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August 2013 Pilot Discussion

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He's right, they do have to live with it. Under our TA we didn't, whether you agree with the method or not, that's a fact.

Legally not yet, I predict we will and what has been the cost of the delay?

Ethically we do have to live with it.
 
Legally not yet, I predict we will and what has been the cost of the delay?

Ethically we do have to live with it.

I've always thought that absent outside events(merger with AA?) we would too, and the cost has been great. But, you overlook the fact that the TA gave us the power to make changes, or live with separate operations. That is costly to both sides and I think we should have found another solution.
 
No, what's ACPC?

It was the ALPA dog and pony show they put on to keep us in ALPA. Where they bought peoples trips, paid for their rooms, food etc.

I went, just didn't let them buy me off. There was lots of good information there. Some I bought, some I didn't. The most interesting ALPA guy there was not a pilot, but a lawyer, as I recall. He gave a good history of ALPA merger policy, and how it changed over time. He flat out said "We screwed up. We will change it, we just can't help you." I appreciated his honesty.

It should be evident that Nicolau screwed up. It's why SLIs are done differently now. I can see guys arguing that the policy was follow, the west didn't forces anything on the east and that we should live with the results. I just can't get someone arguing that it was fair or right.
 
It should be evident that Nicolau screwed up. It's why SLIs are done differently now. I can see guys arguing that the policy was follow, the west didn't forces anything on the east and that we should live with the results. I just can't get someone arguing that it was fair or right.

We'll see if the courts or the next arbitration panel agree with you, that's all that matters.
 
ual mec update:

This ISL Update will cover a number of questions we have received from pilots regarding the ISL itself and related areas. Questions regarding procedures and policy on certain subjects may not be able to be addressed at this time since many items are still being resolved by the Company, related committees and the MEC.

1. How was "status and category" solved for and applied to the ISL?

A1: "Status and category" was part of the hybrid solution and was given a weighting of 65% by the Arbitration Panel. It is important to understand that an individual pilot's status and category to him, but instead creates a list of slots (approx. 7,699 at l-UAL and 4,800 for l-CAL) from top to bottom ordered per the following list:

[indent=1.625]1) B747 CA and B777 CA[/indent]
[indent=1.625]2) B767/757 CA[/indent]
[indent=1.625]3) A320/319 and B737 CA[/indent]
[indent=1.625]4) B747 FO and 777 F/O[/indent]
[indent=1.625]5) B767/757 F/O[/indent]
[indent=1.625]6) A320/319 and B737 F/O[/indent]
[indent=1.625]7) Furloughees[/indent]

For purposes of the ISL, this ordering of aircraft created a list of slots for each airline which were filled in seniority order with names from the respective lists irrespective of the equipment each individual pilot was flying. Each name was assigned a rank, from 1 to approx. 12,499, based on the placement on this list. Note that in no case can a pilot's seniority be adjusted up or down relative to fellow pilots from their respective lists, but the resulting ISL does respect the number of status and category slots carried in to the new United.

For a comprehensive understanding of how the status and category list and the longevity list are created which, in turn, are weighted 65%/35% to create the hybrid list, please review UAL Exhibits, Vol. 4 (Harwood), at 3-1 through 3-15 and the hearing transcript at 2401-2415 (Harwood).

2. How was "longevity" applied to the final ISL?

A2: "Longevity" was given a weighting of 35% by the arbitrators. Mainline longevity values were not linear in either pilot group's pre-merger seniority list. Previous furloughs with returns not in seniority order and previous mergers (with varying longevity carried into the merged carrier) are examples of why the longevity maps are chaotic in relation to the individual seniority lists.

In the same way the "status and category" lists described above were created, two lists of empty slots were created with longevity values applied from actual pilots from the most to the least longevity. Only mainline time was credited in the various longevity values. With that step complete, individual pilot names were matched with those longevity values from top to bottom in seniority order. As before, in no case can relative seniority on individual lists be reordered, irrespective of the arbitrators' decision to credit only "mainline" longevity. The correct longevity was used in creating the slots and the effect of utilizing mainline longevity only is reflected in the final award. It is critical to understand that for the purposes of the ISL, an individual pilot's longevity, just like status and category, is assigned in descending order to a slot which is then paired to an individual pilot in seniority order. As before, each name is assigned a ranking, from 1 to approx. 12,499 based on the placement on the list.

