SAFETY OVERSIGHT

As to your 1st paragraph: you've got me confused with someone else. As to your 2nd: I don't believe that I, nor anyone whose post I've read, has enough facts to come to any realistic conclusion, positive or negative, about this incident. Having a negative opinion about WN, combined with having read a newspaper article is enough "evidence" for some; not me. Not having enough facts is exactly why I've opined that too many seem to be in too much of a rush to convict WN.

You will never learn and are a large part of the problem, not part of the solution.
If UA or 'anyone else' did this, my actions would be the same.
Read my posts on the NWA forum when good ole 'boy' Oberstar put the screws to them.

As for me, read these links and my responses:

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php...st&p=579586

Bobbie said:
Let me look at this objectively...this article wants to make me scared of flying on a Southwest 737. So what do I do? Fly on a US 737 instead? The US 737 has visible cracks all over it: cracked seats, cracked side panels, overhead bin doors broken or missing.
Sorry, I'd feel safer putting myself and my children on the exceptionally clean and well-maintained (at least it looks that way) Southwest plane.

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php...st&p=579720
UAL_TECH said:
Big difference Boobie, you will not 'DIE' from cracked seat covers. You can 'DIE' when the aircraft skin rips open.

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php...st&p=579794
UAL_TECH said:
Probably the most 'true' statement in this thread.
No one died so this is a 'non-issue'.

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php...st&p=580030
UAL_TECH said:
AD’s, FAR’s, and OEM FAA recommended periodic maintenance checks are not to be taken lightly. The aviation industry is ‘continually’ expanding the time periods between maintenance checks based on two criteria.
1. Inspection findings of zero to minute problems found and corrected.
2. No one died
Much of the problems that I see are that the historical data to extend periodic maintenance checks is based on young airplanes that have been maintained per regimented OEM specifications and inspection periods. In the case of UAL, everything was maintained by the airline until the 2002 meltdown. Now it's a crap shoot.
As the aircraft age, one would think that inspections would be more stringent and the time periods reduced, but this has not been the case in recent years mainly due to criteria #2.
Like one of the ‘passenger posters’ elaborated, the perception of having a clean cabin, neat and working overhead bins, seats, and IFE take precedence over little nit picky stuff like a crack in the aircraft hull.
That is the ‘passenger’ expectation, not mine.
They are of the ignorant mindset that government mandated (FAA) oversight will dictate the serviceability of the aircraft while in fact the maintenance crews and aircraft crew members ‘constantly’ perform due diligence above and beyond FAA oversight on a flight-by-flight basis.

More than likely, the only individual that will be suffer ‘retribution’ will be the whistleblower.

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php...st&p=580037
UAL_TECH said:
Sounds like you need a 'HUG'!
To me, '"HUG" maintenance is unacceptable.

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php...st&p=580051
UAL_TECH said:
And it doesn't help that WN turned him down for a job in the past.
You are a Liar!
Prove it!

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php...st&p=580123
But there has
UAL_TECH said:
Thanks for the Link

http://www.usaviation.com/forums/index.php...st&p=580953
UAL_TECH said:
I have to admit that I am quite amazed and perplexed in this thread.
PAX, pilots and maintenance justify a clear violation of an AD and justify it with the ‘well known’ no one died defense.
Sad, truly sad and disappointing.
Consider this, If SWA is capable to do this unfettered, then were will the next line in the sand be?
Oops, 100 people died but the FAA and Boeing knew about it.
Bull####

Taking my posts in full context, what is your issue?

If you desire for everyone to be quiet until a 'judicial' ruling occurs, that will probably not happen.
Although, I have little doubt that both SWA and the FAA will be vindicated and the whistleblowers will be fired and fined.

After all, 'no one died'!

B) UT
 
You will never learn and are a large part of the problem, not part of the solution.
If UA or 'anyone else' did this, my actions would be the same.
Read my posts on the NWA forum when good ole 'boy' Oberstar put the screws to them.




Taking my posts in full context, what is your issue?

If you desire for everyone to be quiet until a 'judicial' ruling occurs, that will probably not happen.
Although, I have little doubt that both SWA and the FAA will be vindicated and the whistleblowers will be fired and fined.

After all, 'no one died'!

B) UT
If UA was accused of something, and there was as little "evidence" (as there is thusfar with WN), and your actions were the same, you'd be just as wrong. Assuming someone's guilty before all the evidence is in is wrong, whether it's a company you don't work for, or one that you do.

