AA grounds the sp80 fleet....

[commavia]

Here it is:

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance.../2006-15-15.pdf

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance...ight=2006-15-15

Incorporates by reference the various revisions of the SB (which aren't online).

Thank you very much for posting that link.

The AD refers specifically to the issue in question in the section entitled, "Installation of Additional Wiring Protection:"

For airplanes in Configuration 4, as defined in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD80-29A070,
Revision 1, dated July 28, 2005: Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD, install
additional protective sleeving on the upper portion of the auxiliary hydraulic pump wire assembly in
accordance with the procedures under Configuration 4 in the Accomplishment Instructions of the
service bulletin.


Since I am not a mechanic, I am not sure if it is possible, but does anyone know where the "Accomplishment Instructions" might be viewable? I'd love to see how the specifics of the wiring attachment to the wheel well assembly were described in the original AD.

 

[AMFAMAN]

Here it is:

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance.../2006-15-15.pdf

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance...ight=2006-15-15

Incorporates by reference the various revisions of the SB (which aren't online).

Well this has to be the understatement of the year:

Cost Impact
There are approximately 1,063 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. We
estimate that 732 airplanes of U.S. registry (i.e., airplane Configurations 1 through 4; we do not know
how many airplanes are in Configuration 4) will be affected by this AD, that it will take up to 12
work hours per airplane to accomplish the required inspection and other specified actions, and that
the average labor rate is $65 per work hour. Required parts will cost up to $524 per airplane. Based
on these figures, the cost impact of this AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be up to $954,528, or up
to $1,304 per airplane.

 

[UAL_TECH]

Here it is:

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance.../2006-15-15.pdf

http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance...ight=2006-15-15

Incorporates by reference the various revisions of the SB (which aren't online).

Thanks

Typical AD verbiage but not valuable without the "Alert Service Bulletin MD80-29A070" and revision history.
Due to 'proprietary information' it will probably not be available to the public.

B) UT

 

[UAL_TECH]

Then again, revision history should be moot if this is the latest and greatest:

[Docket No. 2001-NM-387-AD; Amendment 39-14696; AD 2006-15-15]

Excerpt:

(e) Unless otherwise specified in this AD, the actions must be done in accordance with Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin MD80-29A070, Revision 1, dated July 28, 2005. This incorporation by
reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)
and 1 CFR part 51. To get copies of this service information, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes,
Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data
and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024). To inspect copies of this service information,
go to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; to the
FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California;
or to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to
http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/c..._locations.html.

The AD references Revision 1 DTD: July 28, 2005 ‘specifically’.
Any revision after that is irrelevant.
So what were the instructions of ‘this’ revision?

B) UT

 

[PRINCESS KIDAGAKASH]

There is still confusion on how to correctly comply with this wiring ECO. The FAA is saying do it this way and the engineer who wrote this abomination is saying do it another way. All having to do with clamps and their orientation. All I know is this ECO should have never been issued until all the "issues" had been addressed, and none of these airplanes should have been grounded for the trival "problems" that have been found. The FAA needs to be sued for causeing these unnessary groundings. These "problems" could have been easily handled at the next "B" check since none of the "problems" are airworthiness related.

 

[xmarlin]

There is still confusion on how to correctly comply with this wiring ECO. The FAA is saying do it this way and the engineer who wrote this abomination is saying do it another way. All having to do with clamps and their orientation. All I know is this ECO should have never been issued until all the "issues" had been addressed, and none of these airplanes should have been grounded for the trival "problems" that have been found. The FAA needs to be sued for causeing these unnessary groundings. These "problems" could have been easily handled at the next "B" check since none of the "problems" are airworthiness related.

Actually Princess, there is a difference between "unairworthy" and "unsafe" or "airworthy" and "safe" as the case may be. I think in this case it's an airworthiness issue rather than a safety issue.