To apply the 65%/35% weighting, a pilot’s status-and-category ranking (1 to 12,499) was multiplied by 0.65 and his longevity ranking was multiplied by 0.35. The resulting, weighted ranking governed the pilot’s placement on the final list.

For a comprehensive understanding of how the status and category list and the longevity list are created which, in turn, are weighted 65%/35% to create the hybrid list, please review UAL Exhibits, Vol. 4 (Harwood), at 3-1 through 3-15 and the hearing transcript at 2401-2415 (Harwood).

3. How were career expectations addressed?

A3: Career expectations were factored into the list by the arbitrators as they settled on the 65% / 35% ratio to "status and category" and "longevity." Further corrections for career expectations were applied in "Conditions and Restrictions" such as the 747-400 / A350 and 787 fences.

4. Can you please explain the Furlough Out of Seniority Order clause?

A4: Condition & Restriction (“C&R&rdquo😉 No. 7 to the SLI Award provides that, for five years, pre-merger UAL pilots that were involuntarily furloughed as of October 1, 2010 shall be subject to furlough prior to the furlough of any pre-merger CAL pilot. This C&R is based on one that the UAL Merger Committee included in its ISL proposal. In operation, it will require that any furloughs begin with new hire pilots, including constructive notice pilots, and if necessary, continue to pre-merger UAL pilots that were involuntarily furloughed as of the snapshot date. Pre-merger CAL pilots and pre-merger UAL pilots that were not on furlough status at the time would then be subject to furlough in reverse seniority order.

The Committee proposed this C&R as part of its efforts to persuade the Board to integrate UAL pilots on furlough as of the constructive notice date with CAL pilots that were active. Ultimately, these efforts were successful and the Board integrated an unprecedented number of furloughed pilots with active pilots. Had the Board not integrated these pilots in this manner, they would have been placed at the bottom of the combined seniority list permanently, and would therefore be subject to furlough prior to any pre-merger CAL pilot for the rest of their careers.

5. How do the fences in the ISL award apply to a UAL furloughee hired at CAL?

A5: The fences apply to the pilot's legacy carrier. The UAL pilots flying at CAL (the 7.B pilots) have the protection of the 747-400/A350 fence and not the 787.

6. Why is the list not linear and why did 332 pilots fall off the list since the proposal in June?

A6: The longevity push is NOT linear. It follows a sine wave for the UAL pilots and a cosine for CAL pilots (see attached chart) - the outer lines are the 50% longevity solution (our proposal), the inner is ISL. Pilots at different points on the list will have relative motion changes that differ from pilots at other points of the list. Those spots where the red or blue lines touch have ZERO percentage change due to the change in the longevity component, while others are seeing 2+% point changes due to the change from 50% to 35% longevity. That being said, if you randomly select a single pilot and follow their seniority change through various longevity iterations, the results are quite linear, as you are only comparing them to themselves.

The more important issue that people are often not considering is the scrub (the update since our proposal was presented to the arbitrators). A total of 332 pilots fell off the list since our 50% proposal was published. These pilots came from various locations along the list, so their effect on individuals is not uniform throughout the list.



7. How soon will we start flying each other's equipment? Cross crewing?

A7: The 737 base in SFO will be the first to see L-UAL and L-CAL pilots flying together by the end of 2013. There is no definite date at this point for implementation or completion of equipment swapping and cross-crewing in other domiciles and fleets. It may take a year or more to bring maintenance, dispatch, aircraft systems, difference training and other issues in line to mix legacy fleets. In the meantime everyone will be able to exercise their ISL seniority in bidding any aircraft categories that become available even if they are split like with EWR and IAH 757/767.

8. Now that the ISL is out, what's next? There is talk that the 767-400 will be split from the 767-300/757 fleet.

A8: The Company has said there is no plan to split off the 767-400 fleet.
 
We'll see if the courts or the next arbitration panel agree with you, that's all that matters.

