DL transatlantic routes perform well when compared with others

WorldTraveler

Corn Field
Dec 5, 2003
21,709
10,721
With all of the talk about DL’s international expansion and assertions that it is just low yielding capacity dumping, I felt it was necessary to do some sound, numbers based analysis. Some UA posters assert that UA’s transatlantic routes are worth much more than DL’s so I thought that was worth a look. I looked at performance of some of AA, CO, DL, and UA’s markets which are known to be particularly strong compared with the most similar markets at other of the three airlines. I did not sample every market for every carrier since I couldn’t pull all data for every carrier.

DOT data shows in fact that DL has a number of routes such as JFKSVO, JFKNCE, ATLSTR, ATLZRH and ATHJFK (and ATL when it was flown) have higher average segment fares (average of all passengers on the flight) than do UA’s average fares on UA’s LHR routes from JFK and even ORD. In fact, AA has a premium in most east coast/midwest LHR markets (ORD included). It is also significant that CO gets better fares on EWRLGW than UA gets on JFKLHR so LHR isn’t the end all and be all for getting high fares, although it certainly helps. In fact, DL gets better revenue on ATLLGW than UA does on ORDLHR or JFKLHR. UA’s advantage relative to DL and AA is in its flights to Germany and DL’s advantage relative to AA and UA is on flights to France and Italy (all cities) making it apparent that the US carrier who has a partner in the destination country enjoys a revenue advantage over its competitors. UA only enjoys a revenue premium to Germany (at least the cities it serves). In non-partner, non-LHR western Europe markets, DL and AA have fairly comparable performance.

However, most importantly and to debunk the assertions that DL’s scattered international routes are worthless (which only the uninformed would state anyway), DL obtains better revenue from its Eastern Europe and unique Western Europe routes than AA or DL does in Western Europe, even when adjusted for mileage. In short, DL’s strategy of adding routes to Eastern Europe and beyond is perfectly valid and, based on historical data, is very likely to yield revenue premiums relative to many Western European routes flown by DL or other airlines. Further, UA doesn’t have a revenue premium for their entire transatlantic system and AA and DL generate substantial revenue at very respectable average fares in Europe outside of the limited scope not served by UA.

CO is an interesting case study in that they have a large European hub at EWR that serves most of the top cities. DL’s ATL hub is really only the only comparable comparison in the number of cities served and the inclusion of London service. CO generally doesn’t have a lot of high average fare markets although some such as ZRH and MXP do perform well relative to other industry markets. CO generates a lot of revenue by flying to lots of places even though they don’t get particularly high fares. CO also has relatively low costs so those markets can be profitable.

On another point, UA and CO rely to a great extent on their local markets (IAD, EWR, ORD, IAH) to generate international premiums. DL and AA (outside of LHR) get better fares than UA and CO from the whole country rather than just the gateway city. CO in particular has a lot of markets outside of EWR and IAH that have low average fares which seem to be necessary to fill capacity.

Airlines with low costs can indeed be profitable, esp. if developing new routes where there is little competition as CO has done from EWR and DL has done and will be doing from JFK. There are a number of key markets in western Europe that have to be served in order to have a well-rounded portfolio which DL and CO serve and AA to a lesser extent but which UA does not. Because market dominance to a region is more important than to a particular city in getting revenue premiums, UA is significantly threatened if other carriers gain increased access to London, even if its LGW since UA’s only consistent premiums are to Germany.

So, DL folks, don’t believe those people that try to tell you that DL’s route system is worthless. It’s simply not true. You generate a lot of good revenue flying to places other carriers don’t fly. And you generate higher average fares across your system because of your dominance across the Atlantic. CO has shown that low costs can be a strong platform for growth. AA people, tell your management to figure out how to grow. CO and DL are taking NYC in international presence and it is very obvious from these statistics that the dominant carrier in a market does enjoy a revenue premium. AA’s 757s might be part of the solution but you’ll have to butt up against CO who flies many of the same potential routes. NW’s A330s might be the answer to facilitate transatlantic and transpacific growth.

And while I didn't look at many transpacific flights, DL's sole ATL-NRT route does deliver very strong revenue performance.
 
Simply.........ANYONE can start flying to EVERYWHERE Delta flys. Therefore, if the others see Delta make some profits, they'll just start flying there too. So much for that argument. Delta's route structure holds ZERO value because anyone can have it (sort of like the local whore)

Looks more like Delta has chosen to be the guinea pig of the industry. If anything they do becomes profitable, everyone else will jump in. If not, Delta loses even more BILLIONS of dollars. Good for us. Thanks Delta for trying it out for us. We'll be paying attention to see how it works out.
 
Wow ... with DL flying all those high-yield, profitable routes, they must be making a killing these days!