:mellow:

 

[Flyboy4u]

Gee...maybe Conley was right about suggesting the workers should not have high expectations of the contract. This MD-80 mess paired with the price of oil is serious stuff...Maybe we should voluntarily take a reduction in pay for another 6 years to help the company buy new airplanes and help foot the gas bill....

SOMEBODY IN AA M&E AND QA NEEDS TO GET FIRED OVER THIS JUST LIKE THE COMPANY FIRES MECHANICS FOR SLEEPING AFTER THEY DID THEIR WORK...THEY NEED TO FIRE THE BIG SHOTS WHO WERE ASLEEP WHILE THEY SHOULD'VE BEEN WORKING!

You are correct Hopeful...Big Shots are those due to take their "so called" Million dollar Bonus checks next week!

I think this is Brilliant....Cancel more flights AA....It's Working>.....LOL

 

[chucky]

I don't think AA added anything to it's expenses here. My gut instinct is that this is all fully insurable, and AA will be able to pass the bulk of these "losses" off onto their insurance. Voluntary or not it had to be done by FAA directive and it created a massive loss of revenue. That sounds insurable to me. Time will tell.

"I think it will be in the tens of millions of dollars," Arpey said of the final cost. But he said the airline had built up enough cash and paid down debt to deal with the loss. He said the carrier has business-interruption insurance, but he doubted that it would cover the cancellation-related losses.

Link

 

[DAL Mech]

You can't just tease us like this. What have the Fed's ordered this time? How much longer will it keep the Super 80's on the ground?

From what I heard, they weren't blaming the mechanics, they were blaming the FAA's overnight changing of the standards from the spirit of the rule to the letter of the law.

Here at Delta, they say they aren't blaming the mechanics, but interviews are being conducted and mechanics are being suspended during a "investigation".

It is a horribly written AD and we are all paying the price.



As of this AM, all but 5 of our 117 '88s are making revenue flights.

 

[nbmcg01]

"I think it will be in the tens of millions of dollars," Arpey said of the final cost. But he said the airline had built up enough cash and paid down debt to deal with the loss. He said the carrier has business-interruption insurance, but he doubted that it would cover the cancellation-related losses.

Link

I would think this would be a business tax write off. Probably not all would be recouped but there would be a significant recovery.

 

[RDU Jetblast]

I just read the last three pages of this thread. There has been talk about AA causing this mess or the FAA causing it but when I read the AD, it seems pretty clear what needs to be done (although I saw no mention of cord spacing) and that there was 18 months to comply. That would mean compliance had to occur by March of '08. AA timed out.

My thoughts are that AA failed to comply w/i ample timeframe. Seems like the faa said "you ground them are we'll ground them for you." AA chose the lesser of two PR evils.

 

[commavia]

I just read the last three pages of this thread. There has been talk about AA causing this mess or the FAA causing it but when I read the AD, it seems pretty clear what needs to be done (although I saw no mention of cord spacing) and that there was 18 months to comply. That would mean compliance had to occur by March of '08. AA timed out.

My thoughts are that AA failed to comply w/i ample timeframe. Seems like the faa said "you ground them are we'll ground them for you." AA chose the lesser of two PR evils.

I suggest you read all 12 pages.

This was not so cut-and-dry. And, if the AD you say you read was the one posted a few posts back by FWAAA - which seems obvious since you didn't see the reference to wire spacing that has caused the problem - then you weren't reading the actual pages in question. The all-important "Accomplishment Instructions" are not - at the moment - available to the public. It was in these Accomplishment Instructions that the problems apparently arose.

The more we hear about this, and the more information is slowly emerging, it is becoming more and more clear that this is nothing more than an issue of the FAA covering its a**. These planes were not unsafe, nor have they ever been. And it's not simply an issue of AA "failing to comply." AA was in full compliance based on the level of acceptability of the excellent work their mechanics have done in the past. It is only now, in the last week, that the standard of what the FAA finds "acceptable" has become much higher - needlessly.

