MarkMyWords
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Dude......You're killing me today! LOL 
Should 700uw Change Names
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calibrator
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delldude said:
Remember SHRINKY DINKS -- that's what the Pax will look like with 100% odds.
MarkMyWords
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700.....no reply to PITMTC? He has some very valid points.
CaptianBoomer
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700:
The JAL 747 that crashed did indeed crash because the aft pressure bulkhead blew out which took out most of the vertical stabilizer and the whole rudder. Did a lot of damage to the stabilizer and I believe the loss of control was caused by either the flight control damage or the loss of all hydraulics......
However, faulty maintenance it was NOT. The aircraft was damaged during a hard landing. The aft pressure bulkhead was cracked. The STRUCTURES ENGINEER who designed the repair only called for one row of rivets on each side of the crack.
After the crash, they found the repair in the wreckage. Another structures engineer looked at the design of the repair and calculated to within like 100 cycles when the repair would fail. If memory serves, it lasted longer than anticipated. The mechanics who did the repair did a flawless job......the engineer who designed the repair was to blame, and took his own life later.
Boomer
The JAL 747 that crashed did indeed crash because the aft pressure bulkhead blew out which took out most of the vertical stabilizer and the whole rudder. Did a lot of damage to the stabilizer and I believe the loss of control was caused by either the flight control damage or the loss of all hydraulics......
However, faulty maintenance it was NOT. The aircraft was damaged during a hard landing. The aft pressure bulkhead was cracked. The STRUCTURES ENGINEER who designed the repair only called for one row of rivets on each side of the crack.
After the crash, they found the repair in the wreckage. Another structures engineer looked at the design of the repair and calculated to within like 100 cycles when the repair would fail. If memory serves, it lasted longer than anticipated. The mechanics who did the repair did a flawless job......the engineer who designed the repair was to blame, and took his own life later.
Boomer
Boeing had negligently made repairs on the aft pressure bulkhead following damage to the plane's tail fin in a bad landing in Osaka in 1978. Repairs of the aft pressure bulkhead were not made even in accord with Boeing's own repair manual.
JAL crash info
JAL crash info
justaumechanic
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You are correct. It was not faulty maintenance but a faulty design. The repair was carried out correctly by the technicians. Boeing assumed responsibility for the failure.
CaptianBoomer said:
PITMTC, Please tell us the whole story on this particular entry door.PITMTC said:
Seems you forgot to mention that this entry door was damaged by a Jetway...This entry door problem was NOT a result of any maintenance check.....
It did in fact RTF with an air leak...IMHO, a over-reaction...
Since you're a foreman in PIT, and this incident took place in CLT, would it be fair to say you don't have all the info ?
insp89 said:
I never forgot to mention anything. I simply stated it came out of our maintenance. The door was lifted by a jetway. It was taken to the hangar, removed, repaired and re-installed. It RETF, but after learning of why, I would rather PM you with what was the root cause of the leak.
jetmech01890
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I can remember a incident in bos a couple years ago with a certian md-80 whose nose gear would not come down , a little bird told me that during a a check a descripencey was reported to the lead on duty that night and he chose not to pursue the matter becuse there were too many a/c with problems there and he would mention it to pit maint and they would change the gear as there were none in bos ,well the same a/c came in with the same problem next check a month or two later and a jr mech had seen the same thing and reported it to the same lead and again it was blown off and well the gear got stuck in the wheel well it seems all the fluid in the strut had leaked out from this small problem that no one cared about my point is its not contract or in house its the guy doing the job you can bash contract if you want too but when a log book is signed by a mechanic they own the work and its their name and we all know what can happen like everthing else there are mechs who care and there are ones who want to blow stuff off so they can catch the 3am nap and unless you were there to see this take place I dont want too hear any IAM or I knew a guy who knew a guy or any cut and paste crap
USA320Pilot said:
Thats why they have parachutes and ejection on military aircraft seats right? You can claim thats only for combat but Ill bet that the overwhelming majority of cases where these devices were used over the last thirty years were not in combat but rather for mechanical malfunctions.
CaptianBoomer said:
I dont know if thats correct.
The double row of rivets were there,actually there was three rows of rivets with the repair. The original design before the damage only had two rows. One through the two skins and the stiffener and one through the two skins.
The problem was with the doubler plate that was put in place for the repair, not the rivets. The doubler plate should have went from the stiffener to both of the skins. In all there were three rows of rivets. One through the stiffener, doubler and upper skin, one through the same doubler and both peices of skin where they overlapped, and one through the doubler and lower skin. One of those two rivets should have gone through both skins and the same stiffener which meant that there were two rows of rivets for both sides of the skin through the doubler, one rivet being common to both skins. The problem was that the doubler was made wrong, not the rivets. Instead of having one doubler with two rows of rivets through each skin they ended up with two seperate doublers, one between the stiffener and the upper skin, and one right next to it between the two skins. However, since the doublers were sandwiched between the two skins, and the stiffener, from the outside the repair appeared correct.
isn't this the example they (one of many) in MRM training? if i'm right,the engineer who designed this repair ended up committing suicide over his judgement and resulting loss of life.....
also i believe SRM dictates you go stringer to stringer plus 2 or 3 rivets past the stringer...(boeing)
