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flyingskier said:
Lying is a pattern with Usapians, even under oath. Which probably has no meaning to a Usapian anyway.
2015 Pilot Discussion.
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Lying is a pattern with Usapians, even under oath. Which probably has no meaning to a Usapian anyway.
luvthe9 said:
And capt Ken made the call to capt x, then capt x called capt y, who called capt z who denied all allegations and accused capt eastscab of retaliation behavior, so capt z called HR to launch a formal inquiry into capt eastscabs employment history, because capt z could not have perpetrated the allegation!
Have a nice day junior!
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nic4us said:
Ken will get to the bottom of allegations and skeeters should take note.
Splat!
traderjake
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luvthe9 said:
cactusboy53
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Try this on for size: While I was not a party at Wye river, I do know several that were. You are a liar. Its so simple, you should get it.luvthe9 said:
snapthis
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For your reading pleasure Claxon.
The answer is NO to negotiations to release LMRDA defendants from liability.
GARY HUMMEL, STEPHEN
BRADFORD, ROB STREBLE,
STEVE SMYSER, ROBERT
FREAR, COURTNEY BORMAN,
and JANE DOE BORMAN,
RONALD NELSON, PAUL DIORIO
PAUL MUSIC, JOHN TAYLOR,
JOE STEIN, PETE DUGSTAD,
JAY MILKEY, and STEPHEN NATHAN,
Defendants
Case 3:14-cv-00577-RJC-DCK Document 67 Filed 07/30/15
Argument
In what can only be characterized as a desperate attempt to escape liability for their
expenditure of union funds in violation of Title V of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 501, the LMRDA
Defendants have filed a Supplemental Response in Further Support of USAPA Defendants
Motion to Vacate the Order of March 5, 2015, or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss the Bollmeier
Verified Complaint and in Further Opposition to the Bollmeier Plaintiffs Motion For a Temporary
Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (Supp. Resp.). The thrust of their submission is that
when, on June 29, 2015, the USAPA Merger Committee permanently withdrew from the seniority
integration proceedings, USAPA was no longer a labor organization, the LMRDA Defendants
were no longer officers of a labor organization and Plaintiffs were no longer members of a labor
organization. That circumstance, they argue, means that Plaintiffs cannot prevail in their LMRDA
law suit because the LMRDA only protects union members from the malfeasance union officers.
As USAPA is no longer a union, Plaintiffs are not union members and Defendants are not union
officers, Defendants assert there can be no claim against them for the improper use of USAPAs
funds.
Defendants assertion is as breathtaking in its implications as it is wrong on the law. The
entire purpose of Title V is to prevent union officers from looting a unions treasury, consisting of
dues involuntarily paid by members, in contravention of the unions governing documents and for
the officers own purposes. See Hood v. Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers, Cosmetologists and
Proprietors Intl Union of America, 454 F.2d 1347, 1354 (7th Cir. 1972) (the mischief that Section
501 guards against is the misuse of union funds and property by union officials in its every
manifestation); Brink v. DaLesio, 453 F. Supp. 272, 277 (D. Md. 1978) (A primary purpose of
the Congress in enacting Section 501 was to prevent the looting of union treasuries by powerful
and despotic union leaders.). The natural result of Defendants argumentwere it a correct
statement of the lawwould be that a union officer could steal from his union, be sued by a
member and then resign his office and escape liability, thereby depriving the unions members of
money to which they are entitled. Or he and his fellow officers could dissolve the union after
being sued and escape liability. Given Title Vs purpose, no rational interpretation of the statute
could lead to that result.
Not surprisingly, then, the decided cases do not support Defendants contention. See Intl
Assn of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Schimmel, 128 F.3d 689, 69193 (8th Cir.
1997) (affirming Title V liability for defendant union officials even though the union was
decertified and no longer had representative authority over any bargaining unit employees at the
time the Title V suit was commenced); Intl Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine, &
Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416, 1417 (11th Cir. 1996) (permitting a Title
V suit by a union against its former officials); Council 49, AFSCME Union AFL-CIO v. Reach,
843 F.2d 1343, 134546 (11th Cir. 1988) (affirming Title V liability of former union officials who
breached their fiduciary duties while holding union office, resulting in the union being placed into
administratorship); Erkins v. Bryan, 663 F.2d 1048, 104852 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that
members of a decertified union had Title V standing to sue the unions former officials).