I don't desire for everyone to be quiet; I've suggested they be patient. I don't expect a judicial ruling to occur; we work in an industry where if you're told you're guilty, then you are-until and unless you can prove otherwise; that can hardly be described as "judicial".

It's quaint how in your world, you've set things up so that no matter what, you'll win: either WN and the FAA will be shown to be guilty (in which case you can say, "I told you so"), or they'll be vindicated (in which case you can say, "I told you so").
 
CNN reported this morning that WN put 3 employees on paid leave as a result of this situation... they did not report what positions the employees hold.
 
Former NTSB Investigator In Charge Offers Safety of Flight Assessment on Behalf of Southwest Airlines


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I was requested by Southwest Airlines (SWA) to review and assess the potential safety of flight risk that could have resulted from the continued in-service operation of 46 of their Classic 737 airplanes in March 2007 as they progressively inspected a small area (under 0.6%) of the fuselage skin as required by FAA Airworthiness Directive 2004-18-06. The assessment involved the review of technical documents associated with both mandatory and non-mandatory inspections, pertinent service/maintenance history for the 46 airplanes, a technical briefing by the Southwest Airlines Engineering Department and technical data/analysis provided by Boeing (the airplane manufacturer) related to structural integrity of fuselage skin cracks that were found on five of the 46 SWA airplanes. The scope of the assessment was confined to the safety of flight issues only.

Based on the information I have reviewed, it is apparent that on March 15, 2007, SWA initiated re-inspection of the affected airplanes to accomplish the inadvertently missed portion of FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004-18-06. A review of the historical information that led to the issuance of the AD indicates that a progressive inspection for fuselage skin cracking was initially distributed to operators in the form of a “non-mandatory†Service Bulletin (SB) that provided “risk mitigation†actions that operators were encouraged to incorporate into their maintenance program. This Service Bulletin was based, in large part, on an inspection program developed by Southwest Airlines. The issuance of the AD was a continued effort to ensure that cracks in the fuselage skin on the Boeing 737 airplanes was identified and mitigated well before they could pose a safety of flight issue. It is evident from the 4500 hour initial inspection requirement (regardless of aircraft age (i.e.flight cycles)) that the FAA did not regard the skin cracking as an “immediate threat†to the safety of flight of the airplane. Thus, the FAA Airworthiness Directive permitted aircraft to remain in-service for approximately 1½ years, until a normally scheduled heavy maintenance visit occurred, before the first inspection was required.

In addition, it is evident from the analysis and testing data developed by Boeing that cracks up to 6 inches in the fuselage skin do not compromise the structural integrity or pose a safety of flight issue. This is further supported by the design of the fuselage structure which incorporates “internal reinforcing doublers in the skin assembly†and “tearstrapsâ€, both of which are intended to provide strength, and slow or abate the growth rate of a crack under normal operating aerodynamic loads.

Based on the available data and information reviewed, it is apparent that there was no risk to the flying public in March 2007 while Southwest Airlines performed their program to re-inspect the small area of aircraft fuselages identified in the AD inspection that was inadvertently missed.

GREGORY A. FEITH
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY & SECURITY CONSULTANT

Mr. Feith is a former National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Senior Air Safety Investigator with a wide range of aviation investigative, safety and experience. He has investigated hundreds of general aviation, business/corporate and air transport aircraft incidents and accidents worldwide during his 28 years as an aircraft accident investigator and aviation safety expert, of which more than 20 years was with the NTSB. Greg served as the Investigator-in-Charge or U.S. Accredited Representative for the investigation of numerous high profile aircraft accidents that include the Valujet DC-9 in-flight fire in the Florida Everglades in 1996; the American Eagle ATR 72 in-flight icing accident at Roselawn, Indiana in 1994; the USAir DC-9 windshear accident at Charlotte in 1994; the Korean Air 747-300 controlled flight into terrain at Guam in 1997; the American Airlines MD-83 runway overrun at Little Rock in 1999; the Emery Worldwide Airlines DC-8 elevator control failure at Sacramento in 2000; the Swiss Air MD-11 in Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia in 1998; and the Silk Air Boeing 737 in Palembang, Sumatra in 1997.

