Good Faith Bargaining

BoeingBoy

Veteran
Nov 9, 2003
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Let's see if some of this sounds familiar....

* The Totality of the Conduct Doctrine

# In determining whether parties are negotiating in good faith, there are no precise standards which may be used. The Board looks at the "totality of the conduct" to determine whether it appears that, all things considered, the party is making a legitimate effort to reach an agreement.

# Under Section 8(d), neither party is required to make concessions or agree to a proposal. As a result, hard bargaining by itself is presumably legal.

# The absence of good faith is generally characterized through a showing that the employer is going through the motions of negotiating, but with no intent to reach an agreement. Surface bargaining, as this tactic is often called, is evidence of bad faith if it appears that the intent of the employer is to avoid agreement rather than to reach agreement.

# Some other factors which might be considered in finding bad faith include:

* Causing long delays or postponements in scheduling bargaining sessions,

* Refusing the union even minor access to workers (posting of notices on bulletin boards) before formal negotiations have begun,

* Giving minor concessions on some items with no negotiations over major items,

* Making no counterproposals at all to the union,

* Insisting on procedural formalities for bargaining with little discussion of mandatory items,

* Making direct appeals to the membership,

* Changing conditions of employment after impasse has been reached, but before negotiation of major issues has been conducted.

# Problems of Proof of Bad Faith -- Boulwarism

# Case XVIII-A: This case is based on the famous management bargaining tactic known as Boulwarism. Lemuel Boulware was the chief management negotiator for the General Electric Corporation from the 1940's through the 1950's and 1960's. He devised and implemented a bargaining strategy which epitomized the minimum standards of the absence of good faith in collective bargaining.

This case outlines the basic tactics of Boulwarism which became the foundation for the legal dispute over the tactic. The essential elements of Boulwarism, for legal purposes were:

1) Offering to the union a packaged proposal on an "all or nothing, take it or leave it" basis.

2) Exhibiting, at the table, a willingness to explain its proposal and to listen to counterproposals, but refusing pro forma (as a matter of form) to make any changes in the complete package, and

3) Appealing directly to the workforce to encourage acceptance of the package, by providing detailed information on the basis for the unilaterally established package.

Boulwarism was determined by the Board and the appellate court to represent bad faith bargaining. In the court decision, the critical issue was the combination of tactics, each of which might have been legal in the abstract. By combining specific tactics which may be legal into an overall effort to circumvent the union, the company had engaged in bad faith bargaining.

Source

Jim
 
And here's a pretty good discussion of the 1113 process and the various interpretations of the different courts...

Section 1113c Review

Jim

ps - this is from a law school.
 
Very interesting , seems US air management better take a hard look at this
Question, when it gets to the judges decision on the 1113c process can the union put up a contract with concessions, but not the medieval bohica that us air is trying to get away with to go head to head with us airs first and last offer that they will put up for the final judgement from the judge?
Also can the judge order us air management to get off the bench and join the team with equitable concessions?
 
If you take the time to read the material at the 2nd link above, it's pretty interesting. I've read before that the 1113c process is still largely untested, meaning that uniform interpretation hasn't arrived yet. Apparently, no cases have gone above the appeals court level and different circuits (even different courts in the same circuit) use different interpretations.

For example, some courts only look approvingly on the minimum changes necessary to avoid liquidation. Others consider the long term survival. One court even stated in it's ruling allowing abrogation that the union had the right to strike.

Jim
 
Boeing boy,

Thank you for all this information.

I am sure AFA legal has the info, it just hasn't been shared with the MEC.

I will make copies and make sure the AFA MEC has these documents for their meeting.
 
USA320Pilot said:
According to ALPA's bankruptcy attorney's Judge Mitchell has significant latitude and he will likely protect the creditors.

Regards,

USA320Pilot
[post="198151"][/post]​

Main Entry: cred·i·tor
Pronunciation: 'kre-di-t&r, -"tor
Function: noun
: one to whom a debt is owed; especially : a person to whom money or goods are due

Funny thing is that lots of employees are creditors, though unsecured to be sure. Abrogating contracts just increases their claim. According to the info in the second link at the top of this thread, abrogating a contract creates an unsecured creditor claim for the value lost due to that abrogation.

So say the judge abrogates the IAM, CWA, and AFA contracts and the savings are $600 Million a year for 6 years - these groups instantly become the largest creditors the company has with unsecured claims totaling $3.6 Billion dollars.

Aside from the other risks associated with seeking contract abrogation, could this be another reason why the company is pushing so hard to get the employees to agree to concessions?

Jim
 
BoeingBoy said:
Aside from the other risks associated with seeking contract abrogation, could this be another reason why the company is pushing so hard to get the employees to agree to concessions?

Jim
[post="198206"][/post]​

Not really, I'm afraid. IIRC, in a BK, the employees truly gain the status of unsecured creditors only if the company liquidates with wages/benefit payments outstanding. Moreover, their place in line is just in front of the stockholders who are last in line and pretty much SOL.

The contract abrogation creates a debt to the employees, but I think there is an "unspoken" interpretation that this debt is paid in the future through the fact of the survival of the company.
 
jimntx,

That could well be the case - the material I read didn't go into that amout of detail. It just said that abrogation created an unsecured claim for the value lost.

The article said:

By rejecting an unfavorable contract, the debtor company rids itself of its full contractual obligation to the union employees, i.e. the company is permitted to repudiate the contract in toto and simply convert it into a judgment for damages. The judgment then becomes an unsecured claim and must compete with all other unsecured claims against the debtor company.

Allowing a debtor to reject the executory contract achieves the underlying policy of reorganization of the Bankruptcy Code, which is to permit the successful rehabilitation of debtors and to recognize that “assets that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.â€￾ At the same time, however, such a rejection imposes a significant loss on the union and the employees the union represents.

First, as noted above, the damages resulting from the permitted breach are
treated as an unsecured claim. So if the wage established by the collective
bargaining agreement is fifteen dollars per hour and the post-rejection wage is ten dollars, the employees are likely to receive only pennies on the dollar toward the five dollar difference. Second, the union and employees are left without an effective remedy for the loss of provisions of the collective bargaining agreement that are not reducible to quantifiable money damages, such as seniority provisions and the employer’s promise to arbitrate grievances. The Bankruptcy Code requirement that agreements be either accepted or rejected in toto ensures that these provisions are tossed out with the wage provisions.

Jim