first, Jim's information is not only patently incorrect but it is part of the same strategy that far too many people, esp. AA aviation internet chat forum participates, have used for years: if you can't debate an argument on the merits of the subject itself, then attack the person, esp. with false information.
DL has offered early retirement packages over a half dozen times between 9/11 and the present and tens of thousands of employees have left VOLUNTARILY, allowing DL to reduce employee headcount and costs and for employees to leave earlier than they otherwise would in order to pursue other things in life. To argue that anyone at DL was forced out or that DL wanted them gone is simply false and nothing but an attempt to deflect from discussing real business issues.
second, AA is still in ORD-DUS but it, to few people's surprise, gets average fares that are lower than UA/LH on the same route. AA has never been able to maintain a strong presence in continental Europe although IB is doing more to help them accommplish that to Spain. US' continental Europe presence was heavily built around Star hubs or low fare traffic and that is precisely why AA has had to restructure its network.
third, the two basic principles that are are work in this discussion and that far too many people can't accept is that A. DL has been more successful at penetrating AA's major int'l markets compared to what AA has been able to do in AA's and B. AA's niche market strategy both in NYC and now in the JFK transcons is not sustainable long-term.
Few people would argue that carriers don't enjoy a revenue premium in their hubs - just as AA does at DFW and US does/did at CLT. It is that same type of dynamic that exists all over the US and world; hub carriers achieve a premium in most markets to/from their hubs while the largest carrier in a hub - UA at ORD compared to AA, UA at DEN compared to WN, DL at ATL compared to WN/FL, AA at DFW compared to WN at DL - obtain a larger premium.
whether some can accept it or not, AA neglected NYC for 10 years while B6 and DL grew. DL specfically surpassed AA at the largest airline at both LGA and JFK and now has the revenue premiums - not just in average fares but in total revenues by market - in many markets where it has competed not just wiht AA but other carriers. The few examples are to other carrier hubs that are larger than DL's NYC hubs - CLT, ORD, DFW. Even where DL has not obtained size parity, it has often achieved average fare parity.
NYC is now home to hubs by 3 carriers - B6, DL, and UA that have larger hub operations than AA at the airports where the two compete.
While the huge size of the NYC local market and the relatively slow pace at which market power shifts in a market of that size have slowed the changed in market share compared to other markets, you cannot believe that NYC is any less bound by the same economic principles that govern other hubs and which AA and its fans seem to want to enjoy there.
Thus, it is hard to accept that AA's NYC strategy is viable long-term, esp. given that DL has pushed into AA's top markes from NYC - LAX, SFO, MIA, and LHR - and has achieved parity or better in each of those markets.
people can disagree with me as to where AA in NYC is headed but the path of where they have come and what DL has achieved both in JFK-LAX/SFO and to LHR - where the redeployment of aircraft in this thread is the issue - but it is mighty hard to argue that NYC will be the sole exception to hub strength when AA/US built the merger in part around the strength that US had built at every one of US' eastern US hubs.
There is no basis for trashing someone or making patently false statements if you don't agree... express your disagreement, keep looking for data to support your position, and let time be the judge.