Greg has won numerous NTSB and aviation industry awards and was the recipient of an Aviation Week and Space Technology Laurel Award in 1996 for his leadership in the investigation of the Valujet DC-9 in-flight fire accident in the Florida Everglades. He also received the 2001 Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Distinguished Alumni Award for "extraordinary distinction and success in the field of aviation and achievements;" and the SAFE Association, Michael R. Grost Award for “outstanding contribution in the field of accident investigation.â€

Greg is currently in private practice as an international aviation safety and security consultant specializing in: aircraft accident investigation, reconstruction and flight safety; expert witness testimony; general aviation, business/corporate and commercial airline flight safety and security program design, development, implementation and evaluation; and business/corporate and commercial airline emergency response (ERP) and crisis management program development and evaluation. He is also a principle member of The Aviation Response Management Advisory Group (TARMAC), which is comprised of former NTSB, FAA, FBI, NYCPD and U.N. experts dedicated to analyzing, developing and implementing programs that enhance both the flight safety and security of corporate/business aviation flight operations.

Greg is widely known and respected for his frequent public speaking engagements and safety lecture, involvement in aviation safety and security education programs, and his persona as an instructor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in the area of accident investigation/reconstruction and aviation safety. Greg regularly appears in a variety of aviation safety-related television programs on Discovery, TLC, the History Channel, “Seconds to Disaster†on National Geographic and PBS. He is the host of a television series on the History Channel titled Secrets of the Black Box, dedicated to telling the story about the investigation of aircraft accidents and the “Lessons Learned†that have enhanced the safety of aviation. In addition, he is a frequent contributor to various writers for articles in aviation publications such as Business & Commercial Aviation, Aviation Week and Space Technology and Aviation International News. Greg is seen regularly as an aviation safety and security expert on NBC, MSNBC and other major networks worldwide.



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It's quaint how in your world, you've set things up so that no matter what, you'll win: either WN and the FAA will be shown to be guilty (in which case you can say, "I told you so"), or they'll be vindicated (in which case you can say, "I told you so").

quaint

Thanks :up:

That is the 'first' label (above 5 letters) that I have been 'called'... :p

If it were 'MY' world, chit would be 'much different' and this crap would never happen with 'any' airline. :shock:

Bite Me,
B) UT
 
I haven't tried to justify anything. I responded to an employee of another airline who implied that Southwest's stellar on-time rating was because they wouldn't pull aircraft offline for maintenance. Just wanted to point out that at the airline HE works for, HIS management didn't want to pull an aircraft offline for maintenance, and a mechanic felt strongly enough about it that he threw objects into the engine to keep the aircraft from leaving the gate.

Yes, and he is largely regarded as a hero now. Fortunately that was just one occurance and not some frequent incident indicative of a larger problem or conspiracy.

The point I am making is this. There was no person who stopped these a/c from departing, either with a wrench or otherwise. Obviously something is wrong... Either a cog in the system is broken, or people werebeing dishonest. Hopefully the investigation will bear this out. In the mean time, we DO know that those flights left the gate anyway, and Southwest made a lot of money.
 
Yes, and he is largely regarded as a hero now. Fortunately that was just one occurance and not some frequent incident indicative of a larger problem or conspiracy.

The point I am making is this. There was no person who stopped these a/c from departing, either with a wrench or otherwise. Obviously something is wrong... Either a cog in the system is broken, or people werebeing dishonest. Hopefully the investigation will bear this out. In the mean time, we DO know that those flights left the gate anyway, and Southwest made a lot of money.
If I hated this "other" airline; or if I couldn't sleep at night because my airline wasn't making money, while another one was, and I was looking for something - anything - to explain how this could be (so I could sleep/feel better), I could turn on the ol' conspiracy theory motor and conclude that there is a problem at "all of Southwest" (I don't know how you, personally, feel about WN; so the above may only apply to some others).

"A cog in the system is broken" could mean that one, or two, or three employees of WN did something wrong (intentionally or unintentionally). In that case, one, or two, or three should receive an appropriate punishment. If there is a problem at "all of WN", then "all of WN" should be punished. My only disagreement with a few on this topic has been, "Is there enough evidence, thusfar, to convict 'all of WN' "? I say "no".
 
Yes, and he is largely regarded as a hero now. Fortunately that was just one occurance and not some frequent incident indicative of a larger problem or conspiracy.

The point I am making is this. There was no person who stopped these a/c from departing, either with a wrench or otherwise. Obviously something is wrong... Either a cog in the system is broken, or people werebeing dishonest. Hopefully the investigation will bear this out. In the mean time, we DO know that those flights left the gate anyway, and Southwest made a lot of money.
Ad....so, you're telling me that in the end, the actions of the mechanic caused the airline to reconsider what it considers "airworthy" now?
 

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