Yep, that's to be expected; recall that AMR borrowed about a billion dollars in mid-March secured by LHR and NRT slots to boost the cash balance and has probably paid down a billion or so of this year's maturing debt (and/or some combination of pension contributions) in the third quarter. We'll know for sure in about a month. I would bet serious money that AA generated positive operating cash in the third quarter but that maturing debt and pension contributions consumed at least a billion dollars.
although less than 24 hrs have passed since I posted this, the thread has carried on ... in force.
Yes, I have said for quite some time that those who thought that the $6B in cash that AA had wouldn't last real long if they could no longer borrow money or are no longer able to refinance debt.
In their SEC filings earlier this year, AMR said they had better than $2B in debt payments due this year - plus their pension obligations... I don't remember the exact amount but AMR did refinance some of it - pushing the payments out.
They still have significant amounts of debt and pension obligations due in the current and 4th quarters - thus, the drain on cash is very much expected - and some of that will occur in the 4th quarter - thus it wasn't reflected in AMR's calculations regarding the $900M decrease in cash that will occur in the 4th quarter.
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Given that AMR has said they will do impairment analysis on their fleet later this year, it is possible that the underlying assets will be found to be insufficient for the debt they guarantee - which could further diminish cash as AMR might have to either put up more collateral or reduce their indebtedness.... since they likely have no further unmortgaged collateral they can pledge, the alternative is to shell out more cash. Since they appear to have no unmortgaged assets, they will not be able to obtain debtor-in-possession financing which is essentially the working cash a company needs while they are in bankruptcy. Absent DIP, AMR MUST ensure they have enough cash to get them thru a BK should that occur - $3B is the minimum amount of cash AMR should hold going into BK and probably a lot more.
Debt service and pension obligations stop very quickly after a BK filing. Operational losses still have to be covered.
If AMR did not generate positive cash flow in the 3rd quarter or did so at fairly small levels, the chances of depleting cash due to operational losses is quite high.
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The implication of this is that as AMR's cash declines, the pressure to stem losses increases - and with it comes the threat to the pension plans - and the resulting likelihood that the pensions will be terminated... which will itself drive a spike in retirements from people who want to get in on the current pension plans... and remember that retirement funding of all forms usually is not paid in BK so employees could be faced with a terminated pension plan but no 401K replacement until AA emerges.
Thus, there could be a further spike in retirements, including pilots, which could drive operational shortages and reduced cashflow which creates a viscious cycle.
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The point in knowing this information is that for some people it does provide insight about what will likely happen w/ AA/AE and how AA employments should prepare themselves. For those who say they intend to stick it out but will reduce their output to match their reduced salaries, there isn't much any of us can do to argue otherwise. For others, though, they will give their best regardless of the return.
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E is absolutely right that the world has changed... there is way too much finger pointing about what has caused AA's problems and far too little on how to get out of the present situation.
I personally believe that AMR mgmt had some flawed assumptions - other carriers would fail and AA didn't need to do make some of the tough choices they otherwise should have made. IN reality, airline BKs have not been completely successful in the past so it could well have been rational to believe that at least one of AA's competitors wouldn't make it out.
I also believe that AA's best efforts after the 2003 cuts were hampered by efforts well beyond AA's control - the 2004/05 spike in fuel prices, one of the deepest economic drops in US history, and the unfortunate reality that Washington is itself so broken that they can't fix anything - and just keep passing the blame and bill everyone else.
AA's mgmt might not have been able to overcome even half of what they have outside of BK... and even then once again there is no assurance that BK would have worked.
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Whatever got AMR to this point, though, is far less important than what it will take to get AA back on its feet and as a viable employer and competitor. Right now, AA's employee loyalty is barely palpable and competitors continue to escalate their attacks on AA's core markets; as AA's core markets from both ORD and DFW going both east and west are infiltrated by competitors, the fix MUST COME quickly or AA could well become one of the statistics of airlines that did not successfully restructure or did so only to find they were so weakened they could never compete.
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AA needs mgmt that can steer the company and employees thru a restructuring that becomes more difficult by the day - but they also need employees that are not dead set on burning the company down because their own expectations are so far out of line that they can never become reality.