You must be one sick dude to keep bringing this up. Counseling may benefit you.
NICDOA
NPJB
The truth is ugly and hits a nerve.
Quit the BS about how the East is superior to the West and I'll quit refuting your BS.
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
USAIR, INC.
BOEING 737-400
LAGUARDIA AIRPORT
FLUSHING, NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER 20, 1989
3.2 Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the
probable cause of this accident was the captain's failure to exercise his
command authority in a timely manner to reject the takeoff or take sufficient
control to continue the takeoff, which was initiated with a mistrimmed
rudder. Also causal was the captain's failure to detect the mistrimmed
rudder before the takeoff was attempted
3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Findings
1. The flight and cabin crews were properly certificated and
qualified for the flight.
2. The airplane was certificated, equipped, and maintained in
accordance with Federal regulations and approved procedures.
3. Rudder trim moved full left while the airplane was parked with
engines off at LGA.
4. The captain could have detected the mistrim rudder condition
during taxi, during the flight control freedom-of-movement
check and during the response to a checklist challenge. He
failed to do so.
5. The captain did not use the autobrake system during the
takeoff roll, as recommended by Boeing and USAir management.
His failure to do so delayed the onset of maximum braking and
extended the airplane's stopping distance.
6. Both pilots were relatively inexperienced in their respective
positions. The captain had about 140 hours as a B-737
captain, and the first officer was conducting his first nonsupervised
line takeoff in a B-737, and also his first takeoff
after a 39-days non-flying period.
7. Early in the takeoff attempt, the first officer inadvertently
disarmed the autothrottle. He then manually advanced the
throttles; the resultant delay and the slightly low thrust set
on the left engine lengthened the airplane's ground roll and
added to the directional control problem.
8. The captain's use of the nosewheel steering tiller during the
takeoff roll was not proper and may have masked the initial
directional control problem created by the mistrimmed rudder.
9. Because of poor communication between the pilots, both
attempted to 'maintain directional control initially and
neither was fully in control later in the takeoff, compounding
directional control difficulties.
10. Neither pilot was monitoring indicated airspeed and no
standard airspeed callouts occurred.
56
11. The captain should have been aware of the directional control
problem and should have initiated an RTO before accelerating
to high speed.
12. Unusual noise and vibration from the cocked nosewheel, and the
leftward veer, led the captain to reject the takeoff.
13. Computed VT speed was 125 knots and action by the captain to
reject the takeoff began at 130 knots.
14. After initiating the RTO, the captain used differential
braking to steer the airplane. This delayed the attainment of
effective braking until 5 l/2 seconds after the takeoff was
rejected.
15. Braking during the RTO was less than the maximum braking
achievable on the wet runway; the airplane could have been
stopped on the runway.
NTSB Identification: DCA94MA065 .
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division
Scheduled 14 CFR USAIR
Accident occurred Saturday, July 02, 1994 in CHARLOTTE, NC
Probable Cause Approval Date: 1/19/1996
Aircraft: DOUGLAS DC-9-31, registration: N954VJ
Injuries: 37 Fatal, 16 Serious, 4 Minor.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
1) THE FLIGHTCREW'S DECISION TO CONTINUE AN APPROACH INTO SEVERE CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY THAT WAS CONDUCIVE TO A MICROBURST; 2) THE FLIGHTCREW'S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE A WINDSHEAR SITUATION IN A TIMELY MANNER; 3)THE FLIGHTCREW'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE PROPER AIRPLANE ATTITUDE AND THRUST SETTING NECESSARY TO ESCAPE THE WINDSHEAR; AND 4) THE LACK OF REAL-TIME ADVERSE WEATHER AND WINDSHEAR HAZARD INFORMATION DISSEMINATION FROM AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, ALL OF WHICH LED TO AN ENCOUNTER WITH AND THE FAILURE TO ESCAPE FROM A MICROBURST-INDUCED WINDSHEAR THAT WAS PRODUCED BY A RAPIDLY DEVELOPING THUNDERSTORM LOCATED AT THE APPROACH END OF RUNWAY 18R. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WERE: 1) THE LACK OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROCEDURES THAT WOULD HAVE REQUIRED THE CONTROLLER TO DISPLAY AND ISSUE AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE RADAR (ASR-9) WEATHER INFORMATION TO THE PILOTS OF FLIGHT 1016; 2) THE CHARLOTTE TOWER SUPERVISOR'S FAILURE TO PROPERLY ADVISE AND ENSURE THAT ALL CONTROLLERS WERE AWARE OF AND REPORTING THE REDUCTION IN VISIBILITY AND RUNWAY VISUAL RANGE VALUE INFORMATION, AND THE LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR ALERTS THAT HAD OCCURRED IN MULTIPLE QUADRANTS; 3) THE INADEQUATE REMEDIAL ACTIONS BY USAIR TO ENSURE ADHERENCE TO STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES; AND 4) THE INADEQUATE SOFTWARE LOGIC IN THE AIRPLANE'S WINDSHEAR WARNING SYSTEM THAT DID NOT PROVIDE AN ALERT UPON ENTRY INTO THE WINDSHEAR. (NTSB REPORT AAR-95/03)
