Delta Schedule Changes

[eolesen]

April 17:
ATL-LGW canceled
MIA-LHR canceled

24Apr:
ATL-CDG reduced from 2x to 1x

01June:
ATL-AMS goes from 2x to 3x daily for the summer
ATL-LHR increased from 11 weekly to 18 weekly (offsets LGW cancellation)
HNL-KIX increased from 1x to 2x daily for the summer

04Sep:
MEM-AMS canceled (4x weekly thru summer, not clear if it returns for summer 2013)

Interesting that it looks like they're pushing more Skyteam traffic via AMS vs CDG...

 

[WorldTraveler]

I was wondering how long it would take for the LHR/LGW discussion to come up....
I'm still not sure how DL did it but they were able to obtain at least one decent early evening slot from ATL to LHR... whether that had anything to do with MIA-LHR or not, I do not know but DL clearly before did not have a large enough presence at its largest hub to be competitive so it went after the MIA-LHR slot in order to build necessary mass and be able to carry some of the traffic in the SE.
There was no need to continue to operate to LGW once DL obtained a large enough presence at LHR from ATL.
The fact that DL is closing LGW on relatively short notice going into the fall and dropping MIALHR at the same time says they apparently did some slot swaps that required them to move quickly.
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DL and AF/KL have been playing a balancing act trying to feed the dual European hubs.... but remember that DL has taken over several US-CDG markets from AF.
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Partner hubs are the most solid way of carrying traffic year round - and DL made the decision last year that it would reduce the amount of seasonal flying to Europe which necessitates pushing more traffic into its partner hubs.
UA is also reducing duplicate PMCO routes out of EWR by moving one of the two flights to EWR and/or reducing capacity during the winter months... it has been hard to make money at all flying to/from Europe for about 3 months per year... it becomes even more difficult as fuel as it $3/gal and continues to increase.
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As MEM connecting capacity has been pulled down, it became doubtful that the AMS flight would remain. Note that CVG-CDG remains and does well (have been through that airport and seen the flight full including no seats in Business class from DL's gate screens with standbys still on the list). CVG-CDG also carries engine cores between France and the US for GE.
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The most recent DOT data continues to show that DL is maintaining its local market share in both CVG and MEM despite cuts... meaning the cuts have come at the expense of connecting rather than local traffic. DL has 3 much larger interior hubs for connecting traffic in the eastern US... CVG and MEM are not needed to carry connecting traffic.

DL has added FUK-HNL as well... Japanese wanting to go to the beach apparently are willing to pay more (at least in USD) than Europeans.

 

[eolesen]

IIRC, FUK-HNL is simply coming back -- NW operated it eons ago.

I pulled some traffic data on MIA-LHR from a non-DOT source, and it looks like DL was only carrying about 100-120 O&D pax a day, and with little opportunity to add flow traffic from Skyteam partners (something I'd said for a long time).

Data for BOS-MIA doesn't look any better; since killing off one of their two frequencies, they've actually lost more than half the share they already had.

 

[WorldTraveler]

since EONS have passed, markets are considerably different and DL is making its decision based on a strong yen and because DL acquired and built on NW's leadership position in the US to Japan market.
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DL did very well in the local BOS and MIA local markets to LHR - obtaining comparable average fares to AA with DL's flatbed product and obtaining decent percentages of the local market - markets in which AA/BA signfiicantly outclass DL in terms of numbers of flights. I don't think DL realistically expected Skyteam to deliver any traffic to/from their MIA-LHR flight although Skyteam did a buildup of MIA-Europe of which some of the flights have been pulled. DL DID expect it would have to provide its own feed to MIA-LHR which is why they added all that RJ flying.... even if MIA-LHR as a single flight did well, the total package included all of that RJ flying and included multiple flights in some markets because they couldn't add a one off roundtrip to support the MIA-LHR flight alone. When you consider all of the flights that were necessary to make MIA-LHR work, it is doubtful the results were positive.
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But more importantly is the notion that DL could better use the asset (which included the airplane) elsewhere, in this particular case ATL.
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The MIA and BOS-LHR flights were unique opportunities that DL took in order to build its presence at LHR using slots that AA/BA had to divest. DL clearly has a budget for "developmental flying" and they were able to achieve their strategic objectives to the degree possible w/o the high cost of the MIA-LHR route and the associated RJ flights to support it.
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It is also possible that DL pulled back on its MIA presence to minimize anti-trust concerns should DL make an offer for all or parts of AA - and it also validates that DL is still at a disadvantaged position at LHR compared to AA and UA/CO which each have more than twice the number of slots DL has.
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DL is apparently keeping BOS-MIA and it isn't surprising that they are pulling back to just one flight and of course that will affect their share. The fact that they received average fares on par with AA says they can compete with AA in core AA markets but DL's strategic objectives (the corporate market in BOS) does not require that they have service on par with AA/BA. DL has 1/3 of the combined number of AA/BA flights in JFK-LHR yet receives fares and local market share comparable to what AA carries on its own metal. .
Long term I am certain that DL will address its competitive disadvantage in both the MIA-Latin America market and at LHR - and an AA acquisition - in whole or in part could be the means by which that happened.
DL partner Gol has asked Brazilian authorities for the ability to serve the US market, something I predicted DL - who now owns part of Gol - wants them to do since there are sufficient frequencies for Brazilian airlines to expand in the US-Brazil market.
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Finally, DL just announced its Feb traffic and financial results and posted another solid double digit increase in RASM... since DL has outperformed the industry in RASM growth for several quarters, the chances are good they will continue to do so.
It is also noteworthy that DL reported a significant jump in fuel costs... which continues to say that capacity in the industry will either have to deliver stronger and stronger revenue or will need to be pulled.