You don't agree that the Nicolau award had an effect on ALPA merger policy and SLI handling in general?

I think if our SLI had gone like UA/CO then we wouldn't be here right now.
 
Yes, but I think the predominate reason the ALPA merger policy was changed was to benefit the United pilots just like it was changed to benefit them before the attempted USAirways United merger.
 
C. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE BUILD MODELS
The primary failing of the CAL proposal's use of only status, to the virtual
exclusion of all other Merger Policy factors, is that it unfairly, inequitably and
disproportionately benefits one pilot group to the consequent detriment of the other. If
either group proposed using any other single Merger Policy factor alone, like longevity,
the resulting list would also be distorted, but in a different direction. Another defect of
the CAL Committee's proposed ISL is that it unjustifiably creates extremely large tiers of
pilots from a single airline. Some such distortions are inevitable in any merger of
seniority lists. But the career-long blocking effect of those spawned by the CAL proposal

could harm morale and employee relations for decades to come.

21


The CAL Committee's use of an April 1, 2013 base list date is manifestly intended
to embrace the windfall of potential Captain upgrades in February 2014, generated by
premerger CAL System Bid 14-02. Memorializing that windfall by treating captains (or
at least some captains) as fungible equals irrespective of aircraft, while treating others as
“unneeded”, is not a bone fide status & category ratio. And simply disregarding
longevity as an equity factor seems engineered to justify the unfair stapling to the
bottom of the list all United pilots in furlough status on May 3, 2010.
On the May 3, 2010 MAD, United had many more pilots on furlough than
Continental. However, United’s furloughees, in the main, had significantly greater
longevity than the Continental furloughees. Those UAL furloughees brought substantial
longevity to the merger, compared to the CAL pilots at the bottom of the CAL list.3
Further, as a consequence of their respective hiring patterns, United’s First Officers as a
whole had greater longevity than, but also were older than, similarly situated
Continental First Officers. A proposal that completely ignores sweat equity longevity
cannot be a plank in our ISL platform.

In our considered judgment, both the methodology of the CAL Committee and its
resultant proposed ISL are incompatible with the revised ALPA Merger Policy. Aside
from the windfall inequities generated by using an April 1, 2013 snapshot date, total
disregard of the longevity factor cannot possibly be justified in the factual circumstances
of this case. Not surprisingly, the ISL produced by the CAL Committee's fatally defective
methodology is neither fair nor equitable.
3 Six hundred twenty-one of the most junior 1445 United pilots had greater longevity than
all 1512 Continental pilots hired after 2005 (i.e., the bottom third of the CAL list). Tr. 2481-83
(Ruark); UX-5 (Ruark), at 18. The next, more junior group of 633 UAL furloughees had longevity
similar to the CAL pilots hired between 2005 and 2007. The final, most junior group of 192 UAL
furloughees had longevity similar to the 148 CAL pilots on furlough at the time of the merger.

22


At the end of the day, despite our best efforts, we were unable to find a way to
adjust or modify the CAL Committee's list build model to produce an acceptably fair and
equitable ISL. Even with a different snapshot date, contrived differentials premised on
post-merger changes inflating premerger career expectations still drive that ersatz
ratioed model. A gerrymandered approximation of a status-only model that uses
assumptions at odds with Merger Policy cannot be used to build our Award.
 
Yes, but I think the predominate reason the ALPA merger policy was changed was to benefit the United pilots just like it was changed to benefit them before the attempted USAirways United merger.

Airline pilots are not immune to human nature. Everyone says "I only want what I brought to the merger", but it is rarely true. Certainly isn't in our case.
 
I think if our SLI had gone like UA/CO then we wouldn't be here right now.

If we would have asked for an award like that instead of saying "We're comfortabe with our position" we might have gotten an award like that.

We told Nicolau: You do it with no input from us.

Do you disagree?
 
He's right, they do have to live with it. Under our TA we didn't, whether you agree with the method or not, that's a fact.
But you will die on LOA93. Just so you understand the consequences...
 
He moves up much more rapidly than he could have expected at AWA. The east guy beside him has his movement and achievement slowed by the placement.

