Total gates at LAX ?

[Overspeed]

How much 777/787 gate space is at T4? Last time I flew through there I think only 4 were capable. According to the LAWA site the TBIT can handle mostly A380s so you can pretty much fit everything on there. Still if AA wants to add more Asia/MCLA then they need to get more 777/787 capable gates.

 

[WorldTraveler]

Hey,.....Maybe AA will 'ASSS-WHOOP'...DEL-DUH  in LAX, like they DEFINITELY DID in DFW

and like DL did to AA in NYC.

and it's not over there yet including to LAX (which happens to be a MAJOR market) where DL continues to shift revenue.

 

[commavia]

How much 777/787 gate space is at T4? Last time I flew through there I think only 4 were capable. According to the LAWA site the TBIT can handle mostly A380s so you can pretty much fit everything on there. Still if AA wants to add more Asia/MCLA then they need to get more 777/787 capable gates.

 
I doubt it would/will be much of an issue.  It's hard to imagine AA achieving an "end state" at LAX with longhaul 777/787 beyond LHR, GRU, TYO, ICN, PEK, PVG, HKG, SYD and AKL.  Given the scheduling realities that such an operation would entail, it's likely that the natural departure and arrival banks for such routes would mean a "peak" of flights (and widebody-capable gates needed) around mid-day/1100-1400 (TYO, ICN, PEK, PVG, possibly HKG), another in the evening/1800-2100 (LHR, GRU) and finally one in the late evening/2100-2300 (SYD, AKL).  As such, it seems unlikely that AA would ever need more than 3-5 widebody-gates at one time, and between what AA already has in T4 and what AA will soon have with expanded access to TBIT, that shouldn't be a problem.

 

[NewHampshire Black Bears]

and like DL did to AA in NYC.

and it's not over there yet including to LAX (which happens to be a MAJOR market) where DL continues to shift revenue.

 
Just a little disingenuous here  WT, old boy.
AA pretty much gave up on EWR because of UA/CO.  In LGA, evidently AA saw much more value in the swap of LGA for DCA.
As for JFK,  Bob CRANDALL (you remember him  WT) said looooong ago that he wasn't going to 'chase nickles and dimes', and that accounts for a lot of surrendering the carib  to B6.  Next we've got the AA/BA thing where BA took a lot of the LHR on thier Metal.
AA signaled looooong ago that they were NOT going to fly places in Europe just because there was a paved runway in some countries over there.  I mean, I can remember you on here  'Tub thumping' over the fact that DEL-DUH was  flying from JFK to glamorous places like Romainia or Serbia, perhaps Albania or Bulgaria !
 
 
Good thing that DEL-DUH is 'trying' to 'force thier way into SEA' (though you've in for a no-holds-barred bare knuckle beef with AS for domestic and some short haul International).
As for SFO, DL ain't SHIIT, and your fast approaching a ASSS Kicking in LAX.
So whats left ?
Maybe DL can be #1 in SAN or PDX(but again in PDX, AS will have a LOT to say about that )
 
And back to SEA for a brief second.  I'm Thinking NOW, that...That's WHY DL is so Gung Ho over SEA, because they KNEW sometime back that they WERE NOT going to be #1 ANYWHERE on the west coast.
After all is said and done, DEL-DUH will resettle into thier natural position of  #  " 3 " , behind AA and UA in that order !

 

[WorldTraveler]

AA didn't make the decision to bail on LGA. US did by giving DL 1/4 of the slots at LGA which US couldn't figure out how to use.
and the slots they gained at DCA as part of the slot swap ended up being given up as part of the merger agreement so AA/US gained absolutely nothing but a few coins for all of those slots in the NE.

as for JFK, feel free to call flying across the Atlantic as chump chain but it is the world's largest int'l market and DL solidly established itself as the largest carrier at JFK and is making money doing so.

Quite simply, AA had costs that were too high because they didn't bother to file for BK and get their costs down so DL managed to grow as aggressively as they did.

Given that AA started to grow across the Atlantic post BK, your narrative doesn't match what actually happened.

The Atlantic matters and AA wants and needs to be a bigger player - but they gave up their presence in the largest TATL market and competitors gained a major share even in AA's key LHR market.

as for the west coast, DL has already passed AA as the #2 carrier of the big 3 on the west coast even after their merger with US and passed UA as #2 at LAX. and given that DL has two hubs on the west coast and is only about 15% smaller than AA at LAX in terms of total seats even after the merger, it isn't hard see why DL strategically thought thru what it took to become the #2 carrier on the west coast and is executing perfectly to reach that goal.

DL is now 14% larger than AA/US on a combined basis on the west coast or more than 8000 seats/day.

and DL will be announcing another buildout of SEA for next year as well as additional growth at LAX.

