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Page 18 of US Airways'' Legal Brief filed with the Bankruptcy Court to seek emergency relief to abrogate union contracts states:
The RLA Would Not Allow US AIrways'' Employees to Strike
Although a strike could severly impact the Debtor''s efforts to reorganize, employees subject to the Railway Labor Act could not lawfully strike in response to rejection. The principal purpose of Congress in enacting the RLA was to prevent strikes or other interruptions to the nations''s transportation systems. See 45 U.S.C. 15la. This purpose is embodied in Section 2, First of the RLA, which provides that (i)t shall be the duty of the carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions...in order to aboid any interruption to commerce or to the operations of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof. 45 U.S.C. 152, First (emphasis added). This provision, the courts have held, prohibits a union from strking during negotiations over a collective bargaining agreement until exhaustion of the mandatory negotiation and mediation provisions of the RLA. Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149-51 (1969). This principle applies even where the carrier itself is not subject to any status quo requirement, as during negotiation of an initial agreement. Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal ***''n v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc. 125 F.3d41 (2nd Cir. 1997).
Moreover, the negotiation and mediation procedures of the RLA are purposefully long and drawn out, requiring direct negotiations between the parties until they reach imp***e, and then permitting either party to seek mediation under the supervision of the National Mediation Board. Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. Co., 396 U.S. at 149-51. The rationale underlying the statute is that by delaying the right to self-help, it becomes more likely that the parties can reach agreements without a strike. As the Supreme Court observed in the Shore Line case:
The Act''s status quo requirement is central to its design. Its immediate effect is to prevent the union from striking and management from doing anything that would justify a strike. In the long run, delaying the time when the parties can resort to self help provides time for tempers to cool, helps create an atmosphere in which rational bargaining can occur, and permits the forces of public opinion to be mobilized in favor of a settlement without a strike or lockout.
Id. at 150.
Appling these principles to the present circumstances, it would be completely inconsistent with the RLA to permit either the CWA or IAM to
strike following rejection until the union had sought to negotiate a new agreement with the carreir through the RLA bargaining process. Therefore, a strike is not likely even if the court must authorize rejection of the collective bargaining agreements with CWA and IAM.
The RLA Would Not Allow US AIrways'' Employees to Strike
Although a strike could severly impact the Debtor''s efforts to reorganize, employees subject to the Railway Labor Act could not lawfully strike in response to rejection. The principal purpose of Congress in enacting the RLA was to prevent strikes or other interruptions to the nations''s transportation systems. See 45 U.S.C. 15la. This purpose is embodied in Section 2, First of the RLA, which provides that (i)t shall be the duty of the carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions...in order to aboid any interruption to commerce or to the operations of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof. 45 U.S.C. 152, First (emphasis added). This provision, the courts have held, prohibits a union from strking during negotiations over a collective bargaining agreement until exhaustion of the mandatory negotiation and mediation provisions of the RLA. Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142, 149-51 (1969). This principle applies even where the carrier itself is not subject to any status quo requirement, as during negotiation of an initial agreement. Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal ***''n v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, Inc. 125 F.3d41 (2nd Cir. 1997).
Moreover, the negotiation and mediation procedures of the RLA are purposefully long and drawn out, requiring direct negotiations between the parties until they reach imp***e, and then permitting either party to seek mediation under the supervision of the National Mediation Board. Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. Co., 396 U.S. at 149-51. The rationale underlying the statute is that by delaying the right to self-help, it becomes more likely that the parties can reach agreements without a strike. As the Supreme Court observed in the Shore Line case:
The Act''s status quo requirement is central to its design. Its immediate effect is to prevent the union from striking and management from doing anything that would justify a strike. In the long run, delaying the time when the parties can resort to self help provides time for tempers to cool, helps create an atmosphere in which rational bargaining can occur, and permits the forces of public opinion to be mobilized in favor of a settlement without a strike or lockout.
Id. at 150.
Appling these principles to the present circumstances, it would be completely inconsistent with the RLA to permit either the CWA or IAM to
strike following rejection until the union had sought to negotiate a new agreement with the carreir through the RLA bargaining process. Therefore, a strike is not likely even if the court must authorize rejection of the collective bargaining agreements with CWA and IAM.