Read this:

http://leonidas.cact...ion_18May07.pdf

Okay PI, I read through the East MEC presentation. Despite the numerous claims that the NIC constitutes a windfall to the west, their argument is self-defeating. As I have pointed out multiple times, the definition of a windfall is a sudden and unexpected financial gain that comes without merit. Now the definition of sudden is:

sud·den
[suhd-n]


adjective
1.
happening, coming, made, or done quickly, without warning, or unexpectedly: a sudden attack.

2.
occurring without transition from the previous form, state, etc.; abrupt: a sudden turn.


So, lets begin with the charts presented before the argument even begins. First off, in my opinion, these charts should have been presented with four colors to represent the four distinct groups identified in the award itself. Of course those four groups are:
1. Active east pilots at the time of the merger
2. Active west pilots at the time of the merger
3. Furloughed east pilots at the time of the merger
4. LCC pilots hired after the merger and SLI list award

There is an obvious east, anti-NIC bias presence in the charts when all four groups are not represented separately. Any attempting to evaluate the east MEC's claim with an independent and unbiased vantage point would need to know how many of the blue data points were active east, furloughed east and new hire in order to evaluate the effect of the NIC integration with the orange data points. Also, it would be very useful to see the same data presented on a date-of-hire basis or whatever the east MEC was advocating as a "fair" resolution to the NIC.

Still using the graphs as they were presented, there is nothing to indicate a windfall (sudden, unexpected). Look again at the first graph with this definition in mind. Notice how the blue dominates the 2 2/3 rows and then the orange data points are shown in a well spread pattern intermixed with the blue data points for the next 20+ rows which we can only presume represents the total of the active pilots at the time of the merger. So the merger occurred in 2005 and by 2007 there is no sudden and unexpected windfall two years after the triggering event.

The next chart shows 2011 data which we can presume should be 2016 data now based on the age 65 rule change, which is between four and nine years after the merger and there is still no strong concentration of orange data points that indicate anything significant happened between 2007 and 2011 (2016) other than the top rows which were originally all blue are disappearing. The nicely patterned data spread that was shown in rows 3-22 (or so) of the 2007 chart is effectively identical six to eleven years later even with anticipated movement off the list of blue data points at the top. The spread seems to tighten a bit by the 2015/2020 mark, but without all four groups of pilots represented the analysis is no longer valid just by looking a two colors of data points. So, how does data which shows a fairly even spread of active east and west pilots holding their positions equally for 6, 10, or 20 years AFTER the merger in any way show a windfall that is sudden and unexpected? The "windfall", if it were a reality at all, would not begin until 2019/2024 some thirteen to nineteen years after the triggering event? Sudden? Unexpected? Not even close.


As seen over time, the US attrition at the top of the list would permit the AW pilots to
dominate the top of the list...
The MEC is admitting right here that the NIC did not create a sudden or unexpected windfall.


At the other end of the AW list, the Nicolau Award integrates the junior AW pilot, hired
on 4/4/05, senior to all of the US pilots who were actively flying EMB aircraft under the ALPAUS Airways CBA on 5/19/05, the date of announcement of the merger. Arbitrator Nicolau’s
Opinion incorrectly states that the US Merger Committee’s Certified List shows these pilots as
furloughed as of that date.
Didn't this issue go to arbitration which proved these MDA pilots were not active which renders much of the east MEC argument moot?

The rest of the presentation seems to be dealing with which junior pilots might be eligible for premium flying upgrades some five to twenty years into the future. No displacements/downgrades as a result of the NIC, just what the MEC projects as an injustice that someone at the bottom of the east would not be able to take upgrades because their own very low seniority status would not afford them that opportunity.

Conclusion: no windfall and a well-designed and fair INTEGRATION of active pilots into a single seniority system.
 
To usapa, who purposly and vindictively used their superior numbers to negade a ruling that was given by a partial and neutral professional. And not given so much as an ounce of sympathy towards the 1,947 lives and their families that it has dramatically harmed.

You enter into a predicated agreement. Predications are unresolved. Sellers insist you honor the agreement despite unresolved predications. Sellers seek justification, comfort and solace that God will strike down you and all those who draft contracts of specific performance based on such predications.
 
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