But wait a minute -- of the top three carriers, all of whom have a large transatlantic presence (AA, UA, DL) -- which is the ONLY one of the three that is INSOLVENT? As in BANKRUPT?

How can that be?
 
Further, UA doesn’t have a revenue premium for their entire transatlantic system ...
I'm sorry but that's not correct so I can't let this statement go unchallenged.

According to DOT international O&D data for the year ended 9/30/05, United actually had the highest U.S.-Europe average fare and the highest trip-length-adjusted average yield (and second-highest actual average yield) among the 6 U.S. Transatlantic carriers. It sure sounds like a revenue premium to me.

You can make whatever comparisons and carve-outs that you want while (correctly) noting that United's number of European destinations is the second smallest among the 6 U.S. Transatlantic carriers. Nevertheless, the fact remains that United's European network (including the services of its Star Alliance partners) works for United and, as I noted in another thread, it works for United profitably.

There are a number of key markets in western Europe that have to be served in order to have a well-rounded portfolio which DL and CO serve and AA to a lesser extent but which UA does not.
While I actually agree with this statement and would like to see United add European cities like MAD, MAN, MXP and FCO, among others, one can't ignore the fact that, as noted above, United's European service is currently profitable. IMHO, this gives United the freedom to expand cautiously, or even not at all, if it so desires.
 
Simply.........ANYONE can start flying to EVERYWHERE Delta flys. Therefore, if the others see Delta make some profits, they'll just start flying there too. So much for that argument. Delta's route structure holds ZERO value because anyone can have it (sort of like the local whore)

Looks more like Delta has chosen to be the guinea pig of the industry. If anything they do becomes profitable, everyone else will jump in. If not, Delta loses even more BILLIONS of dollars. Good for us. Thanks Delta for trying it out for us. We'll be paying attention to see how it works out.

Tell me one US carrier that actually has a fleet of widebodies ready to deploy at whim. DL is only able to do it b/c they had 767's flying dumb routes domestically and have finally wisened up and put these on international routes. Sure AA/CO have 757's that could go but that is like flying a CRJ vs. an A320 domestically. I would choose the 320.

Truth is that in the short term, no carrier can expand much at all internationally w/o cutting other international routes such as Asia or SA and I don't see those carriers with monopolies/oligopolies on those routes cutting back just to go head to head with DL.

DL's Eurpean expansion is definitely an experiment but one that seems to be a short-term advantage. I guess the thought is that if nobody can compete in the short term due to lack of eqpt, DL can get a good base in the long term. Who knows. I agree that it is an experiment but it is completely untrue to say that any carrier can just expand. You need the resources and if you check out who is ordering planes...it isn't the US carriers.
 
Anybody else as curious as I am as to why it took a Ch 11 filing for Delta executives to finally see the wisdom in re-deploying several of its widebodies to "maybe-profitable" international flying instead of "practically-guaranteed-to-lose-money" low-yield domestic flying??

Looks to me like it took the creditors breathing down their neck in BK to convice these slugs to try to make money. B)

Here's a press release from this morning where DL blows its horn on its "infinite wisdom" in re-deploying the 767s to international flying:

http://biz.yahoo.com/pz/060322/96056.html

Nowhere in the press release do the execs admit the obvious. :D
 
Deleted,
I’m going to be so brazen as to say that your comments are no longer welcome. You have yet to make any productive comment on any subject.

Cosmo,
In contrast, I do appreciate and welcome your almost fact based responses (today was better than yesterday). There are lots of people who read these boards because they want better information and insight than they are getting from their companies or from outside analysts. There is a lot of noise in the media and a lot of what is said about airlines is not factual. Aviation is a very emotional industry – always has been and probably always will be. You have the insight and intellect to provide factual information to the table and I challenge you to do just that.

More to the issues in a minute.

Whether you folks at UA like it or not, UA and US’s survival was anything but certain three years ago. The track record for bankruptcy survivals in the industry was very low. I am very glad for you and the industry as a whole that UA and US proved the statistics wrong and have restructured successfully at least from a legal perspective. However, there is nothing I have posted about UA or US that wasn’t corroborated by other analysts. Whether you like or not, UA was dealt a lot of negative press because of its financial and strategic situation; some of it was hysterical but much of it was based on historical precedent in the airline industry.

