A few important facts still remain to be released, the runway conditions for one. The release from the Jamaican's also really don't point out that runway 12 is the only ILS and that the tailwind was within acceptable limits. The results of the runway conditions at the time will be interesting. The release seemed pretty one sided to me towards pilot error, it seems way too early to be hanging blame.
AA flight overshoots runway in Jamaica
- Thread starter Hopeful
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eolesen
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- Jul 23, 2003
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Someone far more qualified than me says a moderately loaded 738 at sea level needs 5300ft for dry pavement, and 6400 on wet pavement.
This guy's a pilot, and thinks it was probably a repeat of WN @ BUR -- an unstable approach gone bad. Should have called a toga before the bounce, definitely after the bounce given the lack of an overrun or arresting bed.
This guy's a pilot, and thinks it was probably a repeat of WN @ BUR -- an unstable approach gone bad. Should have called a toga before the bounce, definitely after the bounce given the lack of an overrun or arresting bed.
E,
Once you touch down, the spoilers auto deploy. Makes it problematic to get in the air again without knowing exactly how much runway is left. It's also verboten and nobody is trained to do it. Easy to screw up if not done right.
Some other observations are that it most likely was at max landing weight due to the actual weather and the common practice of adding ferry fuel. I don't have the chart in front of me, but it might be more than 5300 ft. That number is dry of course, with a test pilot flying new brakes and tires. Now get this, the wet, wet/poor numbers are an engineering guess. You can figure all the different runway types out there and the problems getting good readings.
The 5300 ft number is literally a slam down impact with little flare which although sometimes happens
it generally isn't how we fly. While tested with new tires, the FAA alllows airlines to use tires to a limit far beyond what the typical college kid with accept on a beater Corrolla. Bald and cord showing is acceptable. That will be looked at in the investigation. Another thing is the Glidslope intercepts the runway at 7880' down the runway. Again, hitting that point would be an impact. With a normal flare at 162 kts groundspeed, even 1/4 degree high will add distance. How much?, I don't know, 6500' wouldn't surprise me on a crappy runway with 6 inches of pooling water in spots.
Visual cues are bad at KIN. On the left is the bay, on the right maybe a couple of light bulbs within 1 mile, off the end is the ocean. With reduced visibility, depth perception is a problem in the final few moments of approach. Last pilot I spoke with who flys in there like me said it's like "landing on an aircraft carrier at night". He flew off Carriers. The visibilty out the cockpit can also be bad. The 737 wipers basically suck and only do the center part of the window, again reducing cues.
The runway markings at KIN always seemed borderline to me. They look ok in the sun, but it seems at night to be lacking, rain is even worse. This could be a factor of the pavement/concrete color. There are many variations out of the USA.
Did the spoilers and reversers and brakes function normally? I Don't know. That's for the NTSB and still unknown. No pilot at AA hasn't seen one of the systems fail or degrade in his career.
These are just some observations. It may or may not have been total pilot error, I'll wait to read the final report with all the factors involved. There are accidents like BUR where I can say it won't happen to me because I've never done 250kts 5 miles out and tried to land. To me, that was black and white. I already see in this case more than a few things that could be links in a chain leading to an accident. Throw in some of the factors above and add fatigue in the picture, and I see a black and white easy flying judgement call get at least a little blurry in certain areas.
My god man, don't confuse him with the facts! It's so much easier to do it on MS Flight Simulator, and we all know how that makes you ultimately qualified to judge real pilots.
In the pictures, I don't remember seeing the spoilers deployed. It would seem that the pilot would not have been able to stow them after the crash...unless he still had accumulator pressure.
eolesen
Veteran
- Jul 23, 2003
- 15,907
- 9,359
Mach, thanks for the commentary on KIN. Not passing judgement myself, but just sharing someone else's read on the accident.
Not that he'd ever be considered as qualified to judge pilots as an AMT would be, but the guy I referenced above is currently flying right seat on the 777, with time in the 744, 767, 320 and 737, and also sits on a couple ALPA safety committees.
Granted, he's not flying the 738, but I think I'll take his opinion for what it's worth, which is more than mine or yours...
Not that he'd ever be considered as qualified to judge pilots as an AMT would be, but the guy I referenced above is currently flying right seat on the 777, with time in the 744, 767, 320 and 737, and also sits on a couple ALPA safety committees.
Granted, he's not flying the 738, but I think I'll take his opinion for what it's worth, which is more than mine or yours...