 

[FWAAA]

I doubt it would/will be much of an issue.  It's hard to imagine AA achieving an "end state" at LAX with longhaul 777/787 beyond LHR, GRU, TYO, ICN, PEK, PVG, HKG, SYD and AKL.  Given the scheduling realities that such an operation would entail, it's likely that the natural departure and arrival banks for such routes would mean a "peak" of flights (and widebody-capable gates needed) around mid-day/1100-1400 (TYO, ICN, PEK, PVG, possibly HKG), another in the evening/1800-2100 (LHR, GRU) and finally one in the late evening/2100-2300 (SYD, AKL).  As such, it seems unlikely that AA would ever need more than 3-5 widebody-gates at one time, and between what AA already has in T4 and what AA will soon have with expanded access to TBIT, that shouldn't be a problem.

I agree, but my list of possible long-haul routes is a little longer. Some may not have much of a chance, but they're possible. LHR(2), GRU, EZE, NRT, HND, ICN, PEK, PVG, HKG, TPE, SYD, AKL, MAD and CDG (seasonally). And even with my impossibly outlandish proposed maximum number of longhaul flights, the four TBIT gates plus the three or four widebody gates at T-4 should be adequate.

 

[commavia]

I agree, but my list of possible long-haul routes is a little longer. Some may not have much of a chance, but they're possible. LHR(2), GRU, EZE, NRT, HND, ICN, PEK, PVG, HKG, TPE, SYD, AKL, MAD and CDG (seasonally). And even with my impossibly outlandish proposed maximum number of longhaul flights, the four TBIT gates plus the three or four widebody gates at T-4 should be adequate.

 
Out of what you added to the list, TPE isn't impossible to imagine - although it is hard to imagine given what a competitive, and low-yielding, market it is.  Personally, I don't think MAD or CDG have much chance - MAD because it's already well-covered with the seasonal A330 from AA's JV partner Iberia, and CDG because I am just not sure the market can handle another carrier in addition to the dominant carrier on the route, Air France (AA has tried it before).  In any event, though, I agree with you that the most likely scheduling of these flights would mean AA would still have plenty of widebody-capable gate space at the times it would need it.

 

[WorldTraveler]

LHR has a LAX-LHR #2. LAX-GRU is sucking wind and the Argentine economy is smaller than Brazil's

TPE is a Skyteam carrier hub so there will be no feed on that one and if anything DL can do the same thing at TPE that it is doing with PVG - start a route where it has more ability to push/pull traffic; but TPE will be started from SEA first perhaps next year with the new 333s which match the costs with the yields.

AA will always be weaker to any destination in China than either DL or UA which is why AA execs should be smart enough to realize their talk of starting any more LAX to China will result in two flights, only one of which will be operated by AA.

DL will start its own CDG flight the nanosecond AA or UA even think about starting their own.

MAD is the only flight that remotely makes sense but Spain's economy is still very weak and MAD is a poor connecting hub compared to others.

DUB makes more sense than anything else you have listed but that is still mighty iffy.

and I believe NZ is part of the DL - VA JV as well and Air NZ is a Star carrier.

So, once again, we are right back to the fact that LAX is a highly competitive market where other carriers are stronger than AA in a number of key destinations where AA wants to go. There's a reason why AA is realizing its Asian growth works from DFW where it has not from more competitive hubs.

 

[commavia]

Blah, blah, blah - if Delta can't do it, nobody can.  Regardless of the alliance structure in China, I still contend that ultimately Delta and United will come to a point where they stop fighting any further for LAX.  Delta isn't going to match every single new AA flight from LAX to China, or the rest of Asia, plane for plane - it's not only a waste of shareholder resources, but it frankly distracts from and dilutes the good thing Delta has going up at SEA.

 

[WorldTraveler]

no, it just says that this enormous list of destinations is child's play and a game of pins on a dartboard instead of economic reality.

back in the real world, AA will continue to face the reality that LAX is a highly competitive market where it cannot obtain the size or share to build a presence to Asia which is full of much lower cost carriers.

Competitors will do what they have to protect their economic interests which means that if they can make a route work better than AA, they will indeed add that market.

that is reality.

The vast majority of those markets you list would be matched by either DL or UA very quickly with new service of their own.

btw, UA, not DL, announced LAX-PVG service within hours of AA's announcement and UA has consistently pulled down higher average fares and total revenue than AA on that route just as DL has done to Japan on the routes where AA and DL have competed.

 

[commavia]

It's game theory.  The reality, much as it's hard for some to admit, let alone accept, it, is that Richard Anderson doesn't have a bottomless pit of shareholders' money to burn and so he has to pick his battles just like every other airline - especially now that, for the first time in years, he's up against airlines that have just as much, if not more, cash to play with as he does.
 
In the case of LAX, PVG notwithstanding, it's hard to imagine how he would consciously, intentionally pick the battle of just dumping endless capacity to match AA Asia flight-for-Asia-flight, and then still be able to stand up in front of investors and the street and ramble on about capacity discipline.  Put simply - I doubt that if AA does, indeed, start flying from LAX to ICN, PEK, HKG and/or AKL (all of which have been publicly identified by AA executives by name) that Delta will necessarily add those same routes.  It just doesn't make sense given what Delta has built at SEA.
 
