Comair Crash

Wouldn't a simple look at their heading indicator before their TO roll, indicate they were on the wrong runway? It would have indicated 264deg. instead of the correct 225deg. I would think that with 2 possible runways, one with disasterious consequences if used, a verification of heading would be in order before TO.
Absolutely correct! When I first started flying lessons one of the last checks before take-off that was drilled into my head was to check your compass against runway heading. This was more to verify the compass was accurate but in the case of this accident would have alerted the crew that something was not right.
 
Absolutely correct! When I first started flying lessons one of the last checks before take-off that was drilled into my head was to check your compass against runway heading. This was more to verify the compass was accurate but in the case of this accident would have alerted the crew that something was not right.

The aircraft probably has at least 3 ways to check aircraft heading.CRT screen[or similar type screen]-Directional Gyro-Magnetic Compass
There were other signs such as no runway lighting and probably no other traffic on that runway.
Unmarked or mismarked taxi ways could have caused some confusion which would have allowed the crew to choose the wrong runway.

I know at TUL if you get on the wrong taxiway/runway you will hear immediately from the tower.They will be all over you if you even cross a hold line by just a few feet.Maybe another person in this tower could have been the last checks and balances against the crew putting the aircraft on the wrong runway.
 
From MSNBC this morning...

Comair offered to pay $25,000 per passenger to each family who lost a loved one. Meanwhile, law firms lined up to represent families who may want to sue.

“We understand that no monetary relief can overcome the grief of losing a loved one,â€￾ Comair spokeswoman Kate Marx said. “But we also recognize there likely will be additional financial demands at this difficult time, and we hope this form of assistance can help alleviate some of the immediate financial pressures.â€￾

-----------------------------------------------------
Ahhh, the Company is already starting with the "no monetary relief" line of garbage. I wonder if the 25K came along with a "Release of All Claims"
 
now theyre saying that the controller had 2 hrs of sleep. I truly cannot imagine how he feels. I also heard that he had to look away due to other air traffic coming his way or something of that type.
 
Key points from today's article in the Lexington newspaper.

- Controller only had two hours of sleep.
- Controller had handled two flights in the four minutes before Flight 5191. (United and American Eagle)
- Controller was guiding Eagle flight around some "inclement weather" when 5191 began its takeoff roll.
- NTSB's new calculations show 5191 needed 3,744 feet to properly lift its nose wheel; well beyond the end of the 3,500 foot runway.


full article
 
In and of themselves, one controller on duty, and the crew preflighting the wrong aircraft is no big deal but in light of the accident I can see the numbers starting to add up.

Speaking of numbers, this has been creeping me out for the last couple days:

Delta Flt 191 crashed in Dallas August 2, 1985

American Flt 191 crashed in Chicago May 26, 1979

Comair Flt 5191 crashed in Lexington August 27,2006

Tell me I'm being foolish and superstitious. Please.
 
To the Pilots:

I don't mean to be rude with these few questions . . .

Is it part of the pre-flight checklist to check your compass heading against the runway assignment? If so, wouldn't final responsibility for taking off on the wrong runway fall on the pilot? I see a lot of talk about the controller, and I'm sure he/she is a safety gap . . . but isn't it secondary to the pilot?
 
Most of the emphasis now is placed on runway incursions rather than making sure that the aircraft is lined up with the right runway. There are situations where parallel runways exist with different lengths, so there's more to it than merely the correct heading.

Haste, in aviation, can lead to tragic waste. Everyone, from upper management on down, needs to re-adjust their expectations about how long things might take to do. Making everything a competition between airlines and the need to "lean" everything out to gain some phantom "efficiency", leads to safety undoubtedly being compromised.

Safety is not a given. It takes concerted effort and should not have to share attention with "efficiency".
 
Aviation disaster --a pilot's view

A pilot/writer posted this at another writing site. He gave me permission to
repost this here because it is both relevant & important. -
*******************************************************

<snip>
I live in Lexington and have thirty years of airline experience flying in and out of LEX. I was also the station liaison for Lexington for ten years

Here is what I think happened:

The two runways in question share the same common run-up area. The extended taxiway to the correct runway, runway 28 was closed due to construction. It has always been difficult to tell between the two runways when you are
taxiing out. The natural thing to do is to take the wrong one. It is just there and you are always tempted to take it. When I flew out of LEX we always checked each other at least three times to make sure we were taking the correct runway. We checked the chart, we checked to make sure the
correct runway number was at the end and we always double checked the FMS generated moving map.

Most FMS systems will have a warning called "runway dissimilarity" pop up in magenta when your position at takeoff doesn't match the runway you programmed into the computer. This would not happen at LEX since you are
virtually in the same spot when you take either runway.

