According to AWA management, the infusion of capital from third parties that AWA needed to survive and that helped make the merger possible was simply not available to AWA as a standalone carrier.
Subject: According to AWA management, the infusion of capital from third parties that AWA needed to survive and that helped make the merger possible was simply not available to AWA as a standalone carrier..
U.S. Air’s operating revenues were almost three times those of AWA ($7.1 billion - $2.25 billion), it served almost twice as many destinations (179-96) and carried approximately twice the number of passengers (41.3 million-21 million). Id. As of the end of the second quarter of 2005, approximately one month after the merger agreement was executed, U.S. Air had almost four times the amount of cash on hand as did AWA ($557 million - $116 million), had an $11 million advantage in net operating income for the quarter ($41 million - $30 million), had over twice the number of available seat miles ("ASMs") (16.4 billion - 7.7 billion) and enjoyed significant advantages over AWA in Revenue/ASM (10.72¢ - 9.07¢) and Yield/Revenue Passenger Mile (14.11¢ - 10.25¢).
Although AWA did not seek bankruptcy protection in the same time period, it was in tenuous financial condition. AWA had suffered net operating losses during four of the five years preceding the merger. Tr. at 262-64; Local 542 Ex. G (America West Holdings Corp. 2004 Annual Report) at 20. During the calendar quarter culminating with the merger, those net operating losses climbed to $125,000,000.
II. THE RELATIVE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS OF THE TWO CARRIERS PRIOR TO MERGER
While U.S. Air was certainly experiencing financial problems in 2004 and filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on September 12, 2004, Joint Ex. 7 at No. 1, during its period in bankruptcy U.S. Air took significant steps to improve its financial condition. For instance, it won from its unionized employees a series of concessions designed to achieve cost savings amounting to $1 billion per year. Tr. at 79. The Dispatchers as a group gave up 23% in payroll concessions alone. Tr. at 80. In addition, the Company terminated several of its retirement plans, delivering additional savings. Tr. at 79-80; Local 545 Ex. 1 at 10/43. All told, by the end of the fiscal quarter ending June 30, 2005, the Company had managed to decrease its labor costs by approximately 35.9%. Tr. at 80-81; Local 545 Ex. 1 at 24/43. As a result of these and other cost saving measures, U.S. Air achieved positive net operating income of $41,000,000 during the second quarter of 2005, Local 545 Ex. 1 at 5/43, and raised that figure to a positive $280,000,000 for the portion of the third quarter ending at the
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5 Although Local 542 counsel objected to the introduction of these official company pronouncements on hearsay grounds, Arbitrator Harris overruled that objection. Tr. at 64-67. That decision was indisputably correct because the pronouncements are contained in business records, a specific exception to the hearsay rule. See, F.R. Evid. 803(6).
September 27, 2005, approval of the merger agreement. Tr. at 260-62; Local 542 Ex. E (Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm) at 208.
Although AWA did not seek bankruptcy protection in the same time period, it was in tenuous financial condition. AWA had suffered net operating losses during four of the five years preceding the merger. Tr. at 262-64; Local 542 Ex. G (America West Holdings Corp. 2004 Annual Report) at 20. During the calendar quarter culminating with the merger, those net operating losses climbed to $125,000,000. Local 542 Ex. E (U.S. Airways Group, Inc. 2005 Annual Report) at 54.
AWA repeatedly made clear in official pronouncements to its employees, shareholders and the Securities and Exchange Commission that, without a major transaction such as the U.S. Air merger, it, too, was heading to bankruptcy. Tr. 82-85, 88-89; Local 545 Ex. 5 (Nov. 25, 2005, "About US," A U.S. Airways Employee Publication) at 5 ("Assuming fuel costs continued to rise, capacity didn’t come out of the system and thus unit revenues remained depressed, and assuming we couldn’t go out and restructure or raise cash, it is possible that AWA would have been facing its own Chapter 11 at some point"); Local 545 Ex. 6 (U.S. Airways, thehub.usairways.com, "About the Company") at 3 ("2004: America West Airlines mulls restructuring, either through merger/consolidation opportunities or a possible Chapter 11 filing"); see also, Tr. 64-65, 67-69; Local 545 Ex. 3 (June 10, 2005, "Plane Deal," An America West Employee Publication) at 3.5 As AWA’s CEO Douglas Parker declared to AWA shareholders, AWA had lost the cost structure advantage it once had had over its legacy competitors,
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6 Local 542’s effort to paint a much darker picture of U.S. Air’s financial condition at the time of the merger and a brighter picture of AWA’s ignores entirely these statements by AWA’s own CEO and management and, in a number of respects, is directly contradicted by them. See Tr. at 218-19; Local 542 Ex. K (Financial Condition Comparison, AWA and U.S. Air, on basis of SEC 10Q filing as of June 30, 2005). Moreover, the "analysis" of financial data presented by Local 542 in its Ex. K was based solely on the non-expert opinion of Local 542’s President; consequently, Arbitrator Harris ordered the opinion portion of Local 542’s Exhibit K stricken from the record. Tr. at 219-22.
particularly U.S. Air, which had used its period in bankruptcy to "achieve a competitive cost structure," an achievement made possible by "significantly reduced labor cost savings, decreased overhead, increased aircraft efficiency and a rationalized fleet." Tr. 90-92; Local 545 Ex. 7 (2005 Chairman’s Message to Shareholders). Mr. Parker also drew attention to the fact that AWA employees had always lacked a sense of "long-term job security," even during periods when AWA had been "doing better relative to our competitors" -- a condition which, according to Mr. Parker, "simply means we are losing less money than other airlines." Tr. 95-96; Local 545 Ex. 8 ("Merger News," Doug Parker Merger letters, May 19, 2005, thehub.usairways.com). According to AWA management, the infusion of capital from third parties that AWA needed to survive and that helped make the merger possible was simply not available to AWA as a standalone carrier. Tr. 69-70; Local 545 Ex. 3 at 3.6
III. WHAT THE TWO CARRIERS BROUGHT TO THE MERGER
According to the merged carrier’s own website, U.S. Air brought to the merger approximately twice the number of jet aircraft (280 - 139) as AWA and had more firm orders for additional aircraft than AWA (29 - 26). Tr. 101-03; Joint Ex. 1 (Merger News, "HP-US Comparison," thehub.usairways.com). U.S. Air’s operating revenues were almost three times those of AWA ($7.1 billion - $2.25 billion), it served almost twice as many destinations (179-96) and carried approximately twice the number of passengers (41.3 million-21 million). Id. As of the end of the second quarter of 2005, approximately
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one month after the merger agreement was executed, U.S. Air had almost four times the amount of cash on hand as did AWA ($557 million - $116 million), had an $11 million advantage in net operating income for the quarter ($41 million - $30 million), had over twice the number of available seat miles ("ASMs") (16.4 billion - 7.7 billion) and enjoyed significant advantages over AWA in Revenue/ASM (10.72¢ - 9.07¢) and Yield/Revenue Passenger Mile (14.11¢ - 10.25¢). Tr. 97-101; Local 545 Ex. 9 (Financial Condition Comparison, AWA and U.S. Air, June 30, 2005); see also Local 545 Exs. 1 and 10 (AWA’s SEC Form 10Q Report for Quarter Ending June 30, 2005).
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