In this regard, the LMRDA is no different than countless other statutes that create a cause
of action on behalf of a plaintiff against a defendant that survives either or both parties subsequent
change in status. For instance, an ERISA plan fiduciary may be held liable for her breach of
fiduciary duty while serving in that capacity even if the lawsuit is commenced after she no longer
owes a fiduciary duty to the plan. See United Teamster Fund v. MagnaCare Admin. Servs., LLC,
39 F. Supp. 3d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (under 29 U.S.C. § 1109, the applicable analysis for
fiduciary liability is whether the person was acting as a fiduciary at the time of the breach, not at
the time of the lawsuit). Likewise, a police officer may be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 even if he has retired from the police force subsequent to the alleged misconduct. See Andrew
v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2009) (former police commissioner could be held liable under §
1983 for action taken while he held the status of commissioner and was thus acting under color of
state law); see also Summers v. Altarum Inst. Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2014) (permitting
a temporarily disabled plaintiff to bring a claim under the ADA even though plaintiffs disability
had ceased at the time the suit commenced); Tarlov v. Paine Webber Cashfund, Inc., 559 F. Supp.
429, 441 (D. Conn. 1983) (refusing to dismiss claim against former investment advisors for
liability under the Investment Company Act when the alleged misconduct occurred while the
defendants held the status of investment advisors and owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiff).
Not surprisingly, then, none of the cases relied on by Defendants support their position. In
each of them, the issue was whether the putative union was ever a labor organization within the
meaning of the LMRDA. In some it was, see Donovan v. Nat'l Transient Div., Intl Bhd. of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, 542 F. Supp. 957 (D. Kan.
1982) affd in part, revd in part, 736 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1984); Brennan v. United Mine Workers
of Am., 475 F.2d 1293, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cross v. United Mine Workers of Am., 353 F. Supp.
504 (S.D. Ill. 1973); Monborne v. United Mine Workers of Am., 342 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. Pa. 1972);
and in others it was not, see Kanawha Valley Labor Council, AFL-CIO v. Am. Fedn of Labor &
Cong. of Indus. Organizations, 667 F.2d 436, 439 (4th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Intl Typographical
Union, AFL-CIO, 423 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1970). But that is not an issue here, as all parties agree
that USAPA was, for at least some lengthy period of time, a labor organization as defined by
the Act.2
In addition to ringing hollow as a matter of law, the LMRDA Defendants assertion that
USAPA was no longer a labor organization after its decertification in September 2014 is likewise
undermined by its own actions since then. In addition to those actions already outlined by the
Plaintiff in their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, see Doc. 48
at pp. 910, USAPAs continued status as a labor organization is further evinced in its June 29,
2015, Department of Labor Form LM-2, which covers USAPAs activities between April 1, 2014,
and March 31, 2015, and is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. By its plain terms, a Form LM-2 is the
annual report of a labor organization. Indeed, in signing USAPAs June 29, 2015, Form LM-2,
Defendant Stephen Bradford attested that he is a duly authorized officer[] of the above labor
organization, namely USAPA. Ex. 1 at 1. Notably, despite having the option to do so, USAPA
did not designate the June 29 Form LM-2 as a terminal report for the labor organization, id.,
and to date has not filed one.
Footnote: (Claxon likes footnotes)
2 As Plaintiffs demonstrated in their Combined Memorandum of Law (1) in Opposition to
Defendants Motion to Vacate the Courts Order Dated March 5, 2015, or in the Alternative, to
Dismiss the Verified Complaint, and (2) in Reply to Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 36) at pp. 13-15, USAPAs
status as a labor organization did not end with its decertification in September 2014, as it continued
to act at least as an employee representation committee for the purposes of dealing with American
Airlines over seniority list integration. See also 29 USC § 402 (i) (the LMRDAs definition of the
term labor organization). The LMRDA Defendants do not seriously contest that proposition but
argue only that since USAPAs withdrawal from the seniority integration process on June 29,
2015, USAPA is no longer a labor organization. But as we show in text, since USAPA was a labor
organization at all times that Defendants authorized the expenditure of funds challenged in this
case, what USAPAs status is after June 29 is of no moment
The answer is NO to negotiations to release LMRDA defendants from liability.
GARY HUMMEL, STEPHEN
BRADFORD, ROB STREBLE,
STEVE SMYSER, ROBERT
FREAR, COURTNEY BORMAN,
and JANE DOE BORMAN,
RONALD NELSON, PAUL DIORIO
PAUL MUSIC, JOHN TAYLOR,
JOE STEIN, PETE DUGSTAD,
JAY MILKEY, and STEPHEN NATHAN,
Defendants
Case 3:14-cv-00577-RJC-DCK Document 67 Filed 07/30/15
Argument
In what can only be characterized as a desperate attempt to escape liability for their
expenditure of union funds in violation of Title V of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 501, the LMRDA
Defendants have filed a Supplemental Response in Further Support of USAPA Defendants
Motion to Vacate the Order of March 5, 2015, or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss the Bollmeier
Verified Complaint and in Further Opposition to the Bollmeier Plaintiffs Motion For a Temporary
Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (Supp. Resp.). The thrust of their submission is that
when, on June 29, 2015, the USAPA Merger Committee permanently withdrew from the seniority
integration proceedings, USAPA was no longer a labor organization, the LMRDA Defendants
were no longer officers of a labor organization and Plaintiffs were no longer members of a labor
organization. That circumstance, they argue, means that Plaintiffs cannot prevail in their LMRDA
law suit because the LMRDA only protects union members from the malfeasance union officers.
As USAPA is no longer a union, Plaintiffs are not union members and Defendants are not union
officers, Defendants assert there can be no claim against them for the improper use of USAPAs
funds.
Defendants assertion is as breathtaking in its implications as it is wrong on the law. The
entire purpose of Title V is to prevent union officers from looting a unions treasury, consisting of
dues involuntarily paid by members, in contravention of the unions governing documents and for
the officers own purposes. See Hood v. Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers, Cosmetologists and
Proprietors Intl Union of America, 454 F.2d 1347, 1354 (7th Cir. 1972) (the mischief that Section
501 guards against is the misuse of union funds and property by union officials in its every
manifestation); Brink v. DaLesio, 453 F. Supp. 272, 277 (D. Md. 1978) (A primary purpose of
the Congress in enacting Section 501 was to prevent the looting of union treasuries by powerful
and despotic union leaders.). The natural result of Defendants argumentwere it a correct
statement of the lawwould be that a union officer could steal from his union, be sued by a
member and then resign his office and escape liability, thereby depriving the unions members of
money to which they are entitled. Or he and his fellow officers could dissolve the union after
being sued and escape liability. Given Title Vs purpose, no rational interpretation of the statute
could lead to that result.
Not surprisingly, then, the decided cases do not support Defendants contention. See Intl
Assn of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Schimmel, 128 F.3d 689, 69193 (8th Cir.
1997) (affirming Title V liability for defendant union officials even though the union was
decertified and no longer had representative authority over any bargaining unit employees at the
time the Title V suit was commenced); Intl Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine, &
Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416, 1417 (11th Cir. 1996) (permitting a Title
V suit by a union against its former officials); Council 49, AFSCME Union AFL-CIO v. Reach,
843 F.2d 1343, 134546 (11th Cir. 1988) (affirming Title V liability of former union officials who
breached their fiduciary duties while holding union office, resulting in the union being placed into
administratorship); Erkins v. Bryan, 663 F.2d 1048, 104852 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that
members of a decertified union had Title V standing to sue the unions former officials).
In this regard, the LMRDA is no different than countless other statutes that create a cause
of action on behalf of a plaintiff against a defendant that survives either or both parties subsequent
change in status. For instance, an ERISA plan fiduciary may be held liable for her breach of
fiduciary duty while serving in that capacity even if the lawsuit is commenced after she no longer
owes a fiduciary duty to the plan. See United Teamster Fund v. MagnaCare Admin. Servs., LLC,
39 F. Supp. 3d 461, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (under 29 U.S.C. § 1109, the applicable analysis for
fiduciary liability is whether the person was acting as a fiduciary at the time of the breach, not at
the time of the lawsuit). Likewise, a police officer may be subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 even if he has retired from the police force subsequent to the alleged misconduct. See Andrew
v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2009) (former police commissioner could be held liable under §
1983 for action taken while he held the status of commissioner and was thus acting under color of
state law); see also Summers v. Altarum Inst. Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 2014) (permitting
a temporarily disabled plaintiff to bring a claim under the ADA even though plaintiffs disability
had ceased at the time the suit commenced); Tarlov v. Paine Webber Cashfund, Inc., 559 F. Supp.
429, 441 (D. Conn. 1983) (refusing to dismiss claim against former investment advisors for
liability under the Investment Company Act when the alleged misconduct occurred while the
defendants held the status of investment advisors and owed a fiduciary duty to plaintiff).
Not surprisingly, then, none of the cases relied on by Defendants support their position. In
each of them, the issue was whether the putative union was ever a labor organization within the
meaning of the LMRDA. In some it was, see Donovan v. Nat'l Transient Div., Intl Bhd. of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, 542 F. Supp. 957 (D. Kan.
1982) affd in part, revd in part, 736 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1984); Brennan v. United Mine Workers
of Am., 475 F.2d 1293, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cross v. United Mine Workers of Am., 353 F. Supp.
504 (S.D. Ill. 1973); Monborne v. United Mine Workers of Am., 342 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. Pa. 1972);
and in others it was not, see Kanawha Valley Labor Council, AFL-CIO v. Am. Fedn of Labor &
Cong. of Indus. Organizations, 667 F.2d 436, 439 (4th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Intl Typographical
Union, AFL-CIO, 423 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1970). But that is not an issue here, as all parties agree
that USAPA was, for at least some lengthy period of time, a labor organization as defined by
the Act.2
In addition to ringing hollow as a matter of law, the LMRDA Defendants assertion that
USAPA was no longer a labor organization after its decertification in September 2014 is likewise
undermined by its own actions since then. In addition to those actions already outlined by the
Plaintiff in their Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction, see Doc. 48
at pp. 910, USAPAs continued status as a labor organization is further evinced in its June 29,
2015, Department of Labor Form LM-2, which covers USAPAs activities between April 1, 2014,
and March 31, 2015, and is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. By its plain terms, a Form LM-2 is the
annual report of a labor organization. Indeed, in signing USAPAs June 29, 2015, Form LM-2,
Defendant Stephen Bradford attested that he is a duly authorized officer[] of the above labor
organization, namely USAPA. Ex. 1 at 1. Notably, despite having the option to do so, USAPA
did not designate the June 29 Form LM-2 as a terminal report for the labor organization, id.,
and to date has not filed one.
Footnote: (Claxon likes footnotes)
2 As Plaintiffs demonstrated in their Combined Memorandum of Law (1) in Opposition to
Defendants Motion to Vacate the Courts Order Dated March 5, 2015, or in the Alternative, to
Dismiss the Verified Complaint, and (2) in Reply to Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 36) at pp. 13-15, USAPAs
status as a labor organization did not end with its decertification in September 2014, as it continued
to act at least as an employee representation committee for the purposes of dealing with American
Airlines over seniority list integration. See also 29 USC § 402 (i) (the LMRDAs definition of the
term labor organization). The LMRDA Defendants do not seriously contest that proposition but
argue only that since USAPAs withdrawal from the seniority integration process on June 29,
2015, USAPA is no longer a labor organization. But as we show in text, since USAPA was a labor
organization at all times that Defendants authorized the expenditure of funds challenged in this
case, what USAPAs status is after June 29 is of no moment
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Who gives a crap.Claxon said:
It warms my heart that you think that the C&R's mean squat in the SLI.
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