funguy2 said:
Airline (Mainline only) - CASM - CASM ex-fuel
NW - 11.36cents - 8.87cents
US - 10.96 - 8.79
AS - 10.79 - 7.83
UA - 10.68 - 8.34
DL - 10.40 - not listed [actually 8.14]
AA - 10.25 - not listed [actually 7.71]
CO - 9.98 - 7.82
FL - 8.32 - 6.00
HP - 7.98 - 6.00
WN - 7.59 - 6.22
B6 - 6.32 - 4.74
You can get a rough idea of Delta's CASM excluding fuel by dividing mainline fuel expense ($739 million) by mainline ASM's (32.7 billion) for a fuel CASM of 2.26 cents, putting CASM ex fuel at 8.14 cents. Similarly, American Airlines, Inc. (as a subsidiary of AMR) spent $1.088 billion on fuel with mainline capacity at 42.9 billion ASM's, for a fuel CASM of 2.54 cents and CASM ex fuel of 7.71 cents.
So, $1.1bil in annual concessions represents about 15% of total costs. Thus, we can expect CASM (all else equal) to drop by about 15% next quarter. That would be 9.31cents CASM and 7.47cents CASM ex-fuel. So, the concessions get US Airways firmly to the lowest cost legacy carrier and within 15% of the LCC's. Of course, the employee concessions were the "easy" 15% from management's standpoint. Other structural changes to get more is much more difficult to acheive.
Well, there's a slight problem with that assumption -- being that the company already had gotten a significant chunk of the concessions last quarter through the pilots' ratification of concessions in October and the 21% wage cuts obtained through the 1113(e) process. Labor costs will continue to come down as the company moves to outsource and offshore various functions, but other line items will increase as a result. Third-party maintenance, outsourced ramp, outsourced reservations, etc. might be cheaper, but they are certainly not free. The $1.1 billion in concessions does not equate to $1.1 billion in cost savings.
Again, the problem with this for US Airways is that mainline capacity is being reduced, and higher cost E170's and CRJ700's are being added.
This is mainly a problem if the company is unable to achieve a yield premium on routes served by the RJ's; it remains to be seen if the E170 on a route like PHL-IAH can garner higher yields than CO's mainline service (with a first class cabin) or WN's low-fare non-stop to HOU.
I guess the questions now revolve around the revenue impact of the DAL restructuring. It seems clearer to me now, that DAL's fare restructure is a full assault on US Airways. An attempt by DAL to get US Airways' cash balance even lower, before it can attempt to generate cash using the new, lowered cost structure. Its become a game of chicken, with the goal to be that US Airways goes away.
What seems to continue to go unrecognized is that Delta's CASM above
doesn't reflect the impact of their new contract with their pilots or the additional cuts being imposed across the other workgroups there. The same is true at CAL; both will probably see CASM excluding fuel drop below 7.5 cents as their cost cuts take effect. United will also see its CASM fall as further concessions are squeezed out of its unions, although the future there is cloudier given their mechanics' recent rejection of concessions.
US Airways prospects today are much brighter than three months ago... Although, again, success is not assured. The new reduced revenue picture, particularly at smaller cities where US Airways was not competing as intensely on price (the Binghamtons, and Roanoake, and Charlestons), remains gloomy, and thanks to Delta, a wild card.
I agree that things look much brighter given that one of the biggest obstacles (IMHO) was a possible strike by one of the unionized labor groups. But you are absolutely right that the reduced revenue picture, along with stubbornly high fuel costs, will remain a significant stumbling block. I remain skeptical that the company intended to introduce GoFares in any market where low-fare competition did not demand it.