It was also raining at the time of takeoff and dark. The control tower opens at 6 am (because we are, after all, all about saving money) and only has one controller on duty at that time. He or she has to: run ground control,
clearance delivery, approach control and departure control. The one controller also has to program the ATIS and make the coffee. He or she probably cleared Comair to take off and then put their head back down to do a chore or work another airplane.

Taking the runway, the Comair guy would put the power up and wouldn't realize they were on the wrong runway until they were about 70% down the pike. Too late to safely abort so he probably decided to try and continue the
takeoff.

This is when the eye witnesses heard a series of explosions and though the plane blew up in the air. Didn't happen -- what they heard and saw were compressor stalls of probably both engines. The pilot no doubt pushed the
throttles all the way up and that demand to the engines combined with the steep pitch attitude cut off enough air to the intakes to cause the compressor stalls -- which, by the way, made them even more doomed. Less power.

They stalled or simply hit one of the large hills to the west of the airport and came to a stop. Everybody on board was probably injured but alive. Then, a second or two later the post-crash fire began. With the darkness and the
fact that most of them had broken legs, pelvises and backs they literally burned alive. Not smoke inhalation. They really actually burned to death.

In my role as station liaison I wrote most of the post crash safety procedure for Delta at that field. Too bad there weren't enough survivors to use them.

BTW, Comair and the press will tell you what a great plane the RJ is. This is a total lie. The Canadair RJ was designed to be an executive barge, not an airliner. They were designed to fly about ten times a month, not ten
times a day. They have a long history of mechanical design shortfalls. I've flown on it and have piloted it. It is a steaming, underpowered piece of ####. It never had enough power to get out of its own way and this situation is exactly what everybody who flies it was afraid of.

The senior member of the crew had about five and a half years of total jet experience. The copilot less. They had minimum training (to save money -- enjoy that discount ticket!) and were flying a minimally equipped pos on
very short rest. The layover gets in about 10 pm. the night before. They report for pick-up at 4:30 am.

I'm sorry if I sound bitter but this is exactly the direction the entire airline industry is going. Expect to see bigger more colorful crashes in the future.
 
i thought that may be that could of been the situation in regards to Comair Flight 5191 but i read today in the kentucky.com that read that there were so many mistakes it was just trying to see how far back it goes and which mistake was the one that costed them. meanin was it the layout of the runway or other. I think NASA even had/has a list of pilot reports that state they have gotten on the wrong runway. Now in this case, wouldnt the airport also be held liable because of that?
 
To the Pilots:

I don't mean to be rude with these few questions . . .

Is it part of the pre-flight checklist to check your compass heading against the runway assignment? If so, wouldn't final responsibility for taking off on the wrong runway fall on the pilot? I see a lot of talk about the controller, and I'm sure he/she is a safety gap . . . but isn't it secondary to the pilot?
no it's not not but most pilots will always check the heading if not also the localizer for all runways they are not to familiar with, and it does always lie on the crew, not the controller.
 
Aviation disaster --a pilot's view

A pilot/writer posted this at another writing site. He gave me permission to
repost this here because it is both relevant & important. -
*******************************************************

<snip>
ticket!) and were flying a minimally equipped pos on
very short rest. The layover gets in about 10 pm. the night before. They report for pick-up at 4:30 am.

But the CEO said they had LEGAL rest. Wow, 6.5 hours!
 
Aviation disaster --a pilot's view

The senior member of the crew had about five and a half years of total jet experience. The copilot less. They had minimum training (to save money -- enjoy that discount ticket!) and were flying a minimally equipped pos on
very short rest. The layover gets in about 10 pm. the night before. They report for pick-up at 4:30 am.

I'm sorry if I sound bitter but this is exactly the direction the entire airline industry is going. Expect to see bigger more colorful crashes in the future.

Fly,

while certainly tragic, the letter contains many assumptions/outright falsehoods that detract from the safety concerns.

The crew had ample rest, the Captain about 13 hours and the F/O over 24 hours.

The type of arcraft is irrelevant.....the runway was too short!!! If it was a 737/A320 that did this would the author be lamenting what POS those aircraft were?

And finally only 5 and half years of jet time. OMG! the world is ending....and given the inaccuracies of other aspects of the article makes me wonder if that is even true. Who knew what they did prior to Comair.

"Bornhorst identified the three crew members as Capt. Jeffrey Clay, who was hired by Comair in 1999, first officer James M. Polehinke, who was hired in 2002,..."

This accident was not caused by the controller, or the type of airplane, or the pilots experience, or even the schedule, it was sad to say, a big mistake.


DC