 

[FA Mikey]

It is also possible that DL pulled back on its MIA presence to minimize anti-trust concerns should DL make an offer for all or parts of AA - and it also validates that DL is still at a disadvantaged position at LHR compared to AA and UA/CO which each have more than twice the number of slots DL has.

God talk, about grabbing for straws.

 

[WorldTraveler]

God talk, about grabbing for straws.

maybe, maybe not.
Let's just say that DL is watching AMR's restructuring process very closely.

 

[eolesen]

If you consider the DOT's fare sampling alone as a barometer, sure, DL did great. Data available by subscription indicates they were running at a 50% load factor, and under performed VS to be the fourth place player in both markets.

 

[WorldTraveler]

If you consider the DOT's fare sampling alone as a barometer, sure, DL did great. Data available by subscription indicates they were running at a 50% load factor, and under performed VS to be the fourth place player in both markets.

in off-peak months, yes.
But the fact that DL obtained LOCAL revenues on par with AA in core AA markets shows that DL was fully capable of competing with AA. What DL could not overcome was the fact that AA has hubs effectively at both ends of MIA and can carry all the connecting traffic it needed to in order to win... again, when you factor in that DL filled their planes with high cost regional feed from the rest of the SE, then it isn't hard to see that the numbers wouldn't add up.
All that proves is the power of hubs - and the fact that few carriers offer service outside of their hubs - and AA's network strategy is built around its 5 cornerstones/hubs - confirms that it is very hard to compete outside of one's hubs.
That fact also explains why DL restarted JFK-NRT after the merger and quickly became the largest carrier in the NYC-TYO market and has average fares that are at a premium to other carriers - while AA, despite operating in the market for 10 years - is now withdrawing (and the argument about selling seats on JL doesn't offset the reality that JL has also reduced its capacity in NYC. DL's hub at both JFK and NRT is larger than any of its competitors on bank (yes, I know JL and NH are larger at NRT than DL but in the connecting banks that support transpac support, DL is stronger).
The same thing happened at LAX although NW remained in the market... yet DL outcarries its competitors in revenue in the local market by a large percentage... and it uses the connections at both ends to ensure its strength in the local market.
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So, there were no great surprises and it still says that strong hubs and foreign alliances are the best way to ensure success in a market.... and overall, the largest carriers continue to command revenue premiums compared to smaller carriers.

 

[eolesen]

in off-peak months, yes.
But the fact that DL obtained LOCAL revenues on par with AA in core AA markets shows that DL was fully capable of competing with AA.

Data for June, July and August showed similar loads... and getting decent revenue on a half-full airplane doesn't do a whole lot of good.

Haven't gotten around to looking at the Japan data, but I will eventually.

 

[BoeingBoy]

That fact also explains why DL restarted JFK-NRT after the merger and quickly became the largest carrier in the NYC-TYO market and has average fares that are at a premium to other carriers - while AA, despite operating in the market for 10 years - is now withdrawing (and the argument about selling seats on JL doesn't offset the reality that JL has also reduced its capacity in NYC. DL's hub at both JFK and NRT is larger than any of its competitors on bank (yes, I know JL and NH are larger at NRT than DL but in the connecting banks that support transpac support, DL is stronger).

Qualifiers omitted?

Jim

 

[WorldTraveler]

Data for June, July and August showed similar loads, Tim... and getting decent revenue on a half-full airplane doesn't do a whole lot of good.

Haven't gotten around to looking at the Japan data, but I will eventually.

No, it doesn't.
July 2011 LF for MIA-LHR RT was 78.07. BOS-LHR was 83.76.

You need not bother looking any further.
You are obviously trying to prove that DL has failed.... yet the fact remains that DL is profitable and is achieving its strategic objectives.

 

[eolesen]

No, it doesn't.
July 2011 LF for MIA-LHR RT was 78.07. BOS-LHR was 83.76.

You need not bother looking any further.
You are obviously trying to prove that DL has failed.... yet the fact remains that DL is profitable and is achieving its strategic objectives.

Oh, that's rich. "Do not bother looking any further" because you as a former employee have all the answers on DL's load factors, yet a subscription product based on MIDT & other sources, used by airport planners and airline schedulers worldwide, is less accurate???

Have you suddenly rejoined DL and have access to inside information now?


I don't need to prove that DL failed in those two markets -- it was obvious when they announced that they were going to be relegated to be the fourth place carrier in a four carrier market. The facts now back that up as The Whole Truth.

 

[WorldTraveler]

No, Eric, it is public data... reported to the DOT.
Your MIDT data - just like every other CRS data - does not include load factor data because CRS bookings including only partial data - and it doesn't include the operational data which airports and government authorities use to tax airlines.

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As much as you would like to go looking for the single market that shows that DL is failing, one doesn't exist. Because airlines the size of AA or DL or UA can fly a number of money-losing flights if they believed it were strategically necessary to do so - IF they make more than enough money on other routes.
AA thought that having its own metal in Russia and India was strategically necessary - yet threw in the towel after a relatively few months on Moscow DME yet continued to operate to DEL for years after yields tanked when India opened the floodgates to new airlines. DL said that Europe-BOM was enough of a presence in India; CO retained both its India flights. DL and UA remain in Russia.
Did DEL take AA down? absolutely not.
Could MIA-LHR have taken DL down? No, but DL achieved what it needed by restructuring its LHR operations to gain up to 3 flights/day on ATL-LHR... and didn't need strategically to remain in the market.
AA developed a partnership with Malev even though it had been obvious for years they were on shaky financial grounds.... sure enough, AA's plans to Eastern Europe took a hit when AA had no choice to pull the flight after MA shut down.
But JFK-BUD will not make or break AA - and no one with any kind of understanding of the airline industry can honestly believe that a single route would make or break any carrier the size of the US network carriers.
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What has burned your crotch for years is that I have long predicted that AA would end up where it is today because it couldn't figure out how to turn the ship around.
I have also long said that AA's delay in restructuring put the company in an enormously difficult competitive situation - because it was already so much smaller than DL and UA - yet it has to chop money losing routes - and when you pull your own metal out of key markets like JFK-NRT, it shows how high the competitive hurdle AA must climb in order to be one of the global megacarriers again. I could do it for you - or you could post MIDT data showing that AA's share in the NYC-TYO market continues to shrink and its partnership with JL isn't helping. There isn't a single market for a US carrier where a partnership with a foreign carrier generates revenue and share comparable to what a carrier obtains using its own metal when compared with its peers.
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We could talk about AA all day long, Eric. But the fact remains that AA's future now more than ever lies in the hands of AA employees, your former coworkers. People who regularly say they aren't going to take any more cuts and who aren't going to believe AA mgmt's claims that they will turn the company around (and no one else is convinced they have a valid revenue turnaround plan).
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Your efforts to try and convince me and others that DL is the one who can't run its business ring mighty hollow compared to the ongoing challenge that AA's restructuring effort is proving to be and just as before BK it is labor issues that AA cannot resolve - and tossing out labor contracts won't solve the problem. You and a few former management wannabees at AA are finding it harder and harder to convince the other 80,000 employees that they should bust their buns to turn the place around - again.
The difference between why DL and UA are succeeding and why AA is not is far larger than a couple international routes.

 

[BoeingBoy]

No, Eric, it is public data... reported to the DOT.
Your MIDT data - just like every other CRS data - does not include load factor data because CRS bookings including only partial data - and it doesn't include the operational data which airports and government authorities use to tax airlines.

To think...you once claimed that DOT data wasn't reliable enough to use for comparisons. I guess it's reliability depends on whose point it proves...

Jim

 

[WorldTraveler]

To think...you once claimed that DOT data wasn't reliable enough to use for comparisons. I guess it's reliability depends on whose point it proves...

Jim

you find the quote and post it in context and we can discuss it but since alot of "quotes" on this forum are taken out of context, I doubt that I made the statement. I don't recall ever saying that LF data as provided to the DOT was unreliable... since the DOT is the only source of market level LF data for flights to/from/within the US, I'm not sure what other source could be used.
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but whatever side discussion we have about data doesn't change the fact that no single market - even two - even three - that perform great or bad - won't change the overall picture of an airline.
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DL didn't turn itself around by finding a couple of "hot" markets or by dumping a couple of markets that didn't perform as expected - and neither did CO a decade before - or UA at the same time as DL, although UA did a lot less expansion during its restructuring than either CO or DL did.
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The success of CO, DL, and UA can be attributed to a NETWORK that works and the ability to remove/adjust what doesn't work and build on what does.
That is the challenge AA must overcome in an environment where NO other carrier is going to sit by and allow AA to regain the market share and revenue it has lost - and given that there is no evidence of any network airline recovering what it previously lost, then AA mgmt's claims that they will generate billions of new revenue ring rather hollow.
IN the meantime, DL will readjust its London operations and UA will trim a frequency or two a week on its new flights to Africa and move TATL capacity from EWR to IAD demonstrating that both will respond where it is necessary to do so in order to become and remain profitable.
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Trying to pick out a single market here or there that a carrier modifies/drops/adds means nothing if the entire airline does or does not work.