that caused the suspension of discussions. On January 20, 2000, you wrote a letter copied to all pilots trying to blame ALPA for management's unilateral actions that caused the suspension of negotiations. That letter was not well received by the US Airways pilots or the MEC.
On April 7, 2000, the pilots ratified Letter of Agreement 79, Interim Small Jet Agreement, giving the Company 35 additional small jets to be operated under US Airways' code. Then on April 12, 2000, in accordance with the provisions of LOA 79, the US Airways MEC directed the Negotiating Committee to commence negotiations with the Company in accordance with LOA 79 on guidelines for future small jet negotiations and discussion of issues as contained in the first paragraph of this LOA.
On May 24, 2000, United and US Airways announced their intent to merge. Management showed little interest in pursuing an additional small jet agreement because of your preoccupation with the proposed merger.
On July 30, 2001, two days after United and US Airways decided to terminate their merger agreement, I received a letter from you demanding that we make a decision about small jets within 14 days. You even stated, "the time for analysis, discussion and negotiation is over." This was over 15 months after ALPA tried to resume small jet discussions under LOA 79.
Let me make this perfectly clear: It is impossible to resolve this matter without negotiations. The pilots' representatives and I have a duty to properly and responsibly represent all pilots to the Company on issues of this magnitude and, therefore, will not be able to provide management with a resolution to the small jet issue without negotiations, no matter what arbitrary date you set.
To reach a resolution, you must ultimately be willing to ensure the pilots that additional small jets will be used to grow the mainline and not be used to displace mainline aircraft and flying, thus jeopardizing not only pilot jobs, but all US Airways' employee mainline jobs. If you do not address this and other issues, we will fight any ill-conceived management "Plan B" to our fullest capability until a resolution to our job security issues and other concerns are properly addressed.
I find your demand on the MEC to make this kind of decision-one that will not only considerably affect our pilots' future, the Company's future, and the future of all US Airways employees-within a period of a mere two weeks to be, at the very least, unreasonable and unattainable. Though you may think that you are forcing our hand by trying to place the pilots solely in charge of determining the future success of US Airways, management, not we, will be held responsible for your actions. We refuse to be your scapegoat because you did not predict an extended merger approval period that would competitively tie your hands.
I am disturbed that your correspondence does not demonstrate the commitment that is essential to entering into a series of productive contract negotiating sessions with ALPA. Any provisions that are not in the Contract, but that you wish to be considered, must be handled as they usually are-through review, research, and then negotiations. Though it may not suit your purposes to deal fairly with the pilots, I am sure you will find that your requirements will be fairly considered through the negotiations process; that is, if management chooses to act in a responsible fashion.
Management's approach to dealing with this matter, by copying a letter to all employees that misrepresents facts and sets an arbitrary due date with no foundation, is ill-advised, ill-conceived, and doomed for failure. Given the gross stupidity of it all, it appears that failure and blame must be management's real intent.
If the Company will make a commitment to the negotiating process, we are willing to discuss a resolution benefiting the Company, the US Airways pilots, and all employee groups. Without sincere negotiations, we cannot provide a resolution to your small jet concerns.
Sincerely,
Captain Chris Beebe
US Airways MEC Chairman
C: US Airways pilots
All US Airways employees
Chairman Stephen Wolf
President and CEO Rakesh Gangwal