This is just a piece of a recent article from the WSJ that includes outside analyst and UA executive acknowledgement that UA did not do the best job in its bankruptcy reorg.
"Some of those things that other carriers did, we're going to do, too," says Jake Brace, United chief financial officer.
United emerged from bankruptcy reorganization last month with lower labor costs than rival airlines, but total costs that are roughly in line with rivals.
That's because other airlines have driven nonlabor costs down more aggressively by simplifying their fleets and operations, squeezing more seats onto airplanes and getting more productivity out of schedules. They've also used United's new, lower contract rates to help win pay cuts from their own employees and drive down lease rates for airplanes.
Because of the bankruptcy reorganization, says Goldman Sachs analyst Glenn Engel, "United should have lower costs than American and Continental, and it doesn't."
Still, it remains to be seen if choice can be converted to cash. "With all of United's extra brands," says Mr. Engel of Goldman Sachs, "I see no sign that United has a revenue premium over American or Continental."
You also need to recognize that DL is very early in its bankruptcy proceedings compared with UA and took 3 years longer to get into BK because it had more resources at the time UA filed to weather the storm. As we know, problems don’t go away but DL bought itself time in order to get a better assessment of where the industry was going and to learn from other carriers’ mistakes and even experiences, right or wrong. There is even reason to believe both logically and how the case is playing out that DL is doing a better job of reorganizing itself BUT it should – only AA of the legacy carriers has not had a bankruptcy filing and there still are many other deceased legacies from whom we can learn.
Now to the issues:
I did not pull revenue information for all transatlantic markets for any carrier nor did I do mileage adjustments so I could not have seen the complete picture (nor did I have the regional DOT info) but it is indeed possible that UA could have a transatlantic revenue premium. Typically, larger airlines with a below average size in a particular region have revenue premiums because their overall size provides a certain advantage in even disadvantaged regions of the world. I do not have the statistics but I would also guess that UA also has a revenue premium in the South American markets based on the DOT info I saw.
However, UA has shrunk its Latin operation while DL and CO and AA to a lesser extent have grown so that UA is now highly marginalized. Yes, they keep their presence nicely n their gateways and key cities to S. America but UA is losing the larger US market to S. America. At some point, UA or any other carrier that does not maintain a large enough regional presence is marginalized in that region. Let me use DL’s Asian presence is an example. DL’s ATLNRT is probably profitable since it generates revenues that appear to be well above average for the region. But outside of ATL, DL is only a presence to Asia in the SE and that doesn’t include much of the Florida market since DL doesn’t go after many of the Asia-Florida leisure passengers because DL doesn’t have the capacity to do so.
It wasn’t too long ago that AA, DL, and UA had similarly sized European route systems. Based on recent traffic data, UA has now moved into fourth place to Europe behind DL, AA, and now CO. And while DL has been fairly similarly sized to AA, we all know that DL will move way out in front over the Atlantic this summer and no one is going to catch up. We have also established that dominance in a particular region translates into a revenue premium for flow markets to and from that region. And as we also saw, UA has a revenue premium to London only from IAD and from the west coast where UA is dominant.
London is the most restricted access market for US carriers in the world and yet that restricted access has not bought UA an ability to command revenue premiums to all of London. You can also bet that DL will not continue to live with its disadvantaged position to London from the NE. There is debate about whether DL could serve LGW from JFK but they certainly could serve Stansted. I fully expect that at some point DL will say that they are tired of waiting and will become as strong of a force to London from other cities as they are to Continental Europe by either serving LGW or STN.
The principle is the same domestically. LFCs are moving into legacy markets and legacy overall wealth has shrunk. LFCs now largely operate where and when they want and the legacies are the ones that have to react. UA has taken the approach that it will withdraw in markets and regions to where it can make money. That strategy works only until you are marginalized. UA isn’t at that point in terms of the overall domestic market or to Asia but it is beginning to happen on transatlantic routes just as it did to Latin America.
I’d also like to clarify the difference between DL’s drawdown of DFW and FRA vs what UA did in MIA. DL drew down FRA and then replaced some of the markets served via FRA with nonstop service to JFK, some of which were served in the past and will be reinstated and others of which remain to be served again with DL aircraft such as Bucharest and Prague. However, DL still maintained its dominance to Eastern Europe and no other carrier has stepped into any of its former Pan Am Eastern Europe markets with nonstop service to the US. In DFW, DL really gave up the local nonstop market outside of its hubs and the connect markets that cannot be carried over its remaining hubs. DL has already added back some of the nonstop markets with Delta Conx. In contrast, UA’s pulldown of MIA signaled UA’s retreat from Latin America as a leading airline. They are now apparently there only for the incremental profits and revenues as evidenced by their inability to serve the region with more than a single frequency a day to just a couple of markets on a year around basis. Finally, with respect to CVG, the city was overhubbed. DL has pulled down gauge and frequency but very few markets have lost service on DL or Delta Conx and those that did have had their service moved to ATL, which again means only a handful of intramidwest O&Ds can no longer be served by DL. DL still serves all of CVG’s top markets with at least some mainline flights every day. If you think DL can no longer support its international operations, I suggest you have a look at seat maps on some of DL’s flights on delta.com. It sure appears to me that DL is still carrying decent loads from CVG to Europe and they have already ramped up their summer schedule. While you could argue that DL could just be carrying trash, historical statistics prove otherwise and there is only conjecture that DL is not doing at least as good now. Lest you think I’m just beating on UA, remember that CO pulled down its DEN hub and now wishes it had not. US pulled down PIT so far that that they lost their presence in the Midwest to other carriers as well as in the PIT local market to LCCs. There is a point beyond which any airline pulls back that they cannot recover. While it has been bloody, DL has not ceded any strategically significant market regions to any carrier since it pulled down its intrawest coast flying shortly after the Western merger.
DL had a revenue discount to the industry domestically driven by their use of large widebody aircraft on the domestic system. Those aircraft are quickly moving to int’l markets where they have a very good chance of generating industry average revenue if not better based on DL’s current and historical international revenue performance. I suspect we will see DL’s revenue discount quickly turn into comparable performance which should be worth hundreds of millions of dollars to DL. I do not believe it is a risky expansion because DL has experience in many of the markets and the rest are largely not served by US airlines. DL also has a cost problem as do all legacy airlines. However, DL had industry comparable costs BEFORE bankruptcy so it is very likely that they will end up with well below average costs once they are through restructuring. DL also is growing their network and generating as much or more revenue with their reduced fleet as they did before. As we have seen, it is not possible for an airline to restructure if it does not increase revenues while also reducing costs. It was only with CO’s second BK that happened.
As for the time it took DL to redeploy the 767s to international, remember that DL was a very profitable airline using widebodies on the domestic system as late as 1999. Their strategy was not flawed until five years ago. It is not certain the aircraft could have made money internationally three years ago without the corresponding cost cuts. I too wish DL had done it years ago but I’m glad it’s now happening… and they do have huge potential for international growth for the next several years as those aircraft are moved overseas.
I’m not saying UA is on the verge of failing tomorrow. I am saying that US apparently has done what they needed to do although it took two rounds of BK to do it. I believe DL will do it right the first time and do it better than any carrier. I’m not convinced UA did as much as it should have and it remains vulnerable, particularly if it continues to be marginalized in key market regions.
I look forward to your constructive, insightful comments.
 
