Firstly, it may precipitate US Airways departure from ALPA.
Yes, it may. (But I asked this before and got no response: So when's the vote already? Two weeks have passed since I last asked it and still nothing. I'll try again. When's the vote? If you're not happy, go already! Shoo!)
This may create a feeling that each of the legacies are better off to their own devices, than a National Union.
I think this is both a stretch and a non-sequitur. You seem to be under the impression that the ALPA merger policy is obviously unfair. However, the fact remains that ALPA, through a process of representative democracy, adopted the policy. Presumably, a good number of ALPA-represented pilots preferred the current policy over a strict DOH policy. They think it is fairer the way it is now. The LCC/East group would therefore seem to be an outlier in its thinking. So maybe it is better for ALPA if East pilots go their separate way, if their thinking is so different from the majority of other ALPA pilots.
Secondly, the US Airways pilot group disunity will destroy any negotiating leverage it has, which will unquestionably lead to a substandard contract, which will effect any collective bargaining process, since pilot costs are tied together from one carrier to the next because of the competitive nature of the industry. . . . The results and wages with US Airways becoming a $3itbox carrier will put wage pressure on every other carrier out there.
Seems like the U pilots have been dragging the industry-wide bar down for years now, as ALPA members. NOW all of a sudden they are concerned with the effect their caving in to management will have on the industry as a whole? Isn't it a little late to be wringing your hands over that?
Thirdly, there is a very likely scenario this situation has created such anger and hatred for ALPA in particular, that unchanged the results of the seniority award and the bitterness it generates could create a permanent core of strike breakers with US Airways that could take that animosity anywhere and they may number in the thousands.
But according to the East spin-mongers, a good chunk of the East pilots are mostly about to retire in a couple of years anyways, right? (You know, all the screaming about how the arbitrator didn't adequately consider "attrition.") So your concern shouldn't be a major threat for very long, right?
ALPA has a set merger policy that unfortunately due to politics is purely subjective in nature.
I agree that is the major drawback with a policy like that which ALPA adopted, as opposed to a purely objective measure like DOH. However, a rigid DOH method would cause "unfair" outcomes in certain situations as well. There are plusses and minuses to both concepts . . . advantages and drawbacks to each . . . two sides to every coin . . . you gotta take the good with the bad . . . I won't get bogged down in cliches, but that's life. ALPA chose the more subjective system, despite its faults, because in the eyes of the majority of ALPA members (or at least representatives), the good in such a policy outweighed the bad.
ALPA's executive council could determine that in his award, Nicalou failed in upholding the provisions of the policy or the reuirement for it be fair and equitable.
The problem with going down that road is that if you set the standard for "fair and equitable" to be what you appear to want it to be and throw out this decision, in any future merger someone will ALWAYS be able to argue that a given merger was not "fair and equitable." Under the current policy, the solution to that problem must be that "fair and equitable" is what an arbitrator says it is.
You are comparing apples and oranges. This is not a process set forth between the company and the collective bargaining agent in a CBA. This a policy wholly internal to one entity(ALPA) which impacts two of its participating labor groups.
You are making a distinction without a difference. You can try to characterize this as "wholly internal." Arbitration, like the U.S. system of litigation, is at its heart an adversarial process. It is therefore more accurate and useful to characterize the merger that happened as East vs. West (rather than some sort of "internal process"), just like a traditional grievance is Management vs. Union. The two situations are comparable in material ways.
My point was that if a party (East; Management) that initially agreed to binding arbitration is later permitted to renege on that commitment just because it doesn't like the outcome of the arbitration, that makes the whole system break down. You can't say, "OK, I'll agree to binding arbitration if I win the arbitration. If I lose the arbitration, all bets are off and we'll just keep starting over until I get the outcome I want."
ALPA has the authority to administer policies under it's purview and legally defend them . . .
Not only does it have the "authority" to do this, but is has the obligation to do so.
. . . or decide if the provisions of it's own policy have not been complied with, take action to correct it.
Could you please point to the ALPA policy, bylaw, constitutional provision or whatever to which you are apparently referring that permits ALPA to second guess an arbitrator's decision in a situation like this and decide if it wants to "allow" it before it becomes binding? I have asked this before but never gotten a response. From what I have seen posted here several times previously, the ALPA policies / bylaws / etc. indicate ALPA is obligated to follow the arbitrator's decision in this matter. But if there is something in ALPA's rules I am not aware of, please educate me.
But just as the system board is the process to determine if the grievance has merit, the ALPA council by nature is vested with same authority in settling policy disputes.
You are correct, but "settling policy disputes" is different than "following an arbitration decision." You are trying to change the subject. What "policy dispute" is there? Has there been a motion brought at an ALPA EC meeting to change the merger policy (or whatever the policy is within ALPA to change policy)? If so, great; let it go through the process.
Maybe that is the problem. Maybe the East pilots thought there was some sort of dispute or argument about the merger policy that was actively being debated at the time of the arbitration. There was not. Or perhaps the East pilots thought the arbitrator's job was to make up a policy on the fly on his own to apply just to this situation. That is something an arbitrator does not have the authority to do (unless the parties gave him that authority, which they did not in this case).
The policy was (is) what it was (is). There was no dispute. The arbitration panel was told, "Resolve this dispute based on this criteria." The panel was obligated to follow the ALPA merger policy as written.
If an ALPA member wants to now change the criteria by going through the proper channels to do so (i.e., introducing a resolution at a meeting to change the policy for future mergers), that is certainly his or her right as an ALPA member. But that is a separate, distinct and independent process than the seniority merger that just happened.