 

[RDU Jetblast]

Ahh, 12 pages. I only saw the 5. I guess there was a new c/w date with the revision too, which must mean there was no reason to ground the a/c.

I don't dispute that this is NOT a safety issue. The MD-80/88 were built over fifteen-twenty years ago and have flown as long with this wiring which, if there is a short, ought to trip a breaker long before there is a fire.

Nor do I dispute the AA mechs did their jobs correctly. I think the flying public realizes there is egg on faces and CYA going on.

That one news report showing a mechanic scrutinizing a tape measure against the bundle is priceless and speaks volumes.

 

[Veritas]

Seen in the Travel Insider:

I don't understand the lunacy that has surrounded American's massive cancellations of flights so far this week (conservative estimates suggest over a quarter million people have had their travel plans messed up). The rhetorical question I have - indeed, it is a real question I'd like to see answered, relates to the sudden urgency of a formerly non-urgent matter.

The problem that caused all the cancellations relates to an FAA directive issued back in 2006 that gave airlines 18 months to inspect and, if necessary, enhance some wiring in the wheel wells of MD-80 planes. Now - here's the key thing. The matter was deemed so routine and unimportant that the FAA in effect said to the airlines 'take your time, guys, but some time in the next year and a half, when you think of it, go check this out and change it if necessary'.

Flash forward 18 months. Some ambiguities in the inspection/correction process came to light, and so the airlines with MD-80s reinspected and, as may have been needed, corrected any remaining issues in view of what may have been an evolving definition of what needed to be done to the wiring. But instead of asking the FAA 'hey, can we have a few more weeks to do this without disrupting our passengers?' the airlines (and possibly the FAA too) pushed the panic button and without any care for passenger inconvenience, cancelled all MD-80 flights as if this was a mission-critical safety issue that might cause planes to start exploding in mid-air. Needless to say, no planes have indeed exploded in mid-air, and no-one is admitting to have found any dangerously damaged wiring.

That was a week or so back.

And now, this week, it appears that AA may have misunderstood (or perhaps the FAA further clarified/refined) part of what was needed to be done in the rewiring process. And so, again, instead of asking for a week or two (or even a month or two - what is another month or two to redo an already done procedure after being given 18 months to start with) to do this in an orderly manner, AA again pushes the panic button, disrupting, so far, a quarter million passengers.

Does AA deserve kudos for being supremely safety conscious? Or should it (and possibly the FAA too) be condemned for gross stupidity and insensitivity? Their actions are costing itself millions of (maybe even close to a billion) dollars, generating enormous ill-will with AA's passengers, and all for largely no valid reason.

Let's be adult about this - when the FAA says 'do this within 18 months' there is nothing magic about the number 18. It is simply a round number that was semi-arbitrarily chosen by some bureaucrat. Sometimes the FAA gives airlines two or three or more years to institute a new directive, and sometimes it mandates actions to be done in a very short timeframe or almost immediately. An 18 month time period is just another marker on a continuum of time frames. Planes don't switch from being acceptably safe at 17 months 29 days to becoming dangerously unsafe at 18 months and 1 day.

If AA had any care or concern for itself and for its passengers, it would have had a dialog with the FAA requesting a reasonable amount of time to do this work. One can only guess at why this wasn't agreed to.

 

[commavia]

Seen in the Travel Insider:

This guy needs to do a bit more reading to truly deserve the title of "Insider."

For starters, he acts - like so many others do - as if AA just ignored the FAA's AD or 18 months and then just all of a sudden got caught this week. We all know that is ridiculous - AA complied with the AD in a way they felt was adequate given previous history with the FAA, and then the FAA told them the game had changed.

And as for his carping about how AA - if it really cared for its customers - should have asked the FAA for more time to do the mod work, he really needs to read any one of numerous articles already written about this subject. Arpey himself was quoted as saying that they did, indeed, try to get the FAA to give them more time since - as everyone did then and still does now agree - this was never a safety issue. The FAA said no.