Anybody else as curious as I am as to why it took a Ch 11 filing for Delta executives to finally see the wisdom in re-deploying several of its widebodies to "maybe-profitable" international flying instead of "practically-guaranteed-to-lose-money" low-yield domestic flying??

Looks to me like it took the creditors breathing down their neck in BK to convice these slugs to try to make money. B)

Here's a press release from this morning where DL blows its horn on its "infinite wisdom" in re-deploying the 767s to international flying:

http://biz.yahoo.com/pz/060322/96056.html

Nowhere in the press release do the execs admit the obvious. :D
Hey, I didn't realize until now that WT must work in DL's PR department. :) The perfect place to drink the Koolaid.

After, "why did it take so long?" the question for DL and WT is "if international is so spectacular for DL, why aren't you converting all of your 767s to international service?"
 
Deleted,
I’m going to be so brazen as to say that your comments are no longer welcome. You have yet to make any productive comment on any subject.

Yet I will continue to post and piss you off! fyi - you seem to be the only one having an issue Mr Novel.

So how long until the pilots decide to vote to strike. You do realize that the vote will be the pivot point of Delta.


We have also established that dominance in a particular region translates into a revenue premium for flow markets to and from that region.

I KNEW IT!!!! ha so it's finally out, he DOES work at Delta and was simply a hot air blow hard. (hey I guess that goes perfectly with his 'Brokeback Mountain' personality too)
 
Does anyone else find it ironic that WT has time to post these long diatribes on DL during what most would consider normal business hours?

Now the office must be really slow, or it runs on its own. Either way perhaps there is redundancy looming for WT? If he can spend his hours at work pinging on everything UAL then he may not be needed to run the ship of return to profitability.

Finally, WT how about that DL service from Europe to Asia? Also you like to point out that UAL does not serve Europe from DEN. Well does DL serve Europe from the west coast? You can board UAL in either SFO or LAX and be one stop away from Europe, Africa and all of Asia. Also, in regards to JFK can you board a DL aircraft and arrive in NRT ? It is your hub right? How on earth could you not serve Asia from there?
 
Yet I will continue to post and piss you off! fyi - you seem to be the only one having an issue Mr Novel.

So how long until the pilots decide to vote to strike. You do realize that the vote will be the pivot point of Delta.
I KNEW IT!!!! ha so it's finally out, he DOES work at Delta and was simply a hot air blow hard. (hey I guess that goes perfectly with his 'Brokeback Mountain' personality too)
what is a "brokeback mountain" personality?...