I don't dispute that Delta likely will continue to grow at LAX - albeit more in capacity than frequency - but I still predict that, ultimately, Delta will conclude that it's big enough at LAX - internationally, and in general - to be a viable, if not leading, competitor in the market, and that's "good enough," and that it isn't worth distracting from, or diluting, their strong and growing SEA hub just to prove a point by causing pain for AA at LAX.

 

[WorldTraveler]

neither does AA have a bottomless pit of money to develop routes where it will be beat by other carriers on both sides of the Pacific.

AA sucked wind flying from NYC, ORD, and LAX to Asia. They have grown DFW to Asia and have seen some nice improvement.

It is not lost on AA execs even if you don't get it that developing new routes in other carrier strength markets is a very risky proposition and rarely generates decent revenues.

that is compounded 10 tens or more in the LAX to Asia market where AA has much less strength and where it does not get comparable revenues to DL and UA even in Japan where AA has a JV partner.

LAX is the top market for every Asian carrier; they will not allow a carrier to jump in and add service that will impact their profitability.

whether you want to admit it or not, AA will never be a unique and profitable player in LAX to Asia because carriers on both side of the Pacific will match what AA does because a host of competitors will match what AA does route for route and fare for fare and those other carriers all have better potential to make money on those routes than AA does.

If AA's performance on LAX-PVG compared to UA and in LAX-NRT compared to both DL and UA isn't proof then AA can continue to flush more - shareholder assets - down the drain until it becomes clear that the DFWs and PHLs of the world is where AA needs to build its Asia route network.

The fact that DL and UA have both built hubs up the coast doesn't mean they are any more willing to let AA have LAX just because AA didn't have the foresight to develop its own west coast hub in a city where it could be the dominant TPAC carrier.

 

[commavia]

The difference is between adding margin-dilutive capacity in the service of broader, strategic aims vs adding margin-dilutive capacity simply to harm or punish a competitor.  Specifically, I think both Anderson at Delta and Parker at AA can make very compelling and convincing cases that adding capacity (longhaul and domestic) at SEA and LAX, respectively, is well "worth" the investment because of the strategic objectives it achieves.  AA needs LAX in a way Delta does not, which is why I suspect that if it came to throwing cash at losses, AA will be willing to outlast Delta.  Put another way - between the two, I think Delta will blink first with tons of new LAX-Asia capacity if it came to that (which, again, I don't even think it will).  In contrast, I do not believe that Anderson would be able to make such a convincing case for dumping tons of new capacity into LAX-Asia on top of - hypothetically - tons of new capacity from AA.  Investors and the street would ask, justifiably, why on earth he'd be pouring so many more seats into LAX-Asia to prove a point against AA when he has just finished doing the same thing - successfully - at SEA.  And I don't think he'd have a good answer - he'd say, of course, that LAX-Asia was strategic and worth taking the losses, but I don't think investors or the street would buy it as they would for AA (both given AA's greater need, and given AA's larger operation at LAX).  Which is why, again, I think Delta will ultimately settle into a strong #2 position at LAX (internationally and overall) and accept that AA is and will necessarily lead the market (internationally and overall).  Game theory.

 

[WorldTraveler]

and the only way that you can argue that is by calling other carrier flights margin dilutive and AA's margin positive when the reality is that DL and UA generate more revenue per seat to Asia than AA does by a wide margin.

The economic reality is that AA is not going to succeed in adding flights from LAX and be profitable doing so.

You are still hung up with the hope that AA can make LAX a hub to Asia but it won't happen unless there are 3 hubs.... one for each of the big 3.

DL is already the #2 carrier at LAX and the number 1 int'l carrier. They won't SETTLE for a downgrade just so that AA can have what it failed to build elsewhere on the west coast.

UA is still the largest of the big 3 on the west coast and also the largest west coast to Asia. that is not likely to change regardless of what AA wants to do.

AA can settle into the place that the marketplace establishes is appropriate for it.

#3 to Asia including from LAX and #1 domestically from LAX

 

[commavia]

Haha - AA can only make LAX an Asia hub if Delta and United can do.  Such a comical logical fallacy.
 
No, still not getting it - what I'm saying is not that dumping capacity into LAX-Asia would be margin-dilutive for Delta and margin-accretive for AA.  What I'm saying is that it would almost certainly be margin-dilutive for both, at least in the near-term, but that margin dilution would be more justifiable and defensible for AA than for Delta.
 
So yes, I think Delta will, indeed, "settle" for being #2 at LAX - in general, internationally, and to Asia specifically - and allow AA to continue to grow LAX-Asia without dumping tons of additional, excess capacity on top of AA.  Anderson has to pick his battles and I do not believe he will be able to make a compelling case that LAX-Asia is, writ large, a battle worth picking.  It will lose money and put at risk the economics of his growing SEA hub, and for no major purpose other than to ensure AA